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FOREWORD
The gap between those who conduct mediation and those
who study mediation is inexplicably enormous. Complaints about the
gap come not only from academics who would like to see some
attention paid to their analysis by practitioners but from as deep into
the practitioners’ world as the United Nations Secretariat, who would
like to be useful in training newly selected envoys. The complaints
from the practitioners’ side frequently cite (when at all) the
academic’s language, which they find too difficult. Indeed, the
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) of the U.N. Secretariat has
recently established an International Academic Advisory Council to
promote more systematic exchanges linking theory and academic
analysis with practice and to support the generation and
dissemination of knowledge for mediation practitioners. This is
precisely what this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law & International
Affairs intends to do, and it carries it off with skill and
knowledge. Without talking down, the articles lay out established
understandings drawn from mediation practice when it is well done
and then carry forth the implications of established knowledge into
new questions. The ball now is in the practitioners’ court, to use and
test the transmitted knowledge, provide the world with better results
from mediation, and provide the analysts with new data to turn into
knowledge.
I. William Zartman
Jacob Blaustein Professor Emeritus of International
Organization and Conflict Resolution
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University
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TRANSLATING SCHOLARSHIP INTO
POLICY
Scott Sigmund Gartner & Amy C. Gaudion*
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, there were thirty-seven ongoing intrastate and
interstate armed conflicts that together resulted in thousands of civil
and military deaths. During that same year, only one peace agreement
was signed.1 Clearly there is tremendous room for improvement in
peacemaking. Mediation represents one of the most commonly used
mechanisms for preventing and resolving violent, international
conflict. In mediation, disputants more or less willingly work with a
third party to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Mediation is
voluntary and contractual, as compared to arbitration which is
binding and judgmental. Mediation involves: two (or more)
disputants, one (or more) mediators, and one (or more) disputes.
Mediators can structure the disputants’ discussion (called
Communications Facilitation), resolution process (called a Procedural
Mediation Strategy), or agreement (called a Directive Mediation Strategy).

* Scott Sigmund Gartner, Professor of International Affairs, School of
International Affairs and Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University,
and Amy C. Gaudion, Associate Director of the School of International Affairs and
Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs of the Dickinson School of Law,
Pennsylvania State University.
1 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND CONFLICT
RESEARCH, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/.
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Most disputes require multiple management efforts and most
mediated disputes eventually end peacefully.2
Since the end of the Cold War, the incidence of international
dispute peacemaking—especially third-party mediation of civil
wars—has skyrocketed. Figure 1 shows the dramatic shift from
interstate to intrastate (civil) war mediation.3 At the same time, there
has been a surge in the study of international dispute mediation. Not
only has the quantity of research on international dispute mediation
increased, but the research has become increasingly rigorous and
scientific. Scholars now regularly employ large data sets, state-of-theart statistical methods, and sophisticated math modeling techniques
to examine questions such as: who mediates, which strategies are
most likely to lead to peace, and why do some agreements last longer
than others? These recent, innovative approaches have led to a
massive increase in scholars’ understanding of both interstate and
civil war peacemaking.
Filled with jargon and containing steep learning curves,
however, these new approaches have also significantly impeded the
ability of practitioners to draw lessons from current research. The
result is an ever widening gap between conflict resolution
policymakers and scholars—a tragedy given practitioners’ dire need
for new ideas to help resolve deadly conflicts and the growing
knowledge researchers have to share.

2 For an introduction to international dispute mediation, see J. MICHAEL
GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL. INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION (2012). For an
introduction to recent research on international dispute mediation, see JACOB
BERCOVITCH & SCOTT SIGMUND GARTNER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
MEDIATION: NEW APPROACHES AND FINDINGS (2009).
3 Scott Sigmund Garter, Civil War Peacemaking, in J. JOSEPH HEWITT,
JONATHAN WILKENFELD & TED ROBERT GURR, PEACE AND CONFLICT 2012, 71,
73 (2012).

2

2013

Gartner & Gaudion

2:1

Figure 1. Conflict Management Frequency by Dispute Type,
Before and After 1980

This lament is not new but scholars and policymakers have
recently become more vocal in noting the disconnect between
analysis and policy: “policy making and academic research should be
in constant, productive conversation, and scholars and researchers
should be an invaluable resource for policy makers, but they are
not.”4 Indeed, just this year, the United Nations Department of
Political Affairs established the Academic Advisory Council on
Mediation initiative—an entity charged with making research findings
known and accessible to practitioners.5
The goal of this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law &
International Affairs is to narrow the gap between peacemaking
scholars and practitioners. We have worked together to bridge these
communities to create a broad, informed and useful understanding of
4 Robert L. Gallucci, How Scholars Can Improve International Relations,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 26, 2012, http://chronicle.com/article/How
-Scholars-Can-Improve/135898/.
5 U.N. Secretary-General, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/66/811 (June 25, 2012), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/
files/resources/N1234641.pdf.
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dispute resolution. In the nine essays that follow, scholars translate
their analytical research into clear policy implications. The result is an
accessible and comprehensive source of lessons learned from current
peacemaking research. The essays are fully cited, so that readers may
continue learning about a research topic. In the conclusion, Dr.
Dennis Jett, a former Ambassador to Mozambique and Peru and a
current professor at Penn State’s School of International Affairs,
provides a framework for how to assess the applicability of policy
implications and highlights a number of the essays’ most critical
peacemaking recommendations.
We have undertaken extensive efforts to make these essays
relevant to the policy and legal communities, and also grounded in
current peacemaking scholarship. The research was presented at
numerous workshops held by the Folke Bernadotte Academy, all of
which included ambassadors and other peacemaking practitioners in
addition to well-known peacemaking scholars. The essays were
anonymously reviewed by a distinguished mediation scholar, well
known to both the academic and policy peacemaking communities.
In addition, the essays were vetted by School of International Affairs
legal and international affairs scholars. Finally, the essays went
through the Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs editorial
process. The result of this rigorous review is a unique and innovative
series of articles that are both analytical and practical; compact essays
that quickly and accessibly summarize a complex and extensive body
of research and identify its most salient peacemaking policy
implications.
PEACEMAKING TRANSLATIONS
The essays in this issue address critical aspects of
international conflict resolution and are framed to initiate a
conversation with the policymakers tasked with resolving the
complex real world problems arising out of these conflicts.
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In the opening essay,6 Birger Heldt, of Sweden’s Folke
Bernadotte Academy, examines the impact that coordination has on
peacemaking efforts. He offers recommendations on how to utilize
regional organizations, a pre-determined division of labor, and
longer-term peacemaking strategy to achieve more sustainable peace,
and concludes that closer attention to coordination issues may have
the synergistic—and positive—effect of building a culture of
prevention and peacemaking.
The essay by Isak Svensson,7 of the Department of Peace and
Conflict Research at Uppsala University, also challenges conventional
practices in peacemaking. He contests the proposition that neutral or
unbiased mediators are the most effective. Recognizing the
complexities inherent in the process, he proposes that mediator bias
be viewed as an open explanatory empirical factor rather than a
barrier to conflict management. He identifies instances and
circumstances when biased mediators actually may outperform their
neutral counterparts—and thus, should be the preferred mediator
type. Similarly, the essay by Scott Sigmund Gartner,8 of Penn State’s
School of International Affairs, challenges the common view that
mediation is the least effective form of dispute resolution. He shows
that a process known as “selection effects” distorts the inferences we
draw from observations of peacemaking, leading us to infer
erroneously that mediation is ineffective when in reality it is actually
highly effective in facilitating peaceful outcomes. David E.
Cunningham,9 of the University of Maryland, continues this thread by
upending the view that “veto players” —those groups or entities that
have the ability to block settlement and prolong a conflict—should
be excluded from settlement talks. Rather, he offers policymakers a
prescription for including such players in the settlement process to
achieve a more lasting peace. In addition, Cunningham argues that

6 Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking, 2 PENN.
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 9 (2013).
7 Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 PENN.
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 17 (2013).
8 Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail
but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 27 (2013).
9 David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace
Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).
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settlement talks are most likely to succeed if they exclude other, nonveto players, from negotiations aimed at ending the war.
Each essay offers substantive guidance to peacemakers in the
field; several, however are noteworthy in their ability to specifically
address ongoing disputes. One of the most daunting and seemingly
intractable situations confronting policymakers today is the conflict in
Syria. In a provocative essay, J. Michael Greig10 of the University of
North Texas, explains why mediation efforts have failed there, and
offers an unconventional prescription for addressing future conflicts
with similar characteristics. The disheartening lack of progress
observed in Syria can also be seen in the ongoing conflicts in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali, which remain in a
static yet deadly limbo. The essay by Kyle Beardsley11 of Emory
University, offers timely and valuable insights to the policymakers
tasked with resolving these conflicts. He explores the importance of
allowing third-party mediators the flexibility to select mediation tools
and styles suitable to the character and context of the conflict. He
offers recommendations on how much leverage is needed to stop
ongoing brutal violence in the short term and the effectiveness of
“lighter tactics” in helping disputants overcome the final barriers to
settlement—observations that may be of particular relevance to
policymakers on the ground in Syria, Mali and the DRC.
Similarly, two other essays offer insights on the form and
process for achieving successful mediation results. Stephen Gent,12 of
the University of North Carolina, explores why states are reluctant to
use legal mechanisms, most notably arbitration and adjudication, to
resolve disputes despite the fact that these mechanism have proven
to be highly effective. He examines political and other dynamics that
create such hesitancy, and then offers guidance to policymakers on
helping states overcome their aversion to legal dispute forums. The

10 J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on
the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).
11 Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 57 (2013).
12 Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2
PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 66 (2013).
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essay by Molly Melin,13 of Loyola University of Chicago, explores the
unique role that state mediators can play and the distinct benefits
offered by state-led mediation. Her essay highlights factors
policymakers should consider when assessing whether to use state-led
mediation. Drawing on existing research, she identifies the conflict
characteristics and other circumstances under which state-led
mediation efforts will be the most effective and sustainable.
Finally, an essay by Victor Asal of the University of Albany
and Jonathan Wilkenfeld14 of the University of Maryland aims its
criticism at scholars and policymakers alike for failing to recognize
the tremendous harm caused by generalizing ethnic behavior—i.e.,
attributing negative characteristics (for example violence or terrorism
tactics) to an entire ethnic group when the characteristics are more
appropriately attributed to a smaller political entity within that ethnic
group and maybe even lack accuracy when describing that smaller
entity. Their analysis and conclusions will have particular relevance as
states seek to define the threat posed by today’s ethno-political
groups, most notably Hamas and Al Qaeda—two groups that seem
to be moving away from violence as a defining characteristic and
toward more political and social outreach identities.
A PEACEMAKING TOOL KIT
These essays identify an extensive number of critical policy
implications and in some cases, concrete recommendations—
creating, in essence, a peacemaking tool kit. How does one evaluate
them all? Where should one start? In his concluding essay,
Ambassador Jett puts forward guidelines for evaluating policy
implications like those presented. He argues that “mediators are often
crucial to reaching a peaceful resolution to a conflict” but that
mediation is not a “silver bullet.”15 For mediation to be successful,
13

Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78

(2013).
Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational
Perspective, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 91 (2013).
15 Dennis C. Jett, Mediation—Its Potential and Its Limits: Developing an
Effective Discourse on the Research and Practice of Peacemaking, 2 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L
AFF. 103 (2013).
14
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policymakers need to be as informed as possible on what works
when. Using this approach, Jett highlights the policy implications
especially relevant to peacemakers: (1) mediator bias tends to lead to
different outcomes; (2) mediators get the toughest cases and the most
intractable disputes; (3) more may not be better when it comes to
dispute resolution; (4) assumptions about the nature of ethnic
conflict can result in bad peacemaking choices; and (5) in some types
of disputes, arbitration might be more effective than mediation (and
vice versa). Because these conclusions are drawn from studies of the
patterns of past peacemaking events (or incidents) and are informed
by an understanding of conflict management dynamics and history,
their applicability to the dispute scenarios facing today’s conflict
managers (or policymakers) is compelling.
CONCLUSION
Research tends to swing like a pendulum between analytic
and rigorous methods and accessible and relevant approaches. We
reject this tradeoff. We believe that research can be simultaneously
rigorous and relevant, and analytic and accessible. Given the
devastating loss of life associated with armed conflict, the need for
translating research results into policy prescriptions is especially
strong in peacemaking. This issue has tackled the translation of nine
critical research agendas on dispute resolution into a series of policy
recommendations that peacemakers can employ. As William Zartman
ambitiously writes in his foreword to this issue: “[t]he ball now is in
the practitioners’ court, to use and test the transmitted knowledge,
provide the world with better results from mediation, and provide the
analysts with new data to turn into knowledge.”16

16

I. William Zartman, Foreword, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. i (2013).
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THE LACK OF COORDINATION IN
DIPLOMATIC PEACEMAKING
Birger Heldt*
As often observed in recent studies on peacemaking, there
has been a shift from a few high-profile mediators to the present
situation, characterized by states, ad-hoc groups of states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (Track I diplomacy) as well as
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local organizations and
prominent figures (Track II diplomacy). The origin of this shift may
be traced back to the early 1990s when the United Nations initiated
efforts to increase and coordinate the contributions of regional
arrangements for addressing threats to international peace and
security.1 One alleged impetus for the change was the United
* Birger Heldt, Director of Research, Folke Bernadotte Academy,
Sweden.
1 See Jochen Prantl, Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council, 59
INT’L ORG. 559, 561, 584 (2005); Birger Heldt, Trends from 1948-2005: How to View
the Relation between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities, in PEACE OPERATIONS:
TRENDS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS 9 (Donald C.F. Daniel et al. eds., 2008);
Hikaru Yamashita, Peacekeeping Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional
Organisations, 38 REV. INT’L STUD. 165, 167, 171 (2010); accord U.N. SecretaryGeneral, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Rep. of
the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) http://www.undocuments.net/a47-277.htm (highlighting prevention); U.N. Secretary-General,
Secretary-General Says Global Effort Against Armed Conflict Needs Change from “Culture of
Reaction to Culture of Prevention”, U.N. PRESS RELEASE SC/6759 (Nov. 29, 1999)
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991129.sc6759.doc.html;
U.N.
Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC.
A/55/985–S/2001/574 (June 7, 2001), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CPR%20S%202001
%20574.pdf, (devotes an entire report, for the first time, to the broad topic of
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Nation’s perceived inability to cope with the demand for
peacekeeping and peacemaking in the immediate aftermath of the
Cold War.2 The increase in peacemaking actors may also be a
consequence of the expanded space for third-party initiatives as Cold
War rivalries ended. Regardless of the cause, this development
conforms with Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, which encourages
peace initiatives from regional actors as the first resort before cases
are referred to the U.N., which should be the last resort.3
The increased number of peacemaking actors coincides with
“a five-fold increase in the number of diplomatic interventions” in
conflicts (both protracted and emerging) in the 1990s, as compared
to the 1980s.4 Similarly, the number of U.N. peacemaking initiatives
increased by approximately forty percent during 2000-2003 as
compared with the 1990s, and fivefold between 1989 and 2002.5
Furthermore, peacemaking initiatives of so-called Groups of Friends
(small ad-hoc groupings of states and IGOs) increased seven-fold
between 1991 and 2006.6 Moreover, between 1993 and 2004, there
were 550 third-party peacemaking initiatives (mediation, third-partymoderated direct talks, and good offices) in emerging conflicts alone.7
conflict prevention); U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Enhancing
Mediation and its Support Activities, U.N. DOC. S/2009/189 (Apr. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/sgrep09.htm, (discussing mediation); U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results: Rep. of the Secretary-General,. U.N. DOC.
S/2011/552 (Aug. 26, 2011), http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/
files/SG Report_PreventiveDiplomacy_S2011552(english)_1.pdf, (summarizing
the narrower topic of preventive diplomacy); BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN,
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AT THE UN (2008) (providing a detailed account of
preventive diplomacy and peacemaking by the U.N.).
2 See Prantl, supra note 1, at 561.
3 U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 2 (“[M]ake every effort to achieve pacific
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional
agencies before referring them to the Security Council.”), http://www.un.org/
en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml.
4
HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT
2009/2010: THE CAUSES OF PEACE AND THE SHRINKING COSTS OF WAR 6, 63
(2011)
[hereafter
SECURITY]
http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-securityreports/20092010/overview.aspx.
5
Id. at 67.
6
Id.
7
FRIDA MÖLLER, CODEBOOK FOR THE DATASET MANAGING
INTRASTATE LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT (MILC) (2007) (for data and detailed dataset
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The increased amount of peacemaking, however, is accompanied by a
low success rate. On average, there were 31 peacemaking attempts
for every agreement in emerging civil conflicts from 1993 to 2004,
and only fifteen percent of these conflicts ended through an
agreement (as compared to the other outcomes of victory, low
activity or escalation to war).8
This article focuses on recent emerging9 conflicts, and
assesses whether peacemaking has been characterized by
coordination. The second section examines empirical patterns and
their consequences. The third section is an attempt to formulate
policy implications that touch upon the role of regional organisations,
a pre-determined division of labour, and the importance of having a
long-term peacemaking strategy. The focus of this analysis should not
diminish efforts to deal with another problem: the general inaction
on the part of the international community in responding to the large
majority of emerging conflicts may be a bigger problem than the
over-attention suffered by a few cases.
MUCH PEACEMAKING, BUT LITTLE COORDINATION
Peacemaking is prevalent, but is often not coordinated with
regard to choice of tools (mediation, etc.), the agenda or the issues of
the talks. This lack of coordination has for many years been
recognized as detrimental. It allows conflict parties to “shop around,”
wait for better deals, play the third parties against one another in
search of a better deal, or sabotage peacemaking attempts.10 This
on peacemaking); Birger Heldt, Sequencing of Peacemaking: A Pilot Study (July 17,
2012) (unpublished paper) (source of the number of peacemaking initiatives, which
builds on data found in Möller). “Good office” refers to instances where third
parties facilitate talks by offering conflict parties a venue to meet and communicate
directly, but do not actively engage in, or moderate, the talks.
8 Heldt, supra note 7.
9 As used here “emerging” is defined as a conflict that has resulted in at
least 25—but less than 1,000—deaths per year.
10See generally Birger Heldt, Preventive Diplomacy in Emerging Intrastate Conflicts:
Some Historical Patterns, in THIRD PARTIES AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 210
(Anders Mellbourn ed., 2008); Tobias Böhmelt, Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact
of Multiparty Mediation, 41 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 859 (2011); U.N. Secretary-General, Rep.
of the Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities, U.N. Doc.
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insight is corroborated by statistical findings that indicate a negative
relationship between the number of involved third parties and the
likelihood of reaching a negotiated agreement in terms of ceasefires,
partial or full peace agreements that halt the violence.11 A study of the
size of Group of Friends mechanisms—most of which were applied
on protracted instead of emerging conflicts—makes a similar
observation: the larger the size of a Group of Friends, the less
consistent the action.12 Coordination is thus very difficult, even when
coordination mechanisms are in place.
One example, among the worst cases in this regard, is the
conflict between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the insurgent Croat
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From October to December of
1993 a plethora of Track I and Track II actors attempted to resolve
the conflict. Mediation (M), third-party moderated direct talks (D)
and good offices (G) were initiated in the following sequence: D, D,
G, D, G, G, D, M, D, G, D, D, G, G, G, M, D, G, G, M, G, G,
M.”13 Equally disorderly was the sequence of issues discussed, in
terms of how the talks moved back and forth between basic
incompatibility (government power or independence/autonomy),
behavior (ceasefires, withdrawal of troops, etc.), and other issues
(refugees, talks about talks, etc.).14
It is in this particular case difficult to discern a strategy or
straight trajectory; rather it appears that everything is tried and retried
at some point. For instance, it may make sense to start off with
S/2009/189
(April
8,
2009),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
49e6f2880.html; Teresa Whitfield, Orchestrating International Action, 19 ACCORD 18
(2008), http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2019_4Orchestrating%20
international%20action_2008_ENG.pdf.
11 Böhmelt, supra note 10; Heldt, supra note 10; David Cunningham, Veto
Players and Civil War Duration, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 875, 877, 879 (2006).
12 TERESA WHITFIELD, FRIENDS INDEED? THE UNITED NATIONS,
GROUPS OF FRIENDS, AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 270, 280 (2007).
13 See Heldt, supra note 7, at 6.
14 According to a private conversation with a high-level diplomat who
was involved in Balkans peacemaking, this lack of coordination or even
competition was a huge problem for peacemaking in the Balkans. There is a large
debate as to the merits of sequencing peacemaking tools and negotiation issues:
how sequencing should be carried out, what tools to use, what issues to deal with
and in what order. See Heldt, supra note 7 (providing a brief literature overview).
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“other issues,” and over time move towards the more difficult or
core matters instead of moving back and forth again and again.15 This
disorder and plethora of peacemaking attempts makes it difficult to
understand how one peacemaking attempt can build on previous
attempts, or even how the conflict actors themselves can keep up
with the process. This is especially because peacemaking attempts
have different start dates, and sometimes overlap. It is not
implausible that this peacemaking pattern prolonged the conflict,
which in the end was solved on the battlefield instead of through
negotiations.
Other extreme cases for the period of 1993-2004 involving
many third-parties and different mediation tools include: Burundi
(late 1997-2003), Croatia (1995), Guinea Bissau (1998),
Israel/Palestine (2000-2002), and the Ivory Coast (2002-2003).16 It is
possible to find examples of peacemaking, where the application of
third-party tools and issues does not appear chaotic or inconsistent,
even though there are many peacemaking attempts; however, such
cases are rare.
An inherent feature of such uncoordinated peacemaking
processes is not simply a lack of institutional memory and
consistency, but also an absence of learning. Third-party initiated
peacemaking should, in theory, move the process forward by
softening the parties, increasing mutual trust and negotiating skills,
and providing information on fundamental issues that make parties
more likely to spot zones of agreements.17 Third parties also stand to
learn from the process. However, since third parties change and are
numerous in some cases, learning does not appear feasible: third
parties usually do not engage for an extended period of time, and
their lessons learned are not transferred to succeeding or competing
third parties through debriefings. This may partly explain the lack of

Id.
Heldt, supra note 7, at 7.
17 See generally Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There a
Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of
Mediation, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 329, 330 (2006); J. Michael Greig & Paul F.
Diehl, Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy, 32 INT’L
INTERACTIONS 355, 377-378 (2006); Heldt, supra note 7, at 8.
15
16
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peacemaking consistency and continuity in some cases, and the
general lack of progress. It also illustrates how potentially damaging
the lack of long-term engagement by lead peacemakers can be in
individual cases.
TOWARDS MORE COORDINATION,
AND MORE PEACEMAKING
Just as scholars and practitioners think in terms of the steps
to war, it may be useful to apply a similar concept and think in terms
of steps to peace. Steps to peace “implies that early efforts may, or
perhaps even should, fail to generate a breakthrough, but they will
[ideally] inch the process forward, in a productive way such that the
next mediation attempt can build upon” earlier efforts.18 It implies
also that quick breakthroughs—or rapid progress—will be the
exception rather than the rule, and thus will be time-consuming.
Meanwhile, during the period 1993-2004, about one third of the
emerging conflicts escalated to war, and all but five of the cases
escalating did so within two calendar years.19 The same data also
shows that if a conflict avoids escalation in the immediate term, it is
unlikely it will escalate in the future. This pattern may be due to the
most war-prone cases escalating right away, thereby leaving the less
war-prone cases behind; or that peacemaking efforts start to bite—or
are perhaps usually only initiated—after some period of time.
However, since low-level conflicts that escalate to war almost always
do so within a 24-month period, time is of the essence. There is no
time for many cumulative peacemaking attempts or steps to peace,
not least since peacemaking attempts require time-consuming
preparations. Coordination must ideally be at hand from the very
beginning.
Strategic coordination tools such as ad hoc Groups of
Friends, contact groups, friends of a country, and implementation
18 Heldt, supra note 7, at 2, 3, 9; Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War
Peacemaking, in PEACE AND CONFLICT 2012: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED
CONFLICTS, SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY 71, 83 (J.
Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2012).
19 For data see Lotta Harbom, States in Armed Conflict 2006, in UPPSALA
UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND RESEARCH REPORT 79 (2007).
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group approaches, have different strengths and weaknesses.20 They
emerged as novel strategic level peacemaking coordination
mechanisms in the early 1990s and are now widely used with the goal
of achieving strategic level coherence and coordination of
peacemaking in protracted armed conflicts. The focus in this article
is, however, on emerging cases, where coordination mechanisms such
as Groups of Friends are rarely used, probably because emerging
intrastate conflicts do not elicit much international interest. It may
therefore be necessary to consider other solutions which involve a
system or template for coordination that will not only work from the
very first day of an emerging conflict, but also makes peacemaking
more prevalent.
One policy implication is that policymakers need to have a
long-term strategy to address the coordination problem, part of
which is to limit the number of peacemakers in a given conflict. A
second policy implication is not to let initial failures (or nonsuccesses) discourage further peacemaking. Policymakers need to
have a long-term view of the process, and carry out the process in a
strategic manner. To paraphrase Sheri Rosenberg,21 peacemaking is a
process, not an event. Unsuccessful initial mediations build a
foundation for subsequent peacemaking attempts. Research suggests
that it is not sufficient to simply do the right thing; it has to be done
in a certain order, and repeatedly. One far-reaching vision involves
not only the creation of a predetermined division of labor, but
preferably also a predetermined third party that (with the support of
the international community) takes the overall responsibility for an
individual emerging conflict. The U.N. and some IGOs appear to be
the only viable and legitimate actors to assume such regional or subregional responsibilities. Admittedly, such ideal planning would in
practice be difficult to achieve in some regions and sub-regions of the
world (especially in Africa and Asia) because of (sub-) regional
rivalries and unresolved disputes, and because of vested interests in
20 See generally Prantl, supra note 1; TERESA WHITFIELD, EXTERNAL
ACTORS IN MEDIATION: DILEMMAS & OPTIONS FOR MEDIATORS 18 (2010);
WHITFIELD, supra note 12; Whitfield, supra note 10, at 20-21; TERESA WHITFIELD,
WORKING WITH GROUPS OF FRIENDS (2010).
21 Sheri R. Rosenberg, Genocide is a Process, Not an Event, 7 GENOCIDE
STUD. & PREVENTION 16 (2012).
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the conflicts among some countries. Moreover, this approach would
invalidate anything but so-called Track 1 diplomacy, which involves
official government figures, and thus involves a return to the pattern
of the centralised peacemaking that existed before the 1990s. At the
same time this approach would increase the number of overall
peacemaking attempts. In short, the approach involves fewer but
more coordinated actors, not less peacemaking. The present pattern
of peacemaking does not appear to be productive; a change is
necessary.
The international community, under the leadership of the
U.N., has achieved a high degree of coordination in the areas of
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so there may already be templates
for how to improve coordination in the area of peacemaking.
However, peacekeeping is easier to coordinate. Given the high costs
and manpower required, there are fewer potential peacekeeping
actors. There is moreover no competition or out-bidding among
these potential actors, and in those cases where several actors carry
out peacekeeping simultaneously (e.g., Kosovo), there is close
coordination and a clear division of labor. Peacemaking is the exact
opposite of this scenario and a need exists to develop new methods
to deal with this issue.
A further policy implication is that efforts to improve
coordination should not crowd out the fact that most emerging
conflicts are left totally or partially “orphaned,” in that there are no
or few outside peacemaking attempts.22 Only a handful of cases
suffer from over-attention. Efforts to improve coordination should
thus not lose sight of the need for more peacemaking, which in fact
may be a bigger problem than the lack of coordination in a few select
cases.
On a final policy note, regardless of which is the most
pressing issue, they all may be closely linked, in that closer attention
to coordination issues may serve to strengthen the culture of
prevention and peacemaking. A synergy effect may thus be at hand.
Fen O. Hampson, Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations and Beyond, in
FROM REACTION TO CONFLICT PREVENTION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UN
SYSTEM 139, 148-152 (Fen O. Hampson & David Malone eds., 1996).
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RESEARCH ON BIAS IN MEDIATION:
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Isak Svensson*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important and disputed questions within the
field of international mediation concerns the issue of bias. Can
mediators be partial, sympathetic and supportive of one but not both
of the main disputants, or should mediators always be neutral? Is it
possible to be strictly impartial? Although neutrality is only one
aspect of the mediators’ characteristics important to bringing about
peaceful settlement of violent disputes, the question of bias cuts to
the core of what mediation is and the ways in which mediators can
help the parties reach peace. It is therefore crucial for academics and
researchers, as well as policymakers and practitioners, to understand
the occurrence, function, and effect of mediators’ bias in
international conflict resolution processes.
Summarizing the growing field of mediation research, Tom
Woodhouse states:
[a]s the literature on mediation has grown, and as
knowledge has increased from an accumulating base
of case studies and reflections, one of the most
significant questions which has emerged is that related
* Isak Svensson, Faculty Member, Department of Peace and Conflict
Research, Uppsala University.
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to the relative merits . . . between two contrasting
types of mediation: firstly that of a biased
mediator . . . and secondly that of the unbiased
mediator.1
Yet, the issue of bias in international mediation is a complex
one: a simple yes-or-no-answer to the question of whether mediators
should be biased or neutral is not sufficient. It depends on a set of
circumstances, which are discussed in this article. The question of
mediation and bias is a core discussion within international mediation
research.2 This article does not aim to summarize this rich research
field, nor even explicitly situate my own work within this larger field.
Its more limited ambition is instead to draw out the policy
implications of my own empirically-based work on the role of bias in
the mediation of internal armed conflicts.3 My main contribution to
mediation research has been to explore the role of neutrality and bias
in international peace diplomacy in civil wars.
A first basic question to pose is whether mediators can be
biased. If they are biased, do they not cease to be mediators? It is a
common perception that mediation requires unbiased third parties.
Some scholarly definitions require impartiality of the mediators, and
hence, mediators are unbiased by definition. For instance, a classical
1 Tom Woodhouse, Adam Curle: Radical Peacemaker and Pioneer of Peace
Studies, 1 J. OF CONFLICTOLOGY 1, 5-6 (2010).
2 See generally I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN
END TO CIVIL WARS 2-29 (1995); I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International
Mediation, in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A
DIVIDED WORLD 437-454 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2007); Saadia Touval,
Biased Intermediaries: Theoretical and Historical Considerations, 1 JERUSALEM J. OF INT’L
REL. 51 (1975); Bernd Beber, International Mediation, Selection Effects, and the Question of
Bias, 29 CONFLICT MGMT. AND PEACE SCI. 397 (2012); Andrew Kydd, Which Side
Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation, 47 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 597 (2003); Burcu
Savun, Information, Bias, and Mediation Success, 52 INT’L STUD. Q. 25 (2008).
3 For work on bias in international conflicts, see generally Christopher
Gelpi, Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control, in IMPERFECT UNIONS: SECURITY
INSTITUTIONS OVER TIME AND SPACE 107 (Helga Haftendorn et al. eds., 1999);
Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict
Management Mechanisms, 28 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 124 (2011). See also
Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 PENN ST.
J.L.& INT’L AFF. 66 (2013).
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definition of mediation suggests that mediators have a relatively
“impartial stance with regard to the opposing sides in a crisis.”4 Thus,
by definition, impartiality is conceptually linked to mediation. Yet,
with a definitional approach such as this, it is not possible to examine
the extent to which bias helps or hinders peace processes. A more
fruitful approach is to leave the question of bias as an open empirical
question: to use mediator’s bias as an explanatory factor—that is, the
degree and type of bias—and examine empirically the relationship
between bias and how the process unfolds and the outcome is
impacted.
BIAS—AND ITS DIRECTION—MATTERS
My research has shown that biased mediators, in some
situations, outperform neutral mediators. Yet, in order to understand
the role of bias in mediation, we first need to understand the context
of contemporary armed conflicts. Most contemporary armed
conflicts are fought between governments and rebel-groups.5 In other
words, they are intrastate armed conflicts. Yet, until very recently,
statistical analysis on mediation focused almost exclusively on
interstate conflicts. Government and rebel-groups are different types
of actors, a fact that implies that mediation plays a different type of
role than in interstate conflicts, for the following basic reason: the
government is internationally recognized, stronger in terms of
capabilities and military might, and has many other obligations
beyond pursuing a conflict with rebel groups. By contrast, rebelgroups typically are unrecognized (and strive for recognition),
materially weaker, but exclusively focused on achieving their
aspirations in the conflict with the government-side.
This also means that a mediator’s bias plays a different role
depending on whether it is directed towards rebels or governments. I
have suggested that there is a rebel-sided commitment problem, meaning
that governments may fear giving recognition and power to rebels
due to a belief that they will misuse it and exploit their advantaged
ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN
INTERNATIONAL CRISES 52 (1967).
5 See generally PETER WALLENSTEEN, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (2011).
4
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positions. This commitment problem occurs primarily when parties
are about to conclude negotiated peace deals (as opposed to that
which occurs primarily in the implementation phase of agreements).6
A negotiated settlement implies asymmetric opportunities for
exploitation on the rebel-side, and rebel-groups therefore have
commitment problems. They can, however, mitigate these problems
by accepting a mediator that is biased for the other (government)
side. In support of this reasoning, I found empirically—exploring
data on mediation in internal armed conflicts during the time-period
1989-2003—that government-biased mediators are particularly
effective as peacemakers in bringing about negotiated settlements to
armed conflicts.7
Yet, not all peace settlements are the same and therefore
should not be treated alike. Instead, peace settlements should be
disaggregated into different peace institutional arrangements. When
policymakers engage in crafting peace agreements, they need to ask
themselves what type of peace they aspire to reach. Different types of
mediators are associated with different types of institutional
arrangements. I have found that rebel-biased mediators tend, in
comparison with neutral mediators, to create peace settlements that
include political-power sharing arrangements and third-party security
guarantees. In contrast, government-biased mediators are more likely
to create stipulations for government-sided amnesties, and territorial
power-sharing arrangements.
Furthermore, I argue that because biased mediators have
incentives to protect their protégés, they will ensure that there are
stronger mechanisms in the peace agreements. Exploring the content
of all peace agreements since 1989, it becomes evident that biased
mediators actually outperform neutral mediators in bringing about
important institutional peace arrangements, such as stipulations for
power-sharing, repatriation of civilians, and third-party security
guarantees.8 This insight is important because it shows that biased
6 See BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE SUCCESSFUL
SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS 67 (2002).
7 Isak Svensson, Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to
Peace, 44 J. OF PEACE RES. 177, 183-85 (2007).
8 Id. at 185, 187.
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mediators are not only more likely to be successful in bringing about
settlements, but also in some sense, produce “better” agreements.9
Finally, it is also important to understand what makes biased
third parties so effective. In previous work, I have identified four
mechanisms that help explain the effectiveness of biased mediators:
biased mediators can act (1) to protect their side, (2) reveal
information, (3) deliver their side, and (4) counterbalance concession
cheating.10
This article calls into question some of the underlying
assumptions in the contemporary international approach to conflict
resolution. When it comes to the quality of peace, there is a
difference between biased and neutral mediators. If we define quality
in terms of stipulations of institutional arrangements that previous
research has identified as important for deals to stick and peace to
become durable, then biased mediators tend to be more effective in
bringing high-quality agreements about.11
One important, but insufficiently scrutinized issue regards the
tension between justice-norms and peace-norms when it comes to
biased and neutral mediators. Government-biased mediators tend to
mediate agreements giving the government side freedom from
persecution. This is good in the sense that it decreases the cost of
peace for the belligerents—it is easier for decision-makers to agree to
settle the conflict if they think they will not be punished for their
wrongdoing during the war—and thereby make peace more likely to
stick. Yet, it can also have a negative effect in the sense that it creates
a culture of impunity by letting human-rights abusers go free. Biased
mediators—under some circumstances—can be effective peace
brokers, but their intervention may have negative implications for the
values and protection of human rights.

9 Isak Svensson, Who Brings Which Peace?: Neutral versus Biased Mediation and
Institutional Peace Arrangements in Civil Wars, 53 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 446, 449,
464-65 (2009).
10 Id. at 463.
11 Id. at 461-62.
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The policy implication of these global, comparative studies is
that the direction of bias matters. When selecting mediators to
negotiate a conflict assignment, policymakers must pay attention to
which side a potential mediator has supported. In general,
government-sided mediators outperform rebel-sided in terms of
bringing about negotiated settlement,12 but to some extent (for
instance, when it comes to political power-sharing and third-party
security guarantees), it is the rebel-biased mediators that outperform
government-biased ones.13
THE ROLE FOR NEUTRAL MEDIATORS
What then is the role for neutral mediators in peacemaking
processes? Here four clarifications need to be made. First, although
biased mediators, on an aggregate level, tend to be more effective
than neutral ones, this does not necessarily mean that neutral
mediators are unimportant. As with all social sciences, we are talking
about probabilistic tendencies rather than general empirical laws.
Neutral mediators are associated with negotiated settlements and can
therefore also be important. Although they may bring agreements of
less quality, they are nevertheless also engaged in bringing about
negotiated settlements. Nothing we have concluded so far should
lead us to disregard the role of neutral mediators.
Second, there are transformations that need to occur in a
peace process in addition to the peace agreements, and neutral
mediators may be better positioned to support the creation of such
transformations. It can be seen as a success to “just” get negotiations
started.14

Svensson, supra note 7 at 181-83.
Svensson, supra note 9 at 463-64; see also Molly M. Melin & Isak
Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars, 35
INT’L INTERACTIONS 249 passim (2009) (discussing how historical ties also help
explain the occurrence of mediation, which plays out differently in international
and intrastate settings).
14 ISAK SVENSSON & PETER WALLENSTEEN, THE GO BETWEEN: JAN
ELIASSON AND THE STYLES OF MEDIATION 56, 67-68 (2010).
12
13
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Third, coalitions of biased and neutral mediators can be an
effective design for peacemaking. The presence of third-party bias
among any of the mediators as the critical value for defining a
mediator as either biased or neutral implies that neutral mediators
sometimes work in conjecture with biased ones, and in such
collaborations might be particularly effective.
Fourth, an important role for neutral mediators can be to
bring on board potential mediators that will be biased due to their
historical ties to one side, during the mediation process. For example,
most informed observers would agree that peace between Israel and
Palestine cannot be reached unless the U.S. engages as a peace
broker. In fact, any progress that has been made in moving the
parties’ positions towards each other has been made under American
auspices. Sweden played an important role in the late 1980s in
bringing about U.S. engagement in the process, by mediating, not
between the primary parties, but between the secondary supporting
actors to the government-side (the U.S.) and the rebel-side (the
Palestine Liberation Organization). The Swedish approach—neutral
mediation between the main secondary supporting actors—
transformed the U.S. engagement from support to peace-maker and
thus structurally changed the relationships between the primary
conflicting parties. This is in contrast to the direct engagement
approach employed by the Norwegians in the same dispute—the
Oslo Channel. The Norwegian approach was designed to engage
directly with the primary parties, and although it reached a
breakthrough and created a Palestinian Authority, it did not succeed
in changing the underlying dynamics of the conflict. Rather, and
perhaps counter-intuitively, many now view the Swedish approach as
a more long-lasting achievement.
INSIDER-PARTIAL MEDIATORS
Another important policy implication to be drawn from the
empirical research on mediation is the role of internal mediators:
mediators emerged in the context of the conflicts and that culturally
and positionally cannot be seen as strictly neutral. Domestic
resources for peacemaking can be pivotal in peace processes. Most of
the global, comparative research that has been done in the field of
23
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mediation has focused on international mediators. Yet, mediators can
also be insiders. Although Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach point
this out in an important 1991 piece, surprisingly little systematic
research has heeded their advice and included these types of peaceactors in their analyses.15 Insiders commonly carry with them certain
distinct resources, which can provide important advantages in peace
processes.
These insiders, I suggest, can be particularly useful in
mitigating some of the informational problems that arise in conflict
bargaining situations. Most notably: (1) insiders have access to
information about the parties’ resolve and capability to an extent that
outsiders would have difficulty obtaining; and (2) insiders have
significant reputation concerns as they will continue to interact with
the conflicting parties after the intervention whereas outsiders often
leave the scene after their intervention. Given this proximity, insiders
need to be more protective of their reputations, and can ill-afford to
lie, bluff or misrepresent information to the parties. Their concern
for their future reputation incentivizes them to be candid during
talks.
These factors should lead us to examine other types of third
parties than those usually discussed in the literature. In particular, we
need to explore the role of insiders such as religious representatives
and civil society leaders in acting as peacemakers. An empirical
analysis of the role of insiders shows that insiders increase the chance
of reaching the conclusion of a negotiated settlement—but overall
they tend to select the “easiest” conflict situations available.16 Studies
along these lines have important policy ramifications, not least by
underlining the need for developing domestic resources for
peacemaking.

See generally Paul Wehr & John Paul Lederach, Mediating Conflict in
Central America, 28 J. PEACE RES. 85 (1991).
16 Svensson, supra note 7.
15
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PERCEPTIONS OF PARTIALITY
To this point, bias has been discussed in terms of objective
criteria: based on previous behavior (secondary support in terms of
international mediators) or the mediator’s location within the conflict
(insiders in non-armed conflicts). Yet, there are also subjective
aspects to bias. How do parties in conflicts perceive the third-party
mediators? Why are strictly neutral mediators sometimes perceived as
biased? Intrastate armed conflicts involve parties that are not
necessarily equally strong or share the same level of international
recognition. They are, in other words, asymmetric in nature.
Mediators that try to mediate in such an asymmetric context run the
risk of becoming trapped in the dynamics and will commonly have
problems appearing neutral. This is a dilemma that mediators of civil
wars often face. Trying to act in an even-handed fashion will risk
undermining the weaker side in the negotiations. On the other hand,
trying to equalize the parties (thereby enabling a more productive
peace process) runs the risk of having the mediators be perceived as
coming out in support of one side of a conflict. Either way, the
mediator risks being perceived as partial. Norway’s engagement in Sri
Lanka is illustrative of this problem. By supporting the peace
infrastructure of the Tamil Tigers organization, which was necessary
for effective transformation of the conflict, Norway was perceived as
more partial to the rebel-group than the Sinhalese majority.17
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Given the insights generated by the research on bias in
mediation, what are the implications for policymakers? What are the
policy lessons that can be drawn from this research?
Three basic policy implications stand out. First, mediators
with ties and a history of support to one side can play a valuable role
in the process of negotiating peace in intrastate armed conflicts.
Biased mediators have an important function, particularly when
Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson, ‘Damned if You Do, and Damned if
You Don’t’: Nordic Involvement and Images of Third-Party Neutrality in Sri Lanka, 13 INT’L
NEGOTIATION 341, 351 (2008).
17
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getting conflicting parties to agree to concessions on the basic
incompatible issues at the core of the conflict.
Secondly, and more specifically, the direction of the bias
matters: rebel-biased and government-biased mediators have
different functions to play in intrastate peacemaking processes.
Stipulations of particular peace institutional arrangements are
associated with different types of biased mediators.
This point also leads to a last general policy insight: the
importance of a more disaggregated perspective on mediation
outcome. Since peace agreements vary considerably in their content,
policy must go beyond merely trying to get the parties to reach an
agreement—it also matters what kind of agreement is reached.
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DECEPTIVE RESULTS: WHY MEDIATION
APPEARS TO FAIL BUT ACTUALLY
SUCCEEDS
Scott Sigmund Gartner*
INTRODUCTION
Mediation is one of the most prevalent and commonly touted
forms of international conflict management.1 Yet, compared to other
forms of peacemaking such as bilateral negotiation, international
disputes that receive mediation are less likely to result in peace
agreements, and mediated agreements are more likely to fail.2
Furthermore, data seem to suggest the opposite of what is commonly
believed about specific types of mediation.3 For example, scholars
and policymakers frequently champion civil war mediation by
regional governmental organizations.4 Yet, more than half of all civil
war peace agreements reached through regional governmental
organization mediation fail in less than a week.5 Assessing a wide array

* Scott Sigmund Gartner, Professor of International Affairs, School of
International Affairs and Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University.
1 Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There Method in the
Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation, 34
INT’L INTERACTIONS 329, 330 (2006).
2 See id. at 342.
3 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization
Mediation and Civil War Agreement Durability, 73 J. POL. 380, 380 (2011).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 380, 387-88.
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of factors affecting civil war peacemaking, regional organization
mediation is the best predictor of agreement failure.6
Why does mediation seem to have such poor results? It is a
problem of deceptive appearances. A concept called “selection
effects” exerts powerful negative influences on what we observe;
ostensibly suggesting that mediation in general—and regional
governmental organization mediation in particular—produce poor
conflict management outcomes. In reality, appearances deceive; both
mediation overall, and regional governmental organization mediation
in particular, effectively lead to peace.
MEDIATION
Two aspects of international dispute mediation are critical for
understanding these deceptive results: (1) participation in mediation
and adherence to mediated outcomes is voluntary; and (2) mediation
is costly.
A. Voluntary
International dispute mediation is a completely voluntary
process—no judge can order belligerents or a third-party mediator to
participate. The third-party mediator must be willing to offer
assistance, and the belligerents must be willing on their own accord
to accept the third party’s offer to mediate.7 Unlike binding
arbitration, mediation does not require a commitment in advance to
accept an outcome. Adherence to a settlement reached through
mediation requires the voluntary agreement of the disputants.
B. Costs
Mediation costs are “considerable.”8 The costs of mediation
vary with the type of actor. For example, in a civil war, governments
Id. at 387-88.
Molly M. Melin, Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, Fear of
Rejection: The Puzzle of Unaccepted Mediation Offers in International Conflict, CONFLICT
MGMT. & PEACE SCI. (forthcoming 2013).
8 KYLE BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA 22 (2011).
6
7
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take a dim view of appearing to increase the stature of insurgents by
sitting with them as apparent equals at the peacemaking table.9
Insurgents might be concerned that they lack any control over
mediation outcomes given their power asymmetry with a standing
government.10 Mediators’ costs include: (1) forgoing other peace
efforts; (2) damage to reputation from failure; (3) political costs; and,
(4) operational expenses.11 Belligerents look at the human, economic,
and diplomatic costs of additional violence, their likelihood of
victory, and the various costs of mediation when considering conflict
resolution.
The voluntary and costly attributes of mediation combine to
create powerful process and selection effects—dynamics essential for
understanding mediation outcomes.
PROCESS AND SELECTION EFFECTS
The distinction between process and selection effects
represents a critical innovation in studies of dispute resolution.12
Mediators can choose among a wide variety of tools when working to
resolve disputes.13
Process Effects. Process effects reflect choices made during
conflict management that directly influence outcomes, such as mediator
9 Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation
in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 254 (2009).
10 BEARDSLEY, supra note 8, at 154.
11 Leslie G. Terris & Zeev Maoz, Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test,
42 J. PEACE RES. 563, 563-83 (2005). See generally Jacob Bercovitch & Gerald
Schneider, Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management, 37 J.
PEACE RES. 145, 145-65 (2000).
12 See Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, Overcoming Obstacles to
Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements, 50 INT’L STUD. Q.
819, 820, 822, 835-36 (2006).
13 See Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 57 (2013); Molly M. Melin, When
States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78 (2013); Stephen E. Gent, The Politics
of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 66 (2013)
(explaining how similar types of choices also affect other dispute resolution
methods, such as arbitration and adjudication).
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strategy. For example, during the negotiations with Egyptian
President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin, U.S. President
Jimmy Carter guaranteed U.S. funding for military bases to both
countries, a move that greatly contributed to the successful Camp
David Peace Accords. Carter’s guaranty is an example of a process
effect—an action that directly influences the mediation outcome.
Process effects have a clear, causal effect on conflict management
results—they shape dispute resolution success and failure.
Selection Effects. Selection effects identify specific
populations of cases that have particular conflict management traits.
For example, imagine there are two types of disputes: hard (difficult
to resolve) and easy (open to resolution). Difficult to resolve disputes
typically involve higher levels of violence, greater stakes and more
intransigent belligerents than easy to resolve disputes. While a great
mediator might achieve success in a hard dispute and a poor mediator
may fail to settle an easily resolvable dispute, on average, hard
disputes are less likely to result in peacemaking success than easy
ones. Thus, identifying the dispute’s type (hard or easy) helps to
predict the likely outcome of any conflict resolution. Selection effects
identify a dispute’s type. They distinguish the population to which
disputes belong; but unlike process effects, they do not directly affect
the conflict management process. Rather, selection effects signal the
conflict’s likely type and thus its odds of a peaceful outcome.14
The difference between selection and process effects can be
illustrated by comparing a student clinic and university hospital.15 The
clinic refers serious cases to the hospital. The hospital treats the high
risk cases—those with a greater chance of resulting in a fatality
(selection effect). The hospital has superior medical resources and
provides better treatment (process effect). Given a serious illnesses,
students go to the hospital, even if its mortality rates are higher.
Students thus take into account (likely without thinking about it)
14 Scott Sigmund Gartner & Molly M. Melin, Assessing Outcomes: Conflict
Management and the Durability of Peace, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK ON CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 564, 564-79 (Jacob Bercovitch et al. eds., 2009).
15 This example is drawn from Scott Sigmund Gartner & Aimee A.
Tannehill, Negotiating with the Dragon: The People’s Republic of China and International
Dispute Settlement Duration, 12 TAMKANG J. INT’L AFF. 69, 69-99 (2008) (Taiwan).
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selection effects; they recognize that the population of patients at the
hospital is sicker and more likely to die than the population of
patients at the clinic. Without consideration of the influence of
selection, one would erroneously determine that the life-saving
abilities of the clinic are superior to that of the hospital, when in fact
the opposite is true.16
SELECTION EFFECTS AND MEDIATION
Because mediation is costly, belligerents try to avoid it.
Disputants who talk between themselves and resolve their differences
on their own do not have to bear the costs of mediation. Thus,
bilateral negotiation between disputants represents the most efficient,
low cost, conflict resolution mechanism. If bilateral negotiations fail
or their differences make them unwilling to work together (for
example, Sadat and Begin refused to be together in the same room
after their first meeting at Camp David), then disputants who want a
peaceful resolution process can turn to a third-party mediator. As a
result, mediators work on tougher cases than those bilaterally
negotiated; disputes that, as a result of the selection process, are less
likely to result in peace. Mediation itself, however, has positive
process effects. An identical dispute would be more likely to result in
peace if it is mediated than if it is not. But in reality, disputes are not
distributed randomly or evenly, among conflict resolution
processes—mediators get the hardest cases, which are more likely to
result in peacemaking failure.

Cf. Lori Guevara, Cassia Spohn & Denise Herz, Race, Legal
Representation, and Juvenile Justice: Issues and Concerns, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 34445, 347-48, 366 (2004). Selection effects commonly manifest in legal contexts. For
example, juvenile defendants who are not defended by a lawyer are more likely to
have their charges dismissed and less likely to receive a secure confinement
disposition than youth who retain lawyers. A defendant’s lawyer does not have a
negative effect on the case’s outcome; rather, declining counsel signals a low
likelihood of conviction and a low stakes case—selection effects. Id.; see also
Michael Alexander Roach, Explaining the Outcome Gap between Different Types
of Indigent Defense Counsel: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects Essays
on Heterogeneous Treatments of Defendants within Legal Institutions (June 2011)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University).
16
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When the nature of the dispute is taken into account, analyses
show that international dispute mediation has a positive process
effect on reaching durable agreements.17
SELECTION EFFECTS AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
One way to develop a better understanding of how mediation
exerts deceptive selection effects is to look at a specific type of
mediation. For example, consider civil war mediation by regional
governmental organizations. The Organization of American States,
The African Union, and The Arab League represent examples of
regional governmental organizations. Today, “regional organizations
are the most common type of IOs [International Organizations] in
the world system.”18 As the number of regional organizations has
increased, so has their role in conflict management, and specifically as
mediators. Comparing the periods shortly before and after 1980, the
frequency of regional mediation almost doubled.19
This increase is not surprising given widespread beliefs that
regional organizations represent the ideal mediator type.20 These
beliefs draw on four core arguments. First, regional organization
member states frequently share political, economic, social, and
cultural features with the disputants. Bercovitch and Houston argue
that regional organizations are more likely to achieve conflict
resolution outcomes than other types of mediators because they,
“mediate within the same cultural and value system—and this, it
seems, promotes agreement more than any other factor.”21 United
See Gartner & Bercovitch, supra note 12, at 822-23.
Jon C. Pevehouse, With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional
Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 611, 616 (2002).
19 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War Peacemaking, in PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2012 71-84 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2012).
20 See T.H.Y. Nguyen, Beyond Good Offices? The Role of Regional Organizations
in Conflict Resolution, 55 J. INT’L AFF. 463, 484 (2002).
21 Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation:
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 11, 27 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1995)
(stating a counter to this argument, however, is that regional organizations often
contain their own super or regional powers with super or regional interests that can
17
18
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Nations Security Council Resolution 1809 states, “regional
organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of
armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region which can be
a benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of
these conflicts”22 Second, neighboring states have a greater stake in
peacemaking than outsider states or the U.N. and “must live with the
consequences of their work,” which generates higher levels of
commitment and trust.23 Third, disputants are less likely to view
mediation offers from regional governmental organizations as stealth
colonization efforts. Finally, regional governmental organization
charters frequently encourage third-party peacemaking, making them
willing mediators. For example, Article 84 of The Charter of the
Organization of American States directs the Permanent Council to
assist members in the “peaceful settlement of their disputes.”24 For
example, the OAS successfully mediated the Belize-Guatemala
conflict in 2000—a dispute originating from the independence of
Spain in 1839 and which the U.N. failed to resolve.25
There are also aspects of regional organization conflict
mediation that are unattractive to belligerents. Given the inherent
advantages of a sitting government, insurgent success in civil war
requires support from neighboring states.26 The comparatively small
skew mediation. For example, consider the roles of: Nigeria in The African Union,
Egypt in The Arab League, and the U.S. in The Organization of American States).
22 S.C. Res. 1806, U.N. SCOR, 63rd Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1809, at 1
(Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Coop%20w%20Reg%20Orgs%20SRES
1809.pdf.
23 John Paul Lederach & Paul Wehr, Mediating Conflict in Central America,
28 J. PEACE RES. 85, 97 (1991). See also Marie Olson & Frederic S. Pearson, Civil
War Characteristics, Mediators, and Resolution, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 421 (2002).
24 The Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of
American States, “Protocol of Buenos Aires” art. 84, Feb. 27 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
721 U.N.T.S. 324, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_
Organization_of_American_States.pdf.
25 MONSTERRAT GORINA-YSERN, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, OAS
MEDIATES
IN
BELIZE-GUATEMALA
BORDER
DISPUTE
(2000),
http://www.asil.org/insigh59.cfm.
26 Dylan Balch-Lindsey, Andrew J. Enterline & Kyle A. Joyce, Third-Party
Intervention and the Civil War Process, 45 J. PEACE RES. 345, 345 (2008); Salehyan
Idean, No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict, 70 J. POL. 54 (2008).
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size of regional groups ensures all members have influence,
accentuating concerns over bias.27 As a result, governments fighting
civil wars abhor including regional organizations in dispute
negotiations because it provides their insurgent’s benefactors
influence in the conflict management process. Similarly, rebels
recognize that the government they threaten likely plays a major role
in the regional organization. Additionally, some states in the
organization likely have their own insurgency problems and thus
want to come down hard on rebel groups in order to deter challenges
at home.28
Given these disincentives, civil war belligerents prefer to
avoid mediation by regional organizations and only select them in the
most dire circumstances. As a result, regional organizations mediate
particularly deadly and intractable civil wars—those less likely to
result in durable peace agreements. When these selection effects are
controlled for, however, and the intensity of civil wars are taken into
account, mediation by regional organizations has a positive process
effect on peacemaking.29
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Just like the best hospitals get the sickest patients and lose the
most lives, the best peacemakers get the most violent and intractable
disputes that produce the worst peace outcomes. However, when we
take into account the deadly nature and known difficulty of resolving
those international disputes selected for mediation, we see that
mediation generally, and mediation by regional organizations
specifically, facilitate the creation of robust peace agreements.

27 See Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L. AFF. 17 (2013).
28 See Navin A. Bapat, The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns, 24
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 265 (2007). This problem is complicated further
by the frequent shifting preference for violence among ethnic groups. See, e.g.,
Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational Perspective, 2
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 91 (2013).
29 See Gartner, supra note 3.
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Selection effects have two critical policy implications. First,
selection influences how we should evaluate mediation failure. Some
ineffective mediation is likely the result of poor mediators and weak
peacemaking strategies. But other disappointing results, especially
when generated by mediators and strategies thought to be highly
effective, are likely misleading and result from selection effects. For
example, the Camp David Accords mediated by President Carter in
1978 have led to a peace between Egypt and Israel that has lasted for
more than thirty years—in contrast to the five wars fought between
the two countries in the thirty years prior to the Accords. But the
Accords did not bring comprehensive peace to the region. After
Camp David, mediators found it difficult to make further progress in
this dispute. The Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians
have not operated as effectively as the Camp David Accords. Some
might claim that these other mediators lacked Carter’s mediation
skills. It is critical to remember, however, that the Arab-Israeli
dispute remains extremely intractable. While the dispute’s violence
and salience help it to attract the best global mediators they also form
the conditions that make peace elusive. It would be wrong to equate
failure to obtain peace in these disputes with the failure of mediation
generally or the ineffectiveness of any specific mediators. Rather, we
need to keep in mind that the intractable, violent, and globally
important nature of the Arab-Israeli dispute both attracts mediation
and makes it difficult to resolve—an apt illustration of selection
effects. Given that the top mediators get the toughest cases, it is vital
that we keep selection in mind when evaluating mediation efficacy.
Second, potential mediators need to recognize that they face a
trade-off. They can choose to mediate disputes that are likely to be
resolved—but bilateral negotiations may work equally effectively in
these disputes. Or, potential mediators can choose persistent disputes
that are not likely to result in durable peace or civil wars that are
especially challenging to resolve.30 These are the disputes that most
require third-party assistance—they are both the most violent and the
least likely to be resolved through the independent actions of the
See David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be At The Table? Veto Players and
Peace Processes in the Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. INT’L AFF. 38 (2013); J. Michael
Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2
PENN ST. J.L. INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).
30
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disputants—but are also the disputes that are most likely to result in
failed mediation outcomes. Resolving these more intractable disputes
requires a frustrating pattern of peacemaking efforts.31 Thus,
mediators need to assess the value of mediation efforts based on the
challenge of the task they face, not only on what they can achieve.
These perspectives should not, however, suggest pessimism
about mediation and peacemaking. Mediation of previously persistent
disputes does not necessarily result in failed peacemaking. For
example, the Colombian government has battled the insurgent group
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) since 1964.
On March 1, 2008, Colombia attacked a FARC encampment in
Ecuador, expanding the war and enflaming a long-simmering regional
dispute. Viewing the attack as an illegal violation of its sovereignty,
Ecuador cut diplomatic ties with Colombia. Colombia accused the
Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments of financially supporting
FARC. Tensions intensified when Ecuador and Venezuela sent
troops to the Colombian border.32 The OAS intervened rapidly to
diffuse tensions by calling an emergency session and sending a
commission to visit the countries and investigate the attack. The
OAS determined that Colombia did in fact violate Ecuador’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Columbia issued an apology and
the countries resumed diplomatic relations. The OAS launched the
Mission of Good Offices in Colombia and Ecuador which works to
maintain peaceful relations between the two countries.33 Thus,
31 Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking, 2 PENN
ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 9 (2013).
32 See Neighbors Cut Ties With Colombia, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7276228.stm; Simon Romero, Columbia is
Flashpoint in Chavez’s Feud with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/world/americas/05venez.html?pagewante
d=all; LAURA CARLSEN, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, THE ANDEAN CRISIS (John
Feffer ed., 2008), http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_andean_crisis.
33 See Columbia and Ecuador, OAS PEACE FUND, http://www.oas.org/
sap/peacefund/ColombiaAndEcuador/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); Crisis Deepens as
Venezuela Closes Columbia Border, AFP, Mar. 4, 2008, http://afp.google.com/
article/ALeqM5iWzlEd06o1UoIdZxv17wkp18uz4g; TATIANA WAISBERG, AM.
SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, COLUMBIA’S USE OF FORCE IN ECUADOR AGAINST A
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS (2008), http://www.asil.org/insights080822.
cfm#_edn1.
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despite an enduring dispute, a non-governmental actor and a
violation of sovereignty—all factors known to make disputes more
intractable—mediation worked.
For those of us who participate in, study, or encourage
peacemaking efforts, the results frequently seem grim. But we should
not let mediation’s seemingly poor results dissuade us from
promoting peacemaking. Rather, using selection effects we need to
handicap the odds of mediation success and failure. Like many of the
best hospitals, best conflict management practices may at first appear
to be hazardous, but an understanding of the process and its
challenges demonstrates their value and shows that appearances can
indeed be deceptive.
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WHO SHOULD BE AT THE TABLE?:
VETO PLAYERS AND PEACE PROCESSES
IN CIVIL WAR
David E. Cunningham*
INTRODUCTION
Civil war often is conceptualized as a conflict between a state
and a rebel group. In reality, many civil wars, including those
currently ongoing in Somalia, Darfur, Afghanistan, Iraq, Columbia,
and Kashmir, contain multiple rebel groups fighting against the state
at the same time. Within civil wars, there is a sub-set of these groups
(which could include all of them) that have the ability to block an end
to the war. These groups can be labeled “veto players” because they
have the capacity to veto peace and continue the war on their own
even if the other groups involved sign a peace agreement and stop
fighting.1

*, David E. Cunningham, Assistant Professor of International Relations,
University of Maryland and affiliate of the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the
Peace Research Institute in Oslo.
1 See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002) (analyzing veto players in governmental bargaining).
See generally Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Determinants of
Economic Policy Outcomes, in PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 21-63
(Stephan Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2001). Scholars have examined
how governmental veto players affect conflict. See Michael J. Ireland & Scott
Sigmund Gartner, Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary
Systems, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 547 (2001); George Tsebelis & Seung-Whan Choi,
The Democratic Peace Revisited: It Is Veto Players, APSA Meeting Paper (2009),
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Civil wars containing more than two veto players have
fundamentally different bargaining dynamics. The incentives that
combatants have to enter negotiations and negotiate in good faith, as
well as their ability to reach agreements that all parties find
acceptable, are substantially different when there are more actors
involved that can block settlement. These barriers to bargaining mean
that conflicts with more veto players last substantially longer than
those with fewer.2
Because these conflicts are so difficult to resolve,
international efforts are much less successful in conflicts that contain
more than two combatants. Several years ago, a prominent study
evaluated the success of all United Nations led peacebuilding
missions and found that the U.N. was “successful” in 13 out of 27 of
these missions, slightly under 50%.3 Dividing these cases into twoparty and multi-party wars shows that peacebuilding was successful in
10 out of 16 two-party wars (63%) and only 3 out of 11 multi-party
civil wars (27%).4
This article explores how peacemakers can design peace
processes in multi-party civil wars with the greatest likelihood of
resolution. It focuses on the question of participation in peace
processes and argues that negotiations are most likely to lead to a
comprehensive settlement if they include all of the veto players in the
war and exclude everyone else.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450519. See also generally
David E. Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 875
(2006); DAVID E. CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR (2011)
(examining civil war bargaining through a veto player logic).
2 See Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, supra note 1 at 876,
881-87 (arguing that civil wars with more veto players last longer and citing
empirical evidence of this relationship). See also J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria?
Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L
AFF. 48 (discussing some of the difficulties for mediation presented by a large
number of combatants and applying this discussion to the civil was in Syria).
3 MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR &
BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 204 (2006).
4 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at
204.
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Section I defines what it means to be a veto player in civil
war. Section II examines why peace processes are prone to fail if they
do not include all veto players or include actors that are not veto
players. Section III explores two potential caveats to these rules, and
the article concludes by illustrating the applicability of the main
argument in a few cases.
I. VETO PLAYERS IN CIVIL WAR
Veto players have the capability to unilaterally block
settlement of a civil war. The concept of veto players is different
from that of spoilers. Spoilers, as defined by Stephen John Stedman,
are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from
negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use
violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”5 Spoilers, then, are
those actors who have blocked a negotiated settlement to war. Veto
players are those actors who have the capability to be spoilers,
whether or not they actually spoil a settlement. At a minimum, all
civil wars contain two veto players—the government and one rebel
group—because if either of these actors could not unilaterally
continue the war it would end. Many civil wars contain more than
two of these actors, and additional veto players come in a variety of
types.
Many civil wars contain multiple rebel group veto players. In
the 1991-2008 civil war in Burundi, an agreement signed by 19
groups in Arusha, Tanzania in 2000 failed to end the war because the
two main rebel groups—the National Council for the Defense of
Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
and Palipehutu-National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL)—did
not sign and continued fighting. In 2003, CNDD-FDD signed the
Pretoria Accords and exited the conflict. The war still did not end
because Palipehutu-FNL was a veto player and continued fighting.
The Burundian war only ended when Palipehutu-FNL signed a peace
agreement in 2008 and stopped fighting, meaning that all of the rebel
group veto players had exited the conflict.

5

Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT’L SEC. 5,

5 (1997).
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Civil wars can also contain multiple veto players when
external states are heavily involved in the conflict. During the
Apartheid era, South Africa used its military to destabilize hostile
governments such as those in Angola and Mozambique by
intervening in their civil wars. South Africa was a veto player in these
wars because it was an actor with independent preferences and an
ability to prevent full settlement of the conflicts.6 In the Cold War,
the United States and Soviet Union were veto players in many civil
wars because they were involved and capable of prolonging the war if
they did not get the outcome they wanted.
In general, civil wars contain a set of veto players including
the government, one or more rebel groups and, potentially, external
states. Not all of the participants to a civil war, however, are
necessarily veto players, as some combatants may be so weak that
they cannot block an end to the war. Identifying veto players is more
challenging than identifying spoilers. Spoilers are those groups who
have spoiled an agreement; veto players are those groups who could
potentially spoil an agreement. In general, the factors that make
parties veto players are those that make them more of a threat to the
government, or more able to resist being defeated. So, combatants
that have greater numbers of troops, more popular support, operate
in terrain that provides protection from government attacks, have
more advanced military technology and better trained and equipped
troops, and have access to funding sources are more likely to be veto
players.
II. TWO RULES FOR PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESSES
Negotiations in civil war can be long processes, often
dragging on for months or even years. Mediators can affect the
likelihood for a peaceful resolution to a war by deciding who to invite
to participate in peace processes. There are two general rules.

See David E. Cunningham, Blocking Resolution: How External States Can
Prolong Civil Wars, J. PEACE RES. 115, 116-17 (2010) (analyzing the effect of external
state veto players on the duration of civil wars).
6
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Rule # 1: Include All Veto Players
The first rule is that peace processes are more likely to
succeed that include the entire array of relevant veto players.7
Because veto players can continue the war unilaterally, if one or more
of these actors are not included in a peace process then the war will
continue even if the other veto players sign an agreement and stop
fighting.8
This argument may seem obvious, but there are clear cases in
which mediators proceed with negotiations not involving all veto
players and expect these processes to succeed. In the 1998-2000
Arusha negotiations in Burundi, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL
did not participate because the facilitator, former Tanzanian
President Julius Nyerere, barred them from doing so. As those two
groups were the main anti-government combatants, without their
inclusion the Arusha process was doomed to fail before it began.
Another example is the negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian group Fatah in the late 1990s. Those negotiations failed to
lead to a comprehensive settlement of that long-running dispute for a
number of reasons. One important reason was that Fatah was not the
only Palestinian veto player, it did not control Hamas, and so an
accord between the Israeli government and only one of the
Palestinian veto players could not possibly have ended the violence.
One reason that peace processes often proceed without all
veto players is that it is difficult to get them to come to the table. In
ongoing civil wars, many of these actors have incentives to hold out
from negotiating in hopes of obtaining a better deal later on.
See UNITED NATIONS, GUIDANCE FOR EFFECTIVE MEDIATION 11-12
(2012),
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN
%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Mediation.pdf (recognizing the importance
of inclusivity in peace processes, although this source refers to “stakeholders”: a
broader range of actors than veto players).
8 Lakhdar Brahimi & Salman Ahmed, In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The
Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation, N.Y. UNIV. CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION 5 (2008)
(stating that the failure to incorporate all veto players can be the result of
ignorance—one of the “seven deadly sins of mediation” —and arguing that it is
important for mediators to identify both the national actors with the power to stop
or re-start the war, and the source of those actors’ external support).
7
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Additionally, some of these groups may be opposed to negotiation as
a matter of principle.
In cases where not all veto players will agree to negotiate,
mediators often try one of two strategies. They may declare that
negotiations will begin with the parties who are willing to participate
and that everyone else will be excluded from the peace that follows.
This strategy was tried in Darfur in 2007 when the main rebel groups
refused to attend a peace conference in Sirte, Libya. Jan Eliasson, the
mediator for the conference, stated emphatically: “The train has left
on the road to peace . . . the question is how many passengers will
come on.”9 The problem with this strategy is that, if the main
combatants are not participating, there is no credible threat to
exclude them from the benefits of peace because no peace is
possible. Despite Eliasson’s statement, the conference was postponed
and the conflict continued.
Alternatively, mediators often try piecemeal negotiations, in
which governments negotiate with rebel groups individually in
sequence. This strategy was used in Chad in the 1990s where the
government signed a series of bilateral agreements with rebel groups.
While sequenced bilateral negotiations may work in some
cases, it is a problematic strategy. Every agreement that results in one
rebel group exiting the conflict also results in a shift in the balance of
power between the government and the remaining groups. One of
the difficulties with finding a bargained solution to civil war is that it
is difficult for actors to tell how strong they are, relative to the
government. In Burundi, it was clear after the Pretoria Accord that
Palipehutu-FNL was weaker relative to the combined Burundian
army/CNDD-FDD forces but it took years to determine how much
weaker.
Additionally, every new peace agreement reduces the
government’s flexibility with the remaining groups. Peace agreements
often commit specific cabinet ministries and percentages of the
Alfred De Montesquiou, Darfur Talks Postponed as Rebels Boycott, USA
TODAY (Oct. 28, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-1028-2864852227_x.htm.
9
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military and government to former rebels. As these positions are
filled, it becomes harder for the government to use incentives to
convince the remaining veto players that an agreement is better than
fighting. Because of these problems, piecemeal negotiations should
be a last resort for mediators.
Rule #2: Exclude Non-Veto Players
The second rule is that peace processes are more likely to
succeed that exclude actors that are not veto players. Because
negotiations with more parties are more prone to fail, incorporating
actors that are not veto players in peace processes make it less likely
that agreement will be reached by the veto players. Barring this
agreement, wars continue.
A number of peace processes in recent years have included
non-veto players. The 19 parties at the Arusha negotiations in the
Burundian war included some armed groups but primarily unarmed
political parties. Negotiations in Paris in January 2003 to resolve the
Cote D’Ivoire civil war included the government, the three main
insurgent groups, and delegations from six other political parties.10
Mediators may include non-veto players in peace processes
because these processes often play a large role in determining the
post-conflict political environment, including the design of political
institutions and timetable for transition to elections. Limiting
participation to armed groups has the potential to send the dangerous
signal that the only way to get one’s voice heard is through violence.
Additionally, civil wars often occur because of deep divisions in
society, and incorporating civil society and political parties may be
attempts to overcome these divisions.11

10 UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, LINAS-MARCOUSSIS
AGREEMENT (2003), http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_
agreements/cote_divoire_01242003en.pdf.
11 See generally Desirée Nilsson, Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in
Peace Accords and Durable Peace, 38 INT’L INTERACTIONS 243 (2012) (arguing that
incorporating civil society actors into peace agreements increases the durability of
peace).
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Each of these justifications has merit. However, including
non-veto players in peace processes makes them more prone to fail
for two reasons. First, incorporating these groups may actually create
additional veto players in the negotiation. Conflicts with many veto
players are longer and harder to resolve in part because it is hard to
convince all of the participants that they are better off through peace
than through continuing to fight. If unarmed groups are brought into
a peace process and can veto any potential agreement, that increases
the number of actors that can prevent a settlement that might end the
war.
Second, even if non-veto players incorporated into peace
processes are not allowed to veto potential agreements, their
participation virtually guarantees that they will be given something in
a settlement. Any concessions given to these groups, however
minimal, means there are less concessions available to induce the
veto players to stop fighting. In a power-sharing government, for
example, the number of important ministries is finite. Ministries
given to non-veto players mean less are available to convince veto
players that peace is more beneficial than war.
Combining these two rules, peace processes will be most
likely to succeed in ending civil wars when they include all of the veto
players involved and no one else. Mediators are most likely to design
successful peace processes when they analyze conflicts and determine
who the veto players are and think critically about the effect of
including and excluding different actors on those processes.
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES
The above discussion presumed that each veto player was
capable of continuing a war if a peace process did not include them.
However, mediators could proceed with peace processes excluding
veto players if international actors were willing to forcibly disarm
groups that blocked the peace. This may be necessary when veto
players are completely opposed to negotiation. In Rwanda, for
example, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) was a
clear spoiler that worked to prevent the implementation of the
Arusha Accords. Had the international community intervened to
nullify CDR, it is possible that the Arusha Accords would have
45
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worked and the genocide would have been prevented.12 In general,
however, international actors are unwilling to intervene to the degree
necessary to forcibly disarm veto players.
The above discussion also assumed that the goal of peace
processes is to end wars. If that is the goal, then these processes are
most likely to succeed if they include all, and only, the veto players.
However, in many cases mediators and others may have interests
beyond just ending the fighting, such as promoting democratization
or social justice. To pursue those goals, it is possible that some veto
players should be excluded or some non-veto players included.13
Mediators should be cautious about this, however. In many
cases, goals such as democratization or social justice can only be
pursued once civil war ends. Prioritizing other important goals can be
dangerous if it leads to the design of peace processes that are less
likely to actually end the war.
IV. CONCLUSION—THE RULES IN ACTION
The peace process around the 1999 Lusaka Accords in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one in which mediators
included all veto players and excluded non-veto players from direct
negotiation.14 Early rounds of negotiations in the conflict had been
derailed because they only included the DRC government and
external state participants (such as Rwanda and Uganda). However,
Congolese rebel groups were clearly veto players, and the Lusaka
Peace Process incorporated them. At the same time, the Lusaka
process left out non-veto players such as political parties and civil
society organizations. These groups were not completely excluded
12 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at
184, 211, 214. For a more extensive discussion of the Rwandan peace process, see
id. at ch. 4.
13 Beardsley discusses how the best strategies for mediators may differ
depending on whether they aspire to a cessation of hostilities or to build long-term
peace. See generally Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013).
14 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at
ch. 6 (describing the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
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from political discussion, rather, they were incorporated into an
“Inter-Congolese Dialogue” which was designed to decide the
political future of the country.
The DRC civil war ended in 2002, largely along the lines laid
out by the Lusaka Accords. For the last ten years the DRC has
certainly not been a peaceful, stable, or democratic place. However,
the level of violence in Congo is much lower than it was during the
civil war, at least in part as a result of the Lusaka process.
Despite this example, mediators often make decisions about
participation in peace processes that hamper, rather than augment,
the chances of peace. In Burundi and Darfur, negotiations excluded
veto players and included non-veto players and failed to produce
peace. Peace is possible in multi-party conflicts, but only if
peacemakers understand their unique dynamics and design and
implement processes responsive to these dynamics.
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INTRACTABLE SYRIA? INSIGHTS FROM
THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE ON THE
FAILURE OF MEDIATION
J. Michael Greig*
INTRODUCTION
Since its beginning in March 2011, the conflict in Syria has
produced considerable human suffering and increased the risk of
greater regional instability. The conflict has produced in excess of
35,000 fatalities and displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrians. 1
Violence against civilians has brought widespread condemnation
from across the international community. This violence, in turn, has
also increased calls for action to stop the fighting in Syria and protect
its civilian population.
To this end, a wide array of sanctions has been imposed upon
the Syrian government by actors including the United States,
members of the European Union, the Arab League, and regional
powers such as Turkey. The United Nations Security Council has
been sharply divided on how to deal with the crisis, with the United
States, Great Britain, and France calling for tougher language and
action against the Assad regime, and Russia and China in opposition.
Despite this lack of unanimity on the Security Council, U.N.
* J. Michael Greig, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of
North Texas.
1 See CNN Staff, By the Numbers: Syria Deaths, CNN.COM, Jan. 9, 2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/08/world/meast/syria-civil-war-compare/index.ht
ml; VDC: CENTER FOR DOCUMENTATION OF VIOLATIONS IN SYRIA,
http://www.vdc-sy.org/index.php/en/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
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Secretary General Ban Ki Moon appointed former U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan as U.N.-Arab League Joint Special Envoy on
Syria in February 2012. Efforts to mediate the Syrian conflict are
consistent with the broader tendency of mediation to be applied to
the most difficult conflicts in the international system.2 Despite
Annan’s presentation of a plan to end the conflict and the dispatch in
April 2012 of a U.N. ceasefire monitoring mission, the Syrian conflict
has proven difficult to manage. A lasting ceasefire has proven elusive
among the belligerents, with conflict escalating sufficiently that
activities by the U.N. monitoring mission were suspended in June
2012 and its mandate went without renewal following its expiration.
Deteriorating conditions in August 2012 and the refusal of the Syrian
regime to negotiate led to the resignation of Kofi Annan, who was
subsequently replaced as U.N. envoy to Syria by Lakhdar Brahimi. In
his resignation, Annan laid blame for the failure of mediation at the
feet of both external powers as well as the warring sides themselves
stating, “without serious, purposeful and united international
pressure, including from the powers of the region, it is impossible for
me, or anyone, to compel the Syrian government in the first place,
and also the opposition, to take the steps necessary to begin a
political process.”3
The inability of the United Nations or any other third party to
broker an end to the violence in Syria, despite early and frequent
demands by an array of outside powers for a cease-fire and the
dispatch of peace envoys and a U.N. monitoring force, raises the
question of why the Syrian conflict has proven so impervious to
settlement. Not only have third-party efforts to manage the conflict
been unsuccessful, but conditions have continued to deteriorate in
Syria with the level of violence mounting on both sides and civilian
suffering deepening. In this paper, I explore the ways in which some
of the insights from the scholarly conflict management literature can
be brought to bear in understanding the specific challenges faced by
2 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to
Fail but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 27 (2013).
3 Rick Gladstone, Annan Steps Down as Peace Envoy and Cites Barriers in Syria
and the United Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2012 at A6,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/world/middleeast/annan-resigns-as-syriapeace-envoy.html?pagewanted=all.
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third-party efforts to manage the Syrian conflict. I argue that the
characteristics of the warring sides and the way in which fighting has
evolved between the Syrian government and rebels each play an
important role in the failure of conflict management.
NUMBER OF PARTIES
The number of parties involved in a conflict plays an
important role in the prospects for successful mediation. In general,
as the number of parties in a conflict grows, the chances for
mediation success dim. Increasing the number of parties involved in
conflict brings three problems for mediation. First, communications
become tougher as the number of parties involved in a conflict
increase.4 A mediator confronting a conflict involving several parties
faces the difficult task of coordinating communications among each
side while limiting the chances of miscommunications. Second,
increasing the number of parties involved in a conflict raises the risk
of spoilers for the peace process. Increasing the number of warring
actors also increases the number of interests at stake among the
parties, increasing the number of veto players5 and raising the risk
that one or more parties oppose a settlement agreed to by the others.
This can create spoilers who engage in violence to derail the peace
process until their own demands are met.6 Third, increasing the
number of players in a conflict also increases the possibility of
commitment problems for any settlement. Peace efforts in civil wars
are inherently susceptible to commitment problems in which, even if
an agreement can be reached, the lack of enforcement makes neither
side confident that the other will live up to the terms of the
agreement.7 Commitment problems are exacerbated as the number of
actors involved in a conflict grows because agreement monitoring
becomes more difficult and the chances of spoilers increases.

4 See J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION 104-105 (2012).
5 See David Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table? Veto Players and Peace
Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).
6 See Desirée Nilsson, Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil
War Settlements, 45 J. PEACE RES. 479, 481-82 (2008).
7 See Barbara F. Walter, Bargaining Failures and Civil War, 12 AM. REV.
POL. SCI. 243, 254 (2009).
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In this respect, the Syrian conflict presents a difficult
challenge for third parties seeking to mediate it. Because the rebels
are divided among a large number of groups, each with different
goals and backgrounds, it is difficult to simply identify all of the
actors needed to participate in any potential peace process. Although
the Free Syrian Army provides a unified name to much of the armed
Syrian opposition, this unity is limited. The Free Syrian Army is, at
best, a very loose collection of militia groups with minimal
coordination among one another.8 Foreign supporters of the Syrian
opposition have sought to encourage the development of a broad
coalition group to bring the rebels under one political umbrella. The
Syrian National Council was an early effort at unity, but it proved
difficult to coordinate with the Free Syrian Army, and struggled with
major divisions among constituent groups. The new National
Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces is another
effort to unify the Syrian rebels, but its prospects for success remain
uncertain.9
INTENSITY AND DURATION OF VIOLENCE
Just as the characteristics of the warring sides shape the
chances for effective mediation, a large body of scholarly literature
points to the way in which a conflict unfolds over time as a key
influence on the chances that diplomatic efforts will be fruitful. 10
While some civil conflicts at their outset may inherently be more or
less susceptible to successful conflict management efforts, what takes
place on the battlefield over the course of the conflict shapes the
incentives for warring sides to accept mediation and make the
8

See Rania Abouzeid, Syria’s Secular and Islamist Rebels: Who are the Saudis
and the Qataris Arming?, TIME, Sep. 18, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/
09/18/syrias-secular-and-islamist-rebels-who-are-the-saudis-and-the-qatarisarming/.
9
See Jonathan Masters, Syria’s Crisis and the Global Response, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, Feb. 5, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/syria/syrias-crisisglobal-response/p28402.
10 See, e.g., Dean Pruitt, Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks, 2 INT’L
NEGOTIATIONS 237 (1997); J. Michael Greig, Moments of Opportunity: Recognizing
Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation Between Enduring Rivals, 45 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 691 (2001); I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND
INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (1989).
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concessions for a settlement. As a result, some points in time during
a conflict present better opportunities for effective third-party
diplomacy than others.
One of the challenges in managing a civil conflict is that as
the level of violence among belligerents grows, it increases hostility
among the parties, encouraging even more violence in the future. 11
This process, in turn, closes off communication between warring
sides,12 increases the extent to which the parties see themselves as
victims of the other,13 and encourages the belligerents to frame their
goals in terms of punishing the other side.14 Put together, increasing
levels of violence undermine the likelihood and effectiveness of
mediation efforts in managing the conflict.
The intensity of violence in Syria directly cuts against thirdparty efforts to manage the conflict and locate a settlement. When
mediation is applied to a civil war immediately following a spike in
battle deaths, the chances that talks will produce an agreement among
the combatants is sharply reduced.15 This is precisely the pattern that
casualty levels in Syria have followed. From June 2012 to August
2012, the number of Syrian casualties increased sharply, growing
from 2204 deaths in June to 5037 killed in August.16 Rising casualty
levels in Syria have made it harder for third-party efforts to manage
the conflict.
See ZARTMAN, supra note 10, at 263.
See Jacob Bercovitch, J. Theodore Anagnoson & Donette L. Wille,
Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in
International Relations, 28 J. PEACE RES. 7, 13 (1991); THOMAS PRINCEN,
INTERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 54-59 (1992).
13 See generally STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL
WAR (Cambridge University Press 2006) (1964).
14 See Dean Pruitt & Paul Olczak, Beyond Hope: Approaches to Resolving
Seemingly Intractable Conflict, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION, AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS
INSPIRED BY THE WORK OF MORTON DEUTSCH 59 (Barbara Bunker & Jeffrey
Rubin eds., 1995).
15 J. Michael Greig, Rebels at the Gates: Civil War Battle Locations, Movement,
and Openings for Mediation, paper presented at the 2012 Meeting of the Folke
Bernadotte Academy Conflict Prevention Working Group, State College, PA, 2012.
16 David Kenner, Syria Is More Violent Than Iraq at Its Worst, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Sept. 11, 2012, 10:27AM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09
/10/syria_is_more_violent_than_iraq_at_its_worst.
11
12
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Although rising casualty levels diminish the chances for
mediated agreement, the conflict management literature points to
another window for effective third-party diplomacy that is relevant to
Syria. While warring sides build up animosity and become less willing
to compromise the more they fight, at some point, as the two sides
build up more conflict costs, belligerents begin to seek an alternative
to fighting.17 As these costs grow for the belligerents, with neither
able to overcome the other and suffering increasing for each, a
hurting stalemate emerges.18 The development of this hurting
stalemate during a conflict creates a second window of opportunity
for mediation to end the fighting. Fundamental to the hurting
stalemate is that both sides must feel unacceptably painful conflict
costs and each must perceive that it cannot win the conflict and impose
its own terms of settlement. When a hurting stalemate develops, civil
war combatants become more open to mediation and grow more
willing to make the concessions necessary for a settlement.
What does this mean for Syria? Despite the deepening
suffering among the Syrian populace and the worsening level of
violence, there is little indication that Syria has developed sufficiently
into a hurting stalemate that settlement is likely. Although the level of
conflict is high, there is no evidence that it is unbearably so for either
side. At the same time, there is also nothing to suggest that either side
believes that it cannot ultimately prevail in the conflict and impose its
own terms without negotiation. Civil war research suggests that the
chances for mediation success only begin to approach the odds of
success that exist early in a civil conflict after fighting has continued
for 130 months and 33,000 battle-deaths have resulted, a level well
above where the Syrian conflict is.19 In this respect, Syria finds itself
in a nether zone of conflict. The warring sides have fought long
enough to become so hostile that there is little, if any, trust between
them and dialogue among the belligerents has become virtually
17 See J. Michael Greig & Patrick Regan, When Do They Say Yes? An
Analysis of the Willingness to Offer & Accept Mediation in Civil Wars, 52 INT’L STUD. Q.
759 (2008).
18 See I. William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 225 (Paul C.
Stern & Daniel Druckman eds., 2000).
19 Greig, supra note 15.
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impossible. At the same time, the history of conflict has yet to reach
a sufficiently painful, stalemated point that the parties become open
to a settlement. From the perspective of a mediator, Syria finds itself
in the worst of all possible worlds.
GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD
Beyond the intensity and duration of violence, where fighting
between rebel and government forces occurs also significantly
impacts the success of mediation. This has direct implications for the
conflict in Syria. One of the challenges that a rebel force challenging
a government faces is demonstrating its ability to mount a credible,
durable threat to the regime. If a government anticipates that the
rebels can be quickly defeated or doubts the ability of the rebels to
impose significant costs on the regime, there is little reason for the
regime to negotiate with the rebels. To push governments to the
bargaining table, rebels must demonstrate their ability to impose
unacceptable costs on the regime. One way for rebels to do this is to
mount a military threat to a country’s major cities. In doing so, rebels
can disrupt important economic, social, and political activity for the
country. This can increase pressure from the populace on the
government to negotiate with the rebels.
As Syrian rebels increased their ability to threaten the
government across broader swaths of territory, their ability to impose
costs on the government also increased. As protests spread from
Dara’a to Homs and Aleppo, important industrial and financial
centers, the Syrian government began to signal their willingness to
make some limited concessions. At this point, however, these
concessions were not sufficient to stop the violence from deepening
and appeared more tactical than sincere. This points to a particular
challenge faced in managing civil conflicts. Conditions that might
encourage one side to offer concessions can encourage the other to
resist settlement with the expectation of better terms from fighting
than talking. As rebels see more success on the battlefield, they tend
to increase their demands on the government during talks. When
these increased demands are unacceptable for the regime, diplomatic
efforts become more likely to fail.
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The best example of this tendency for rising expectations of
victory to influence mediation is the effect that civil war battles
fought near the capital exert. Rather than increasing the likelihood of
agreement, the closer civil war battles occur to the capital, the less
likely mediation is to take place at all and, when it does occur, the less
likely it is to be successful.20 These diminished prospects for
mediation are a function of the distinct effects that such battles have
on both rebels and governments. For rebels, as their ability to sustain
a challenge near the capital grows, they increasingly see better
prospects for victories. As a result, rebels tend to increase their
demands on the regime in any settlement talks.21 A government
facing rebels near the capital is likely to see continued fighting as
preferable to agreement. First, such a government may see the
potential demands from the rebels as likely to be unacceptable to the
regime, potentially demanding terms such as the complete removal of
government officials. Second, even a government interested in
reaching a settlement may conclude that it can get better terms if it is
able to push the rebels away from the capital.
The way the dynamics of the Syrian conflict changed in July
2012 as rebel attacks began on the capital is consistent with this line
of thinking. The mounting violence in the capital not only imposed
real costs on the Syrian regime, but also carried important
psychological costs as well. Neil MacFarquhar argues that keeping
violence away from Damascus had an important effect on the Syrian
psyche, suggesting that protecting Damascus from threat “became a
kind of a psychological yardstick: if Damascus remained under
control, it meant the Assad government was still in control.”22 As
these attacks on the capital mounted, rather than offering
concessions or embracing diplomacy, the Assad regime adopted
increasingly aggressive measures, using air strikes against rebel
positions in Aleppo and Damascus and shelling Damascus
neighborhoods where rebel forces were believed to be located. In this
See id.
See Halvard Buhaug & Jan Ketil Rød, Local Determinants of African Civil
Wars, 1970–2001, 25 POL. GEOGRAPHY 315 (2006).
22 Neil MacFarquhar, Damascus Confronts New Reality After Attack, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2012, at A13, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/
world/middleeast/bombing-attack-shifts-equation-in-syria-uprising.html?_r=0.
20
21
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respect, Jeffrey White, former senior Middle East analyst for the
Defense Intelligence Agency, argues that “There will not be any
negotiations . . . . He [Assad] will go down fighting, and he will
probably do it in Damascus.”23
CONCLUSION
The Syrian conflict has seen a variety of third-party efforts
from individual states, the Arab League, and the United Nations to
manage the conflict and find a settlement. Thus far, the conflict has
proven intractable. Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan’s
lament about the lack of purposive and unified action by the
international community toward Syria explains some of this conflict
management failure. Others have laid some of the blame at the feet
of the decisions made by those who have attempted to mediate the
conflict. Yet, what we know about conflict management points to
characteristics of the Syrian conflict that make it inherently difficult
to resolve diplomatically. The characteristics of the parties and how
they have fought each shape the effectiveness of conflict
management even before the mediators arrive.

Joby Warrick & Anne Gearan, For Syria’s Assad Only Exit May Be a Body
Bag, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2012, at A01, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/ 201207-31/world/35486777_1_syrian-president-bashar-al-assad-aleppo-troops-battlerebels.
23
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USING THE RIGHT TOOL FOR THE JOB:
MEDIATOR LEVERAGE AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
Kyle Beardsley*
INTRODUCTION
There is tremendous variation in how third parties conduct
international mediation.1 Mediation might involve such functions as
the mere hosting of talks, substantive participation in the negotiation
process, shuttle diplomacy, or heavy-handed involvement in which
the third party shapes the incentives of the parties to reach an
agreement.2 With such possible variation, mediators must especially
tailor the level of leverage—the extent to which the third party uses
* Kyle Beardsley, Associate Professor of Political Science, Emory College
of Arts & Sciences, Emory University.
1 Mediation entails permissive third-party engagement with multiple
disputants in a peace process.
2 The mediation literature has focused on three main styles of mediation
that need not be mutually exclusive: facilitation, formulation and manipulation. See
generally Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan
Wilkenfeld, Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 58 (2006);
Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, a Review of
Practice, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS &
TECHNIQUES 125-53 (I. William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997); I.
William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation, in LEASHING THE DOGS
OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD 437-54 (Chester A.
Crocker et al. eds., 2007); Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen J. Young, David M.
Quinn & Victor Asal, MEDIATING INTERNATIONAL CRISES (2005); David Quinn,
Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Pelin Eralp, Victor Asal & Theodore McLauchlin, Crisis
Managers but Not Conflict Resolvers: Mediating Ethnic Intrastate Conflicts in Africa,
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. (forthcoming 2013).
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positive and negative inducements, either explicit or implicit, to move
negotiations forward—to the needs of the situation.3 In international
dispute mediation, a one-size-fits-all view of mediation may actually
inhibit effective conflict resolution.
This essay highlights the importance of third parties choosing
their mediation styles with eyes wide open to the context of the
conflict. In what follows, this essay first considers existing studies
that have found both potential benefits and risks of heavy-handed
third-party involvement—which rely on implicit or explicit threats of
punishment or promises of assistance—as a conflict-management
strategy.4 It then considers a few illustrative cases to demonstrate the
importance of making sure that the tools of mediation fit the context.
Finally, it concludes with a discussion of how sustained post-conflict
peacekeeping and peacebuilding can reduce some of the risks of
leverage in mediation.
I. THE STRENGTHS AND RISKS OF LEVERAGE IN EXISTING STUDIES
Starting with the upside of leverage, existing work has found
that it is often critical that international dispute mediators employ
positive and negative inducements in a way that creates sufficient

3 The use of leverage matches to the “manipulative” style used in the
literature referenced above. See, e.g., Peter J. D. Carnevale, Strategic Choice in
Mediation, 2 NEGOT. J. 41, 44-45 (1986) (characterizing the use of leverage in
mediation as involving “compensation” and “pressing” tactics). In addition to
“manipulation,” the use of leverage is also sometimes referred to as a “directive”
style of mediation. See, e.g., KENNETH KRESSEL, LABOR MEDIATION: AN
EXPLORATORY SURVEY 13 (1972); Peter J. D. Carnevale & Richard Pegnetter, The
Selection of Mediation Tactics in Public-Sector Disputes, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 65, 67 (1985).
Moreover, the use of leverage can also be termed “power” mediation. See, e.g.,
Loraleigh Keashly & Ronald J. Fisher, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions:
Theoretical and Practical Considerations, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 235 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996);
Isak Svensson, Mediation with Muscles or Minds? Exploring Power Mediators and Pure
Mediators in Civil Wars, 12 INT’L NEGOT. 229, 230 (2007). But see Robert Rauchhaus,
Asymmetric Information, Mediation and Conflict Management, 58 WORLD POL. 207, 22425, 233 (2006) (terming it “heavy” mediation).
4 Mediation with leverage can involve both immediate inducements for
agreement or pledges of future inducements to help guarantee the peace.

58

2013

Beardsley

2:1

leverage to incentivize the disputing parties to reach an agreement.5
Intractable conflicts often need external prodding to create a sense of
a mutually hurting stalemate when the status quo level of hostilities
seems more acceptable to the parties than taking political or security
risks in making substantial concessions.6 The set of tools available to
intermediaries that do not use leverage is indeed quite limited. Third
parties that merely serve a role of providing the disputants with
greater clarity of the relevant parameters often struggle to learn
information that the disputants themselves do not already know or to
convey credibly such information, or both.7 Moreover, third parties
that are unable to use leverage to guarantee settlements reached
during negotiations will be unable to resolve concerns of mistrust
between vulnerable actors who might be reluctant to reach a deal that
obliges them to draw down their security forces.8 Leverage might also
be needed to shield the disputants from political backlash for
unpopular concessions.9

This relates to work pioneered by Jacob Bercovitch on contingency
theory. See generally, e.g., Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There Method
in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of
Mediation, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 329 (2006); Jacob Bercovitch & Richard
Jackson, Negotiation or Mediation?: An Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of
Conflict Management in International Conflict, 17 NEGOT. J. 59 (2001); Jacob Bercovitch
& Jeffrey Langley, The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International
Mediation, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 670 (1993).
6 I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation: Conflict
Resolution and Power Politics, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 27, 41 (1985); Zartman & Touval,
International Mediation, supra note 2; Saadia Touval, Why the U.N. Fails, 73 FOREIGN
AFF. 44, 51 (1994); Moorad Mooradian & Daniel Druckman, Hurting Stalemate or
Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-95, 36 J. PEACE RES. 709, 712
(1999); Svensson, Mediation with Muscles or Minds?, supra note 3 at 237. See also Molly
M. Melin, When States Mediate, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78 (2013) (offering an
account of how actors with leverage are deemed more acceptable by disputants).
7 See Mark Fey & Kristopher W. Ramsay, When is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth
the Commute? Information Sharing Through Mediation, 62 WORLD POL. 529, 531 (2010);
Alastair Smith & Allan Stam, Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of
Civil and Interstate War, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 115, 117 (2003).
8 See generally BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE
SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS (2002).
9 See Kyle Beardsley & Nigel Lo, Third-Party Conflict Management and the
Willingness to Make Concessions, J. CONFLICT RESOL. (forthcoming 2013).
5
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On the other hand, even though many negotiations critically
depend on third-party pressure, there are also real risks for using too
much third-party leverage when less would suffice. Not only is
leverage more costly to the third party, which often must follow
through on threats and promises, but it can prove detrimental to
peace stability in the long term. When third parties are heavy handed
in their approach, they create artificial incentives for agreements that
are not likely sustainable over time.10 As a third-party’s interests shift
and influence wanes, former combatants that had reached an
agreement primarily because of the third-party’s enticements will be
more prone to abandon their agreements than former combatants
that reached an agreement with less incentivizing. The problem of
attenuated third-party involvement is especially strong when multiple
third parties are involved heavy-handedly in the peace process
because of the more difficult coordination needs in the post-conflict
setting.11 Separately, mediation with leverage can also restrict the
ability for disputants to walk away from negotiations that their
opponent is pursuing as a simple stalling tactic or that are otherwise
destined to fail.12
The existing work on mediation regarding these tradeoffs
suggests a basic rule of thumb that mediation with leverage should be
reserved only to stop ongoing or imminent massive bloodshed,
especially when the violence endangers non-combatants. That is, the
10 See KYLE BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA (2011); Kyle
Beardsley, Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency
Problems, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 723, 737 (2008); Suzanne Werner & Amy Yuen,
Making and Keeping Peace, 59 INT’L ORG. 261, 269 (2005); Mehmet Gurses, Patrick
McLeod & Nicolas Rost, Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace, 34
INT’L INTERACTIONS 129, 136 (2008); Zartman & Touval, International Mediation,
supra note 2 at 452 (highlights the dilemma that mediators face in choosing to push
for an early ceasefire or wait for a durable settlement to emerge).
11 See BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA, supra note 10; Tobias
Böhmelt, Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact of Multiparty Mediation, 41 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. 859, 860 (2011); Chester A. Crocker, Pamela Aall & Fen Osler Hampson, Is
More Better?: The Pros and Cons of Multiparty Mediation, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE
CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 497-513 (Chester A.
Crocker et al. eds., 2001); Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic
Peacemaking, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 9 (2013).
12 See generally Kyle Beardsley, Intervention without Leverage: Explaining the
Prevalence of Weak Mediators, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 272 (2009).
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use of strong mediation should be motivated primarily out of shortterm humanitarian goals in order to justify the long-term risks of
making post-conflict peace more fragile and the lack of patience in
waiting for a more organic peace to emerge. At the same time, more
minimal third-party involvement should be used when a long-term,
self-enforcing peace is the most pressing concern and humanitarian
responsibilities are not as pressing. Indeed, it is difficult, and in many
cases impossible, for third parties to successfully attain both an
immediate reduction in hostilities and a long-term resolution of the
relevant points of contention.
II. MATCHING THE TOOL TO THE PROBLEM IN PRACTICE
It is helpful to consider historical cases in which hindsight
suggests that third parties used too little or too much leverage, as well
as cases in which the level of leverage more appropriately matched
the needs of the situation. The problem of not using sufficient
leverage when it is needed to stop mass atrocities can be seen recently
in Syria.13 Kofi Annan’s initiative to facilitate a ceasefire between
Assad and the rebels never had teeth as long as Russia and China
blocked passage of U.N. Security Council resolutions that would
authorize punishment for continued intransigence and as long as a
coalition of the willing to threaten Assad failed to materialize. During
the ceasefire, Assad was more or less free to continue direct attacks
against rebel positions and indirect attacks against sympathizers via
support for pro-government militias.
On the flip side, the risk of using too much short-term
leverage was demonstrated perhaps most dramatically in the lead up
to the 1994 Rwanda genocide.14 The 1993 Arusha Accords resulted
from substantial third-party pressure and the promise of a
peacekeeping force to guarantee the peace. However, once the
mediator involvement waned upon the signing of the Accords and
13 J. Michael Greig, in this issue, provides a detailed account of why this
conflict has proven so difficult to manage. J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights
from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 48
(2013).
14 See Alan J. Kuperman, The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes
Do More Damage than Good, 16 SAIS REV. 221, 222 (1996).
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the peacekeeping force turned out to be weaker than expected and
slow to deploy, implementation of the Accords failed and a window
of opportunity for Hutu extremist militias to establish their
dominance emerged. Stated more particularly, the leverage of the
mediating parties, coupled with their inability to follow through on
their commitments, left much of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu
populations vulnerable to annihilation perpetrated by Hutu militia
groups intentionally left out of the peace process. It is also important
to note that the violence during the Rwandan civil war that preceded
the Accords was not nearly as threatening to non-combatant
populations as the genocide that followed. That is, the heavy-handed
third-party involvement, in retrospect, was not well justified on
humanitarian grounds.
More positively, Richard Holbrooke’s role in pushing for the
Dayton Accords amidst NATO bombings of Serbian positions at the
end of the Bosnian War presents a compelling example of a case in
which the use of much needed leverage effectively calmed a
humanitarian disaster. Prior to the extreme heavy-handed
intervention, earlier mediation attempts lacking sufficient leverage
failed to halt the violence. These earlier efforts stand in stark contrast
to Holbrooke’s role, such that it is often lamented that the
international community did not act stronger sooner. Note that this
does not mean that Holbrooke’s role is an appropriate model of how
third parties can foster long-term, self-enforcing peace, as Bosnia
continues to sit on a razor’s edge with a real risk of returning to
interethnic conflict. But it does well demonstrate that strong thirdparty involvement is often necessary to stop the killing and force a
hurting stalemate, and that the risks of long-term instability may very
well be worth the intervention.
Another example of a well-matched mediation effort, Marti
Ahtisaari’s role in the Aceh peace process, which led to the
transformation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) from a rebel
group to a legitimate political actor, demonstrates the promise of
more hands-off involvement being better able to facilitate long-term
peace. As the former president of Finland and founder of the Crisis
Management Initiative, Ahtisaari lacked any ability to manipulate the
incentives of the disputants, but he was able to shape the momentum
for peace—generated by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and
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military gains by Indonesian forces—and help formulate an
agreement that involved concessions on both sides with an eye
toward long-term political transformation. This example, however,
illustrates that while agreements that result from softer forms of
mediation are more likely to become self-sustaining, the problem is in
getting to the agreement in the first place. Without leverage, the
parties already have to be motivated to resolve their dispute
peacefully, but that is often asking quite a lot. Weak mediation may
not carry much risk, but it also might not carry much value added
when a protracted conflict environment needs more third-party
engagement. That is, weak mediation can perform quite well when
the conflict is already “ripe” for resolution, but it can struggle to help
“ripen” the conflict in the first place.15
III. COMBINING MEDIATION WITH PEACEKEEPING AND
PEACEBUILDING
In light of the limitations and risks surrounding the use of
leverage, single third-party efforts generally fail to produce both
immediate humanitarian relief to the bloodiest conflicts and longterm conflict resolution. As such, it is helpful to think more broadly
about peace processes as potentially involving multiple third-party
efforts that unfold over time. Post-conflict peacekeeping and
peacebuilding, when effective, can supplement mediator efforts to
achieve both short-term and long-term effects.16 If there is sufficient
international will to sustain leverage and engagement after hostilities
have attenuated, then mediation is not likely to create a large risk for
a fragile peace after short-term success in attenuating the hostilities.

See I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND
INTERVENTION IN AFRICA 266 (1985); J. Michael Greig, Moments of Opportunity:
Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals, 45 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 692 (2001) (overviews what ripeness entails).
16 Peacekeeping and peacebuilding both entail permissive third-party
involvement for the purposes of enhancing the stability and duration of peace in a
post-conflict environment. Peacekeeping implies a military component, and
peacebuilding implies a political, social or economic component. These terms often
overlap but need not be provided by the same third parties performing mediation.
15
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Turning first to peacekeeping, deploying international forces
can maintain the outside pressure that existed at the time of
agreement and keep the parties motivated to uphold their
commitments. That being said, peacekeeping is expensive—even
when the costs can be distributed across U.N. or regional
organization memberships—and the financial and decision-making
burdens often fall to those third parties in the developed world that
are fairly insulated from the externalities of recurrent conflict. So,
peacekeeping cannot be counted on as a solution to the mediation
attenuation problem because third parties that would be willing to
step in as peacekeepers and indefinitely remain engaged as guarantors
of the peace are often hard to find.17
Peacebuilding missions that follow intrastate conflict provide
an interesting middle ground, and their increasing prominence is
perhaps well justified given how they can help resolve the long-term
issues caused by heavy-handed, third-party involvement.
Peacebuilding encompasses a number of reforms that can include
various dimensions of political, economic and security sector
reform.18 Relevant to the long-term risks related to heavy-handed
mediation, one of the central goals of peacebuilding is to ensure that
the key stakeholders are invested in maintaining peace and not
dependent on third-party inducements. Through the promotion of
democracy and power sharing, peacebuilding strives to enable the
voices of each of the key constituent groups to be heard; through the
promotion of economic development, peacebuilding strives to
diversify the set of groups that would benefit from sustained peace;
and through security sector reform, peacebuilding strives to improve
the capacity of the state to maintain order and reduce the ability for
one side to threaten others through use of the state security
apparatus. While peacebuilding that follows strong mediation can
See generally VIRGINIA PAGE FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?:
SHAPING BELLIGERENTS’ CHOICE AFTER CIVIL WAR (2008); MICHAEL W. DOYLE
& NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS
PEACE OPERATIONS (2006). This is not to say that peacekeeping is ineffective
when it occurs, which would be inconsistent with some of the existing literature.
The point is that peacekeeping cannot be taken as a given supplement to mediator
leverage, as it still depends crucially on third-party long-term investment.
18 See ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL
CONFLICT 38-39 (2004).
17
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help bridge the gap between the incentives at the time of agreement
and the incentives in the future in the absence of sustained thirdparty engagement, an important caveat is that peacebuilding in many
post-conflict states might be more accurately described as nation
building and still needs substantial, sustained international
involvement for self-sustaining peace to adhere. Moreover, a close
equivalent of peacebuilding does not in practice exist for interstate
conflicts.
CONCLUSION
This article has considered the risks inherent in deciding how
much leverage a third party should bring to bear in a conflict
management effort. Too much leverage, especially when the leverage
is difficult to sustain indefinitely, can risk promoting artificial
incentives that lead to fragile terms of peace. Too little leverage in the
face of ongoing and imminent bloodshed carries obvious
humanitarian risks. The lesson to take away from this analysis is not
that mediators can do no good. Indeed, mediators can do much good
when they are able to use leverage to stop ongoing brutal violence in
the short-term, especially when they can sustain that leverage over
time. Moreover, mediators can do much good when they use lighter
tactics to help disputants get over some of the final barriers to
durable settlements that are not negotiated under duress. In these
ways, practitioners of mediation can choose the form of their
involvement with accurate expectations of both the potential merits
of involvement and the potential risks.
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THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND ADJUDICATION
Stephen E. Gent*
INTRODUCTION
Disputing states may select from a variety of resolution
mechanisms to manage their conflicts—bilateral negotiations, nonbinding third-party mediation,1 or international arbitration and
adjudication.2 Of these mechanisms, arbitration and adjudication
have often proven to be the most effective means of producing longlasting settlements on contentious issues. Despite this fact, evidence
indicates that states are generally reluctant to use such legal forms of
dispute resolution, especially in resolving issues of national security.
To understand when policymakers can and should promote the use
of these mechanisms, they need to understand the reasons behind the
reluctance of states to use arbitral or legal forums. Recent research
provides insight into the political dynamics underlying the use of

* Stephen E. Gent, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1 See Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Leverage and Conflict
Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013); Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive
Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L
AFF. 27 (2013); J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature
on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013); Molly M. Melin,
When States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 78 (2013); Isak Svensson, Research
on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 17 (2013).
2 U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1.
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international arbitration and adjudication—insights that will aid
policymakers charged with resolving such disputes.3
International arbitration and adjudication share three general
characteristics. First, a third party, not the disputants, determines the
terms of any settlement.4 Second, unlike mediation, states agree to
honor the ruling before the third party actually hands down a
decision. Finally, the arbitration or adjudication settlements
incorporate principles of international law that are not necessarily
invoked in other types of negotiations.5 The two methods primarily
differ with respect to the identity of the third party.6 In arbitration, an
individual, state, NGO, or panel of states hands down a decision. On
the other hand, adjudication is conducted by an international court,
such as the International Court of Justice.
While arbitration and adjudication are often viewed as legal
instruments, it is important to view the use of such procedures as
being part of a political process. In disputes over contentious issues,
states are primarily interested in achieving outcomes that protect their
3 See generally Krista E. Wiegand & Emilia Justyna Powell, Past Experience,
Quest for the Best Forum, and Peaceful Attempts to Resolve Territorial Disputes, 55 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 33 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Decision Control
and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, 55 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 710 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, Bias and the
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, 28 CONFLICT MGMT. &
PEACE SCI. 124 (2011); Stephen E. Gent & Megan Shannon, The Effectiveness of
International Arbitration and Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, 72 J. POL. 366 (2010);
Richard B. Bilder, Adjudication: International Arbitration Tribunals and Courts, in
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 195266 (I. William Zartman ed., U.S. Institute of Peace Press rev. ed. 2007); Sara
McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, International Institutions, and Compliance with
Agreements, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 721 (2007); Todd L. Allee, & Paul K. Huth,
Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, 100
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 219, 219-234 (2006); Beth Simmons, Capacity, Commitment, and
Compliance: International Institutions and Territorial Disputes, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 829
(2002) (describing recent studies in political science on legal dispute resolution of
territorial and maritime issues).
4 Franz Cede, The Settlement of International Disputes by Legal Means—
Arbitration and Judicial Settlement, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 358-59 (Jacob Bercovitch et al. eds., 2009).
5 Id. at 360.
6 See id. at 358-75.
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own security and economic interests. Thus, even though decisions of
arbitration panels or international courts are largely based on legal
principles, the initial decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication
represents a voluntary, political commitment. The tension inherent in
the use of a legal procedure to resolve a political dispute has often
constrained the use of arbitration and adjudication in the
international system.7 This article examines how the political frame
helps policymakers understand when and why states would be willing
to use international arbitration to resolve disputes over contentious
issues.
I. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ARBITRATION AND
ADJUDICATION
Despite a tendency to compare these processes legally to their
domestic counterparts, international arbitration and adjudication are
carried out in a different environment. Without a global police force,
international courts and arbitration panels do not have the same
ability to enforce legal rulings as domestic governments.
Nevertheless, international arbitration and adjudication have proved
remarkably effective. Studies have shown that these legal dispute
mechanisms are significantly more successful at resolving
international territorial, maritime, and river disputes than other
bilateral and third-party conflict management mechanisms.8 Table 1
presents historical data on the outcome of attempts to settle
territorial claims in the Americas and Western Europe collected by
the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project.9 Sixty-three percent of
the time, arbitration or adjudication ends the claim between the
JOSEPH PRESTON BARATTA, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
IMPROVING ITS ROLE IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 26 (1989). See generally F.S.
NORTHEDGE & MICHAEL D. DONELAN, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE
POLITICAL ASPECTS (1971).
8 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 368-69; Gent & Shannon, Bias and the
Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 127-28.
9 See generally Paul R. Hensel, Contentious Issues and World Politics: The
Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 81
(2001); PAUL R. HENSEL & SARA MCLAUGHLN MITCHELL, THE ISSUE
CORRELATES OF WAR (ICOW) PROJECT, http://www.paulhensel.org/icow.html.
7
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disputants. On the other hand, bilateral negotiations and mediation
have a success rate of less than twenty percent. What drives this
remarkable difference in success rates?
Table 1. Effectiveness of Different Conflict Resolution
Procedures in Settling Territorial Disputes Between Countries
Arbitration
and
Adjudication

Mediation

Bilateral
Negotiations

Did Not End
Territorial Dispute

14
(36.8)

116
(81.7)

286
(82.7)

Ended Territorial
Dispute

24
(63.2)

26
(18.3)

60
(17.3)

Total

38
(100.0)

142
(100.0)

346
(100.0)

Source: Issue Correlates of War; includes all territorial claims in the Americas and
Western Europe, 1816-2001. Percentages in parentheses.

There are several reasons why states are often willing to
comply with international arbitration and adjudication despite the
lack of traditional law enforcement. First, arbitrators and adjudicators
usually use principles of international law as the basis for their
decisions. Thus, when a state rejects such a ruling, it is also rejecting
well-established legal code. States may respect legal rulings in order to
help preserve the general legitimacy of international law. Second, the
legality of arbitration and adjudication generates international
reputation costs. These rulings are perceived by the rest of the world
as being legitimate because they are founded in legal provisions
agreed to by the global community.10 Thus it can damage a country’s

See generally Dana D. Fischer, Decisions to Use the International Court of
Justice: Four Recent Cases. 26 INT’L STUD. Q. 251(1982).
10

69

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:1

reputation when it chooses to break a binding agreement.11 Finally,
arbitration and adjudication can provide political cover at the
domestic level. Domestic constituents and voters may perceive
concessions based on international law as being more legitimate than
concessions offered in bilateral negotiations.12 Thus, the arbitral and
adjudicative settlements may be more acceptable to a country’s
population, and disparate constituencies within the country, in the
long term than other types of settlements.
II. THE RELUCTANCE TO USE LEGAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
While arbitration and adjudication have proven to be highly
effective at resolving disputes, states are reluctant to use these
procedures. Table 2 presents data on the frequency of different types
of settlement attempts of territorial, maritime, and river claims.
Arbitration and adjudication combined only make up about six or
seven percent of settlement attempts. To understand why methods of
international legal dispute resolution are rarely used, one must
consider the unique characteristics of these procedures. Unlike
bilateral negotiations or other types of third-party diplomatic efforts,
arbitration and adjudication require states to give up decision control.
Decision control is the “degree to which any one of the participants
may unilaterally determine the outcome of the dispute.”13 In binding
arbitration or adjudication, an international court or arbitration panel
makes the final determination about the terms of any settlement.

11

See Mitchell & Hensel, supra note 3, at 723-25; Simmons, supra note 3,

at 843-44.
12 See Allee & Huth, supra note 3, at 222-23; Kyle Beardsley & Nigel Lo,
Third-Party Conflict Management and the Willingness to Make Concessions, 57 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. (forthcoming 2013); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY
AMONG NATIONS 61-62 (1990).
13 John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 541, 546 (1978).
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Table 2. Conflict Resolution Attempts by Type
and Disputed Issue
Type of Disputed Issue
Type of Conflict Resolution
Attempt

Territory River

Arbitration/Adjudication 38
(7.2)

Total
Maritime Attempts

7
(4.9)

16
(6.0)

61
(6.5)

144
(27.2)

48
(33.3)

89
(3.5)

281
(29.9)

Bilateral Negotiations

348
(65.7)

89
(61.8)

161
(60.5)

598
(63.6)

Total Attempts

530
(100.0)

144
266
(100.0) (100.0)

Other Third-Party
Attempt

940
(100.0)

Source: Issue Correlates of War project. Percentages in parentheses.

The requirement that disputants relinquish decision control
makes them reluctant to pursue legal dispute resolution. When
deciding whether to pursue legal dispute resolution, states must
weigh the trade-off between pursuing an effective conflict
management strategy and the costs of ceding decision control to a
third party.14 The following five factors significantly influence the
willingness of states to relinquish decision control and pursue
arbitration or adjudication:

Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 368-69.
14
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A. Third-Party Bias
Each party to a dispute will be reluctant to give up decision
control to an arbitration panel or court that it believes is biased
against its interests.15 A state may expect that such a biased third
party will hand down a ruling that disproportionately favors its
adversary. Given that one of the disputants would likely reject any
biased third party, disputants are generally only willing to jointly agree
to relatively unbiased arbiters or adjudicators.16
B. Salience
States are less willing to cede decision control when
negotiating over highly salient issues.17 An unfavorable ruling on an
issue of critical importance would be very costly, as state leaders
would be faced with the choice between living with an unpalatable
outcome and bearing the costs of reneging on a legal settlement.18
Given this, it is not surprising that arbitration and adjudication are
more commonly used to resolve less salient economic issues such as
investment disputes than more salient security issues like territorial
control.19 Moreover, within the universe of territorial and maritime
claims, states have been less willing to pursue arbitration or
adjudication on highly salient claims, such as those that involve
strategically located territory or valuable resources.20 For example,
despite the fact that Colombia and Venezuela have previously used
arbitration to resolve a territorial dispute, they have been reluctant to
do so over their disputed maritime boundary in Gulf of Venezuela

Id. at 375.
Id.
17 Gent & Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict
Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 134.
18 Id. at 129.
19 See Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 730 n.2. See generally Todd
Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining
Over Dispute Resolution Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 124 (2010) (discussing the use of
arbitration to resolve investment disputes).
20 See Gent & Shannon, Bias and the Effectiveness of Third-Party Conflict
Management Mechanisms, supra note 3, at 138.
15
16
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after the discovery of oil reserves in the 1960s.21 Similarly, while
Malaysia was willing to use the International Tribunal of the Law of
the Seas to resolve a maritime dispute with Singapore over land
reclamation in 2003, it recently avoided arbitration or adjudication to
resolve a disputed claim with Brunei over the rights to offshore oil
reserves.22
C. Uncertainty
Uncertainty about potential legal rulings also influences the
willingness to pursue arbitration or adjudication.23 A state will be less
inclined to give up decision control if it is highly uncertain as to the
terms of the settlement that it should expect from arbitration or
adjudication.24 As the nineteenth-century international law scholar
John Bassett Moore noted, “Governments are not in the habit of
resigning their functions so completely into the hands of arbitrators
as to say, ‘We have no boundaries; make some for us.’”25 Given this,
disputants generally only agree to pursue arbitration or adjudication
after they have successfully reached previous functional, procedural,
and substantive agreements on the issue at hand that decrease the
range of outcomes that could result from legal dispute resolution.26
D. Bargaining Power
The decision to pursue arbitration or adjudication is part of a
bargaining process between disputants.27 On issues of national
security, such as territorial conflicts, a state’s bargaining power is

Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 714.
22 Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case Concerning Land
Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor (Jan. 14, 2005),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1154.
23 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 720.
24 Id.
25 LARS SCHOULTZ, BENEATH THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY OF U.S.
POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA 117 (1998).
26 Gent & Shannon, Decision Control and the Pursuit of Binding Conflict
Management: Choosing the Ties that Bind, supra note 3, at 721.
27 Id.
21
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largely a function of its ability and willingness to pursue its goals
through military force.28 However, once states enter into arbitration
or adjudication, this source of power is no longer salient, as the terms
of any settlement will instead be a function of the strength of each
state’s legal claim.29 Since states with greater capabilities are better
able to guarantee favorable outcomes through negotiations or
military conflicts, they will be reluctant to opt for legal dispute
resolution unless they expect to receive a favorable ruling.30 For this
reason, arbitration and adjudication are less likely when there is a
large power asymmetry between disputants.
E. Armed Conflict
In general, the costs involved with the militarization of
conflict increase the incentive of states to resolve their disputed
claims. Thus, it is not surprising that arbitration and adjudication of
territorial, maritime, and river claims are more likely when there has
been a militarized interstate dispute on the issue in recent years.31
However, legal dispute resolution is rarely used as part of the peace
process of an armed conflict.32 In these situations, there is often a
lack of trust between the disputants that would be necessary for an
effective legal procedure.33 In addition, peace processes usually
revolve around multidimensional issues. Thus, disputants are
generally reluctant to give up decision control to a legal body during
peace negotiations because it reduces their ability to use issue linkage
to find a politically acceptable compromise solution to the conflict.
III. MOVING RELUCTANT STATES TO THE ARBITRAL
FORUM
Systematic analysis has shown that arbitration and
adjudication can be highly effective methods of resolving contentious
Id. at 719.
Id. at 719-20.
30 Id. at 719.
31 Id. at 727.
32 Id. at 713.
33 See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 367.
28
29
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international disputes, but states are often unwilling to pursue such
legal procedures. Looking at the choice to pursue arbitration or
adjudication as a political decision provides policymakers with
concrete strategies to encourage the use of legal dispute resolution. In
particular, policymakers should focus on reducing the costs of giving
up decision control without undermining the unique benefits of
international arbitration and adjudication.
First, policymakers should find the historical shift from
arbitration by states to arbitration and adjudication by
intergovernmental organizations and courts to be a positive trend.
Disputants will likely perceive such organizations and courts as being
less biased than state actors, which will decrease the potential costs of
giving up decision control. For this reason, policymakers should
encourage the use of international courts and instill confidence in the
international community that such courts are unbiased. One practical
step would be to ensure that the methods used by international
courts to select judges for individual cases minimize the possibility of
a biased judge, such as a citizen of one of the disputing states.34
Second, policymakers can help minimize the costs of giving
up decision control by reducing the stakes and the level of
uncertainty in arbitration and adjudication. One potential approach to
doing this would be to encourage disputants to use incremental or
piecemeal binding negotiations to settle portions of their claim.35
Submitting to arbitration rulings over a series of smaller issues poses
less of a risk to disputants than a comprehensive ruling, as it provides
the ability to back out at various stages. While such an approach
would extend the negotiation process, if it encourages states that
would not otherwise do so to enter into a legal dispute resolution
procedure, it may prove to be a more effective long-term conflict
resolution strategy.
Finally, it is also important to emphasize legal dispute
resolution is not a panacea for all conflicts. States have multiple
Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of
Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 624 (2005).
35 See Larry N. George, Realism and Internationalism in the Gulf of Venezuela,
30 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 139, 162 (1988).
34
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avenues—from bilateral negotiations to non-binding mediation to
military conflict—to reach settlements over disputed issues.36 When
disputants opt for arbitration or adjudication, they must forgo these
other options. Since states with greater bargaining power are able to
guarantee themselves favorable outcomes outside of court, they will
be reluctant to submit their claims to arbitration or adjudication
unless they can expect a similarly favorable outcome. In the maritime
dispute with Brunei, Malaysian leaders recognized that they had a
weak legal claim and had little chance of a favorable outcome if the
case was submitted to arbitration or adjudication.37 Instead, Malaysia
opted for bilateral negotiations in which it was able to use leverage
and issue linkage to guarantee itself a future share of the oil and gas
revenues in the disputed maritime area.38
As mentioned above, a similar desire for flexibility and the
need to find compromises over complex, multidimensional issues
also makes states reluctant to give up decision control to a legal body
during peace negotiations of armed conflicts. The limitations of the
use of legal dispute resolution to resolve armed conflict were
apparent in the aftermath of the 2000 Algiers Agreement to end the
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in which the disputants agreed to
allow the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to demarcate their
border and arbitrate claims of international law violations.39 Ethiopia
rejected the arbitral decision that awarded the disputed border town
of Badme to Eritrea,40 and the reparations awarded by the PCA were
insufficient to resolve the political dispute between the states.41 Given
this, policymakers should focus on more flexible conflict
management mechanisms, such as mediation, that allow states to
maintain decision control in the immediate aftermath of armed
See Gent & Shannon, The Effectiveness of International Arbitration and
Adjudication: Getting into a Bind, supra note 3, at 372.
37 Brunei and KL to Share Oil and Gas Revenue, THE STAR ONLINE, June 8,
2010,
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/6/8/parliament/642
1375.
38 Id.
39 Ari Dybnis, Note, Was the Eritrea—Ethiopia Claims Commission Merely a
Zero-Sum Game?: Exposing the Limits of Arbitration in Resolving Violent Transnational
Conflict, 33 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 255, 259, 263 (2011).
40 Id. at 263.
41 Id. at 270-71.
36
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conflict, reserving arbitration and adjudication for situations in which
there is a reduced level of tension between the disputants.
In addition, evidence from territorial disputes indicates that
states are less likely to comply with legal rulings that do not reflect
the underlying balance of power between the disputants.42 For
example, a militarily superior Argentina rejected a 1977 arbitration
settlement of its disputed border with Chile in Beagle Channel.43
Given its power advantage, the Argentine government found the
arbitration ruling unacceptable and hoped to achieve a more
favorable outcome through other means.44 Thus, arbitration and
adjudication will be most effective when they produce settlements
that reflect the political realities on the ground. Understanding these
political factors can help policymakers determine when they should
promote the use of arbitration and adjudication, as well as when they
should turn to alternative methods of conflict management.

42 See STEPHEN E. GENT & MEGAN SHANNON, BARGAINING POWER
AND THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND ADJUDICATION 15-16 (Mar.

13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with International Studies Association).
This version of this paper was presented at the 2011 annual meeting of the
International Studies Association in Montreal, Canada (Mar. 16-19, 2011).
43 See DAVID R. MARES, VIOLENT PEACE: MILITARIZED INTERSTATE
BARGAINING IN LATIN AMERICA 136-37 (2001).
44 See id. at 137-38.
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WHEN STATES MEDIATE
Molly M. Melin*
INTRODUCTION
The use of mediation for conflict resolution is not a new
process. The first recorded mediation efforts occurred in 209 B.C.,
when Greek city-states helped the Aetolian League and Macedonia
produce a truce in the first Macedonian war. Since then, mediation
has been increasingly employed as a tool for peacefully resolving
conflict.1 The International Conflict Management Dataset2 reports
1334 mediation attempts by states in 333 interstate and civil conflicts
since World War II, with more than half of the mediation efforts
occurring since the end of the Cold War.3 States represent the most
* Molly M. Melin, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Loyola
University Chicago.
1 The benefits of successful mediation are widespread. Consider the case
of the Northern Irish “Troubles.” Beginning with the Good Friday Accords and
continuing with the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in mediating
interpersonal disputes, the relative peace in Northern Ireland today is a testament
to the power of a well-orchestrated and sustained mediation effort.
2 JACOB BERCOVITCH, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
DATASET: OFFICIAL CODEBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT DATASET (1999); J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL,
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 31 (2012). The International Conflict Management
dataset was compiled by Professor Jacob Bercovitch in the late 1990s and focuses
on the mechanisms used in international conflict management. JACOB
BERCOVITCH, VICTOR KREMENYUK & I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 570 (2008) (defining international conflict
as “organised and continuous militarized conflict, or a demonstration of intention
to use military force involving at least one state.”).
3
BERCOVITCH, supra note 2, at 31.
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common type of political actor willing to serve as a mediator in
international dispute resolution—a category often referred to as
“state-led” mediation. Not all states, however, volunteer to serve as
mediators and not all disputes receive mediator assistance. This essay
examines the drivers of such choices and suggests factors that
policymakers should consider when assessing whether to engage in
state-led mediation.
An understanding of these factors will help policymakers
generate expectations about which states are likely to have an interest
in mediating conflicts (and can be successfully encouraged to do so),
and which disputants are likely to accept state-led mediation offers
(thereby avoiding the loss of face associated with rejection). The
objective of this exercise is to assist the policymaker in identifying the
circumstances where state-led mediation will have a positive and
permanent influence on long-term peace. Section I of the paper
describes the role states play in the mediation process, both in terms
of the broader spectrum of mediators and in terms of involvement
frequency. Section II discusses the conditions that facilitate state-led
mediation efforts, and the conclusion offers recommendations for
achieving more effective state-led mediation efforts.
I. THE STATE AS PEACEMAKER—A STRATEGIC CHOICE?
There are four main types of mediators: international
organizations (e.g., the United Nations), regional governmental
organizations (e.g., the Arab League), individuals (e.g., former United
States President Jimmy Carter), and states (e.g., New Zealand). States
are the most common mediator and the focus of this paper.4
Mediation works differently across mediator types. Of particular

For work on mediation involving regional organizations, see generally
Scott Sigmund Gartner, Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War
Agreement Durability, 73 J. POL. 380 (2011). For work on international organizations,
see generally Holley E. Hansen, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Stephen C. Nemeth,
IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy, 52
J.CONFLICT RESOL. 295 (2008); Megan Shannon, Preventing War and Providing the
Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 26 CONFLICT
MGMT. & PEACE SCI.144 (2009).
4
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note, the motivations of states for offering mediation assistance differ
from those of the other actors.5
States carefully consider when and where they mediate, and
often consider the strategic benefits when deciding whether to take
on the mediator role. Potential gains include establishing a reputation
as a peacemaker (as have Norway and Sweden) and enhancing the
state’s influence in the dispute’s outcome, either by changing an
unfavorable situation or maintaining a favorable status quo.
Understandably, states are more likely to take up the role of mediator
if it will expand their influence, resources, and power. Figure 1
depicts the number of conflicts and state-led mediation efforts over
time.6 While the number of mediation efforts per year closely follows
the number of disputes per year, the two lines never intersect—a
characteristic I explore further below.

5 For example, international organizations often include peacemaking as
a part of their charter (e.g., the African Union and Organization of American
States), but frequently must overcome political struggles between members before
mediation can occur. Conversely, state mediators often struggle to establish
impartibility given their significant stake in the outcome of the mediation efforts.
States also have more policy instruments at their disposal than international
organizations, allowing for greater variation in reactions to external conflict—most
notably, joining the conflict in support of one side, an unlikely occurrence when an
international organization leads mediation.
6 BERCOVITCH, supra note 2, at 31.
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Figure 1. The Occurrence of Disputes and State-Led Mediation
Efforts, 1945-1999
The Frequency of State-led Mediation and Disputes
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The figure also contains information about state-led
mediation decisions. There are at least two possible ways to explain
mediation occurrence. First, it is possible to think of states as a
population of mediators that indiscriminately mediate any disputes
that arise. Although this description may seem extreme, it is not far
from popular beliefs about the obligations of the Great Powers. The
global community often views states with large capabilities as being
obligated to respond to instances of extreme violence. The second
explanation sees mediation as resulting from strategic calculations. In
this case, states do not indiscriminately mediate, but rather consider
the costs and benefits before agreeing to do so.
If the former proposition is correct, the supply of mediators
would remain relatively constant. And if the supply of mediators was
constant, we would observe stability in the number of mediation
efforts. Years with many conflicts would likely experience mediator
supply problems with a large gap between the number of disputes
and the number of mediation efforts. In years with fewer disputes,
most disputes would be mediated. The data, however, does not seem
to support the proposition that Great Powers feel any significant
81
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obligations to mediate by virtue of their leadership role in the global
community.
Indeed, a further unpacking of the data seems to endorse the
latter view—that a state’s decision to serve as a mediator is the result
of strategic calculations. Figure 2 graphs the gap between the two
lines from Figure 1, showing the variation in the number of disputes
that go without state-led mediation. There is no year for which all
disputes are mediated by states (no matter how few disputes are
observed), and there is variation in the percent mediated—both
provide evidence that states make strategic mediation choices.
Figure 2. The Gap Between the Number of Conflicts and
Mediation Occurrence, 1945-1999
The Gap Between Mediation and Disputes
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II. IDENTIFYING THE OPTIMAL CONDITIONS FOR STATE-LED
MEDIATION
Unlike sanctions or military intervention, a prerequisite to the
occurrence of mediation is the acceptability of mediation to all
involved parties. An often cited definition of mediation highlights
this characteristic, describing mediation as “a reactive process of
conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept
an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change
their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without
82
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resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.”7
Generally, political or economic ties between a potential mediator
and the disputants increase the occurrence of mediation.8 These ties
generate state interest in conflict resolution, and often translate into
leverage at the negotiating table.9 The remainder of this essay
explores the conditions that increase mediation occurrence (both in
terms of state willingness to mediate and in terms of belligerents
accepting state-led mediation) and success, as summarized in Table 1.

7 Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation:
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 11, 13 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996).
8 Ties that affect mediation offers and acceptance include trading
partnerships, alliances, physical proximity, and even former colonial ties. For an indepth analysis of how ties affect mediation and conflict management behavior, see
generally Molly M. Melin, The Impact of State Relationship on If, When, and How Conflict
Management Occurs, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 691 (2011).
9 For more on mediator leverage see Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool
for the Job: Mediator Leverage and Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57
(2013).

83

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:1

Table 1. Summary of Factors that Affect Mediation
Explanatory
Variable

Effect on Mediation
Occurrence

Effect on Mediation
Outcome

Regime Type

Democracy increases
mediation occurrence

Democracy increases
mediation success

Third-Party
Capabilities

Capable mediators
increase mediation
occurrence

Capable mediators
increase mediation
success

Conflict Costs

Violence increases
mediation occurrence

Violence increases
mediation success

Rivalries &
Reoccurring Conflict

Rivalries & reoccurrence
increases mediation
occurrence

not observed

Mediation History

Previous mediation
increases mediation
occurrence

not observed

Conflict Stalemate

Stalemate increases
mediation occurrence

not observed

Conflict Nature

International conflicts
increase mediation
occurrence

not observed

A. Regime Type
Regime type plays an important role in the frequency and
likely success of mediation. Regime type, or form of government, can
encourage mediation and its success at several levels. Mediation and
accepting offers of mediation are more likely when democracies are
involved, as these states are accustomed to third-party involvement in
conflict and garner other states’ trust, making them a more attractive
option for conflict resolution.10 Democratic third parties are more
Mark J.C. Crescenzi, Kelly M. Kadera, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell &
Clayton L. Thyne, A Supply Side Theory of Mediation, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 1069, 108485 (2011).
10
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likely to be accepted as mediators, democratic disputants are more
likely to accept mediation, and a democratic international community
increases mediation use. Democratic disputants are more accepting of
mediation because their populace is accustomed to third-party
involvement in domestic conflicts, thus lowering the political costs of
mediation acceptance.11 A strong democratic community globally
encourages even non-democracies to adopt the behavior of
democracies, such as employing third-party resolution, which
increases the use of mediation.12 A shared democratic culture
between disputants and the mediator is more likely to generate an
agreement, as democracies employ negotiation and compromise in
disputes with other democracies but distrust the intentions of nondemocratic states and are less willing to rely on techniques of
peaceful conflict resolution in those conflicts.13 Mediation is therefore
best encouraged when democracies are involved as disputants and
mediators. An apt illustration of this principle in action was Turkey’s
willingness to work with British and American mediators following
the 2010 Gaza-bound flotilla incident. As democratic norms continue
to spread, state-led mediation will be increasingly employed to resolve
disputes.
B. Third-Party Capabilities
States (or third parties) with material strength and diplomatic
prowess are likely to be accepted and successful as mediators because
these actors have access to resources and negotiating experience that
makes them attractive as mediators and able to create and sustain
peace. Before a state can act, however, it must have the capabilities
necessary to be effective as a mediator.14 Mediation is therefore more
likely when capable third parties have interests in involvement, as
these actors have the ability to be involved. While capable third
parties are certainly not always successful (consider Kofi Annan’s
James A. Wall Jr., John B. Stark & Rhetta L. Standifer, Mediation: A
Current Review and Theory Development, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 370, 372-3 (2001).
12 See generally Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, A Kantian System? Democracy and
Third-Party Conflict Resolution, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 749 (2002).
13 Russell J. Leng & Patrick M. Regan, Social and Political Cultural Effects on
the Outcomes of Mediation in Militarized Interstate Disputes, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 431, 435
(2003).
14 Melin, supra note 8, at 706.
11
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efforts in Syria), their capabilities and reputation mean they are likely
to be deemed “acceptable” to the disputants.15 Mediators with
material capabilities can incentivize agreements by using the
proverbial carrot and stick to increase an agreement’s appeal or
threaten failed compliance.16 For example, the Great Powers are
often actively involved in conflict management, as was the case with
European and Chinese involvement in Darfur. In selecting third
parties with the assets necessary to create and enforce peace,
policymakers can encourage mediation and its success.
C. Conflict Costs
The more costly a conflict is in terms of violence, the more
likely it is to be “ripe” for state-led mediation.17 The increased
international pressure and the disputants’ cost-benefit calculus create
an appealing climate for state-led mediation efforts. Costly conflicts
generally attract international interest. The international spotlight
offers a state mediator the opportunity to gain in terms of reputation
and influence. For example, New Zealand benefited from an
enhanced regional role after successfully mediating the Bougainville
conflict,18 as did Switzerland in bringing peace between the Algerian
independence movement and the French government.19 Disputants
also are more likely to accept mediation offers as the cost of conflict
increases because increasing costs impact the disputants’ assessment
15 For work on the challenges of mediation in Syria, see J. Michael Greig,
Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).
16 Kyle C. Beardsley et al., Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes, 50 J.
CONFLICT RES. 58, 83 (2006).
17 See generally I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT
AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (1985).
18 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War Peacemaking, in PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2012: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELFDETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY 71, 78 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al.
eds., 2012). See generally REBECCA ADAMS, PEACE ON BOUGAINVILLE: TRUCE
MONITORING GROUP (2001); BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE THE CONFLICT (Anthony J.
Regan & Helga M. Griffin eds., 2005); MONICA WEHNER & DONALD DENOON,
WITHOUT A GUN: AUSTRALIANS’ EXPERIENCES MONITORING PEACE IN
BOUGAINVILLE, 1997-2001, 43-48 (2001).
19 See generally JOHN RUEDY, MODERN ALGERIA: THE ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION (2005).
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of whether continued death, destruction and expenditures are worth
achieving their initial objective. Furthermore, state mediators can
expect fewer actions will be required to resolve costly conflicts, given
the high cost of continued conflict.20
Increased costs also increase mediation success rates, as state
party mediators can provide domestic political cover and enable
leaders to agree to otherwise unacceptable terms.21 This was the case
in Sinai (1974), El Salvador (1988), and Mozambique (1992). In
highlighting the low costs and potential benefits of state-led
mediation, policymakers can encourage state actors to offer and
accept mediation.
D. Rivalries and Reoccurring Conflict
States may be more likely to accept mediation offers when
the disputants are strategic rivals or view each other as threatening
competitors.22 Such conflicts tend to be recurring, and especially
destabilizing and violent—not only to the disputants but to thirdparty state actors either located in the region or with other strong
relationships to the disputants. These rivalries also tend to gain
greater international attention. On first blush, these characteristics
may make an offer to mediate unappealing to a state actor.
Policymakers, however, should take care to note the considerable
potential benefits of accepting the offer: the state party’s interest in
building its reputation and in avoiding the costs associated with a
regionally destabilizing, violent and drawn-out conflict. Said another
way, although there is some risk in taking on the mediator role in
such circumstances, the risks of declining such an invitation may be
even greater. The illustrations for this factor show both sides of the
20 Lesley G. Terris & Zeev Maoz, Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test,
42 J. PEACE RES. 563, 579-80 (2005) (arguing “the greater the versatility of the
conflict, (1) the more likely are disputants to seek mediation, (2) the more likely are
outside parties to mediate, and (3) the more intrusive the mediation strategies
employed.”).
21 Kyle Beardsley, Pain, Pressure and Political Cover: Explaining Mediation
Incidence, 47 J. PEACE RES. 395, 404 (2010).
22 Jacob Bercovitch & Paul F. Diehl, Conflict Management of Enduring
Rivalries: The Frequency, Timing, and Short-Term Impact of Mediation, 22 INT’L
INTERACTIONS 299, 316 (1997).
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calculation. While President Jimmy Carter’s efforts between Egypt
and Israel produced the still-intact Camp David Accords, mediation
efforts between India and Pakistan and on the Korean Peninsula
have been less successful.
E. Mediation History
States are more likely to agree to serve as mediators, and the
mediation is more likely to be successful, when the disputants and the
state have previously engaged in mediation. These prior mediation
experiences, or mediation history, establish rapport and signal a
commitment to peaceful conflict management. Mediation efforts are
not isolated events. Each instance creates a mediation history of the
state’s experience as a mediator and the disputants’ experiences in
working with mediators. In this broader process, previous mediation
encourages future efforts and success.23 Previous disputant
experiences with mediation signals a disputant’s willingness to work
with an outsider and encourages mediation offers by states. For
example, mediation was employed repeatedly in Yugoslavia, because
the parties had signaled they were willing to meet and negotiate, and
the mediator established trust and rapport with the belligerents. A
state’s mediation experience can signal to disputants the mediator’s
ability, preferred methods, resourcefulness, and objectives.24 To be
effective, the state mediator must be perceived as having access to
suitable techniques for encouraging bargaining, and as having
sufficient authority and experience to be able to utilize them.
Consider Sweden and Norway’s reputation as purveyors of peace
based on their history of mediation successes. Policymakers can
encourage mediation by involving experienced third-party state
mediators, especially when the disputants have exhibited openness to
mediation.

J. Michael Greig, Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?, 49
AM. J. POL. SCI. 249, 255 (2005).
24 Oliver Richmond, Devious Objectives and the Disputants’ View of
International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework, 35 J. PEACE RES. 707, 713 (1998).
23
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F. Conflict Stalemate
Disputants sensing a conflict stalemate or seeing the
improbability of winning are likely to accept state-led mediation as it
offers a viable alternative to continued conflict. “When parties find
themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to
victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not
necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way
out.”25 Disputants that have reached a hurting stalemate are “ripe”
for mediation, since they cannot envision a successful outcome or an
end to unbearable costs if they continue current strategies. Mediation
offers a “way out” of an increasingly costly conflict. Henry Kissinger
(under U.S. President Nixon) highlighted the notion of a stalemate in
the Sinai withdrawal negotiations,26 as did Chester Crocker (under
U.S. President Reagan) in Angola.27 Similarly, policymakers can
encourage disputants to accept mediation by highlighting the
presence of a stalemate and the futility of further escalation.
G. Nature of the Conflict
The international or domestic nature of the conflict has
important implications for the effectiveness of the mediation effort
as the cost of involving mediators varies between civil and
international wars. Mediation is less likely in civil wars as it transfers
legitimacy to the non-state actor and can hinder state sovereignty. In
effect this means the political costs associated with accepting
international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars.28
States therefore only accept mediation in the most serious civil
25 I. William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 225, 228 (Daniel
Druckman & Paul C. Stern eds., 2000).
26 See Briefing by Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger on Sinai Agreement:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 94th Cong. 5 (1975).
27 See Angola: Options for American Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong. 3-6 (1986).
28 Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting
Mediation in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 254 (2009).
For work on civil wars and the role of veto players, see David E. Cunningham, Who
Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. &
INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).
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disputes, or when the benefits of peace outweigh the costs of
legitimizing an opponent. For example, Swedish opposition leader
Olof Palme was immediately recognized as a mediator in the war
between Iran and Iraq, but the Sri Lankan government took 17 years
to allow outside involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE). Given this fear of legitimizing opponents, third-party
mediation offers are more likely to be accepted in international
conflicts. States seeking to mediate civil conflicts will need to
highlight other incentives, such as potential costs, before mediation is
accepted.
CONCLUSION
State mediators can have a significant impact on the creation
of a stable and sustainable peace. However, states should be selective
in deciding when and where to mediate—as such, the policymakers
tasked with this portfolio should be cognizant of the optimal
circumstances for state-led mediation. Threshold considerations
include the characteristics of the state, the nature and characteristics
of the conflict, and the characteristics of the disputants. The ideal
state mediator will have prior mediation experience, democratic
governance structures and access to the resources necessary to
enforce agreements. Democratic third parties and disputants are
more likely to agree to mediation and to generate an agreement.
Experienced mediators are more likely to be accepted, as are those
with greater capabilities and resources. Mediators that lack resources
and diplomatic experience and those from non-democracies are less
likely to be accepted or generate lasting peace. While policymakers
have less ability to influence the conflict characteristics, they can
encourage mediation by highlighting the presence of a stalemate, the
potential for escalation, and the costly nature of the conflict. By
carefully considering the appropriateness of mediation and
highlighting its benefits, states and disputants are more likely to
employ mediation as a conflict management tool for crafting a lasting
peace.
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ETHNIC CONFLICT: AN
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld*
INTRODUCTION
To talk about the behavior of others is to generalize1
especially if that behavior is perceived to be negative.2 As researchers
who have studied ethnic discrimination and ethnic conflict for close
to two decades, we have noticed, anecdotally at least, that this
penchant for generalization is rampant in discussions of ethnic
politics. Newspapers are not the only forum in which one will find
articles that talk about one or another ethnic group’s involvement in
violence without specifying a political organizational agent—by
which we mean groups with a set of political goals along with an
organizational structure. If an organization is mentioned, the article
often offers a generalization about the use of violence or the
* Victor Asal is an Associate Professor at Rockefeller College of Public
Affairs & Policy, University at Albany, State University of New York; and Jonathan
Wilkenfeld is a Professor of Government and Politics and Director of the ICONS
Project at the University of Maryland. Support for this research was provided by
the National Science Foundation through Award #0826886 and by the Science and
Technology Directorate of the United States Department of Homeland Security
(grant number 2008ST061ST0004) through the National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). All views expressed in this
article are those of the authors and not of the agencies supporting the research.
1 See generally Eric Hoyle, The Professionalization of Teachers: A Paradox, 30
BRIT. J. EDUC. STUD. 161 (1982).
2 See generally Wouter Vanhouche & Joseph W. Alba, Generalizing from
Negative Experiences, 26 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 238 (2009).

91

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:1

behavior of an entire ethnic group based solely on the characteristics
of one organization within that ethnic group. This problematic type
of analysis is too often present in policy and academic journals as
well.
The problem of generalizing ethnic behavior becomes more
pronounced when one examines the attribution of a particular
behavior to a group over time. For example, take the statement that
the “Kurds have always rebelled against Turkey,”3 which is
problematic for many reasons since not all Kurds have ever rebelled
—as many Kurds would tell you. Certain organizations that claim to
represent the Kurds have rebelled for extended periods of time while
others have not. Generalizations about the Palestinians provide a
more extreme example: “Historical circumstances have changed over
the years, but the Palestinians have always seemed to prefer the hopes of
annihilating Israel in concert with Arab states, or the romance of
violent struggle, to constructive accommodation”4 (emphasis added).
Is this the desire of some Palestinians? Yes, disturbingly so, as some
surveys suggest.5 Is this the desire of all Palestinians? No, and polls
continuously provide evidence that this is not the case. For example,
consider the polls from the Oslo process where “monthly CPRS polls
show an increase in general public support for the ‘peace camp,’ from
thirty-nine percent in January 1994 to fifty-five percent in October
1995.”6
This kind of generalization is a serious obstacle to
understanding conflicts and identifying solutions because it prevents
policymakers and academics from getting at the messy reality of
ethnic politics—especially when they become contentious or violent.
Generalizations are even more problematic when the goal is to
identify the implications of different policies. Although the Kurds,
3 Dilara Sezgin & Melissa A. Wall, Constructing the Kurds in the Turkish
Press: A Case Study of Hürriyet Newspaper, 27 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 787, 788
(2005).
4 Saul Smilansky, Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion, 114 ETHICS 790, 796
(2004).
5 See generally Stuart J. Kaufman, Narratives and Symbols in Violent
Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case, 18 SEC. STUD. 400 (2009).
6 Khalil Shikaki, The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the
Transition to Democracy in Palestine, 25 J. PALESTINE STUD. 5, 7 (1996).
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Palestinians, Druze and other ethnic groups each have a shared
identity, “ethnic groups” do not make policy decisions and are not
monolithic wholes. Rather, it is the individuals and organizations
within the ethnic groups that initiate political behavior. Accordingly,
we must recognize that organizations are much more flexible about
the behaviors they are willing to embrace than generalizations permit.
Using a dataset of 118 ethnopolitical organizations in the
Middle East and North Africa spanning the period 1980-2004, this
article analyzes the enormous variance in behavior among and
between organizations claiming to represent the same ethnic group. It
also will show how such organizations often change their policies and
shift back and forth between violent and nonviolent strategies,
occasionally adopting both at the same time. While this article does
not focus on the larger question of which policies make organizations
more likely to move in one direction or another, it illustrates the
importance of avoiding over aggregation when studying contentious
politics. In the process, this article provides a counter-balance to
generally accepted wisdom concerning the relationship between
ethnicity and conflict.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR CAN CHANGE:
THE MAROB DATASET
The Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB)
dataset7 examines organizations that represent Minorities at Risk
groups.8 The 118 organizations included in the MAROB dataset
include twenty two ethnopolitical groups in sixteen countries of the
Middle East and North Africa, operating between 1980 and 2004.9
Victor Asal, Amy Pate & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Minorities at Risk
Organizational Behavior Data and Codebook, MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT (Sept.
2008),
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data/marob/me_marob_sept08_code
book.pdf.
8 Center for International Development and Conflict Management,
Minorities at Risk Dataset, MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT (Nov. 2010),
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp.
9 Data collection is currently underway on the Terrorism and
Extremist Organizations (TEO) Database, which will update much of the MAROB
Middle East dataset through 2010. Victor Asal, R. Karl Rethemeyer & Jonathan
7
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To be included in the dataset, the organization must not have been
created by a government, must claim to represent an ethnic group,
must be active at least at the regional level and exist for at least three
years.10 Table 1 provides a breakdown from 2004 of the number of
Middle Eastern and Northern African organizations in the dataset by
ethnic group.11
Table 1. Organizations in the MAROB Dataset
in 2004 by Ethnic Group

Highly different organizations frequently claim to represent
the same ethnic group. Table 2 lists two ethnic groups, Kurds in
Turkey and Palestinians in Jordan, and a sample of the organizations
Wilkenfeld, Terrorist and Extremist Organizations (2012) (data collection will be
completed by 2015).
10 See Asal et al., supra note 7.
11 Other contributions to this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law &
International Affairs also focus on the challenges presented by multiple organizations’
participation in conflict and violence. See, e.g., David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be
at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF.
38 (2013); J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the
Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).
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that claim to represent them. For example the Partiya Karkari
Kurdistan, which claims to represent the Kurds, has used violence
for every year in the dataset while the Halkin Emek Partisi and the
Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Partisi never used violence during this
time period. The same diverse strategic picture can be seen if we look
at the Palestinian organizations in Jordan. The Jordanian People’s
Democratic Party, which was a spinoff of the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine, has not used violence since its founding
in 1989, while the Black September Organization used violence for all
but one year of its existence in Jordan between 1984 and 1988. To
uniformly label the Kurdish or the Palestinian ethnic groups as
violent represents a gross distortion of reality.
Table 2. Examples of Minority at Risk Groups and MAROB
Organizations
Minority at Risk Group

MAROB Organizations

Kurds in Turkey

Partiya Karkari Kurdistan (PKK)
Halkin Emek Partisi
Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Partisi

Palestinians in Jordan

Jordanian People’s Democratic Party
Black September Organization

An examination of general behavior trends for the region over
time reveals several observations about the ethnopolitical
organizations claiming to represent MAR groups in the Middle East.
First, a very large proportion of the organizations used violence in
any given year (Table 3). That is, for an extended period of time
more than twenty percent of the organizations in the dataset used
violence in the same year, and in some years the number shot up past
thirty percent.
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Table 3. Strategies of Ethnopolitical Organizations 1980-2004

Of course, organizations can engage in more than one activity
at the same time. If terrorism is defined as the intentional targeting of
civilians, then clearly Hamas is a terrorist organization. If insurgency
is defined as an organization that shoots soldiers, then Hamas is not
only a terrorist organization but also an insurgency. But as Table 4
illustrates, Hamas is not solely a violent organization. It also spent
some of its time involved in electoral politics, and by 1994 was active
in education, propaganda and in providing social services. This is not
to say that Hamas is not a terrorist organization but it does show that
Hamas is complex and acts as more than just a terrorist organization.
Understanding that Hamas has a larger presence is a starting point
for gaining a better understanding of why part of the Palestinian
public might have very strong concrete reasons for being loyal to
Hamas beyond its policies as they relate to Israel.
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Table 4. Political Behavior of Hamas, 1987-2004

Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

Attack
Attack
Security
Civilians
Forces
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

Provide
Social
Services
not used
not used
unclear
unclear
unclear
infrequent
infrequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent

Education Involved in
and
Electoral
Propaganda Politics
not used
infrequent
infrequent
infrequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent
frequent

not used
not used
frequent
not used
frequent
infrequent
infrequent
infrequent
infrequent
frequent
not used
not used
not used
not used
not used
not Used
not used
infrequent

Despite its other efforts, Hamas has clearly made a choice to
embrace violence in general and target civilians specifically as a
central part of its policy, as shown by the organization’s involvement
in attacks against civilians every year since 1989. There is in this chart,
though, a hint of the fact that organizations make choices about their
strategies and that those choices can change or be influenced. In 1987
Hamas did not use violence at all. In 1988 they moved into the realm
of violent politics but the organization did not target civilians.
Something happened in 1988 and the organization embraced the
targeting of civilians. This change over three years suggests that
organizations make strategic choices about violence and those
choices can change over time. One might argue that it is not so
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complicated and is simply an escalation of violence—but that
reasoning would be a mistake. Terrorism is called the “weapon of the
weak” not only because some people are trying to validate
reprehensible behavior. Shooting a civilian without a weapon is a lot
easier than shooting a soldier with one. As Martha Crenshaw so
trenchantly pointed out:
The observation that terrorism is a weapon of the
weak is hackneyed but apt. At least when initially
adopted, terrorism is the strategy of a minority that by
its own judgment lacks other means. When the group
perceives its options as limited, terrorism is attractive
because it is a relatively inexpensive and simple
alternative, and because its potential reward is high.12
This remark suggests that Hamas’s move to begin attacking
civilians was not simply an escalation but a choice about what it was
willing to do, and a statement that it reached a point where
intentionally killing unarmed civilians was acceptable; collateral
damage is a different issue. If an organization chooses to move
toward killing civilians, this suggests that an organization can choose
to move away from such behavior as well.13 For example, Amal in
Lebanon fits this category. Before 1989 Amal regularly engaged in
terrorist tactics. From 1989 on, it did not engage in intentional
attacks against civilians, but it continued to engage in attacks against
military personnel during the entire time period. Some organizations
flip back and forth on a regular basis. As Table 5 shows, the
Palestinian Fatah Revolutionary Council based in Lebanon went back
and forth repeatedly between using terrorist tactics to not using such
tactics, to ending the use of violence entirely, to then going back to
its use.

12

Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13 COMP. POL. 379, 387

(1981).
For a discussion of Hamas as well as other extremist organizations
use of mixed tactics (violent and non-violent), see Kristine Höglund, Tactics in
Negotiations between States and Extremists: The Role of Cease-Fires and Counterterrorist
Measures, in ENGAGING EXTREMISTS: TRADE-OFFS, TIMING, AND DIPLOMACY,
221, 236-39 (I. William Zartman & Guy Olivier Faure eds., 2011).
13
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Table 5. Violent Behavior of the
Fatah Revolutionary Council Based in Lebanon
Year

Civilian

Security

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

0
0
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
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II. STATE BEHAVIOR CAN CHANGE TOO
These case studies suggest that generalizing about an ethnic
group is a mistake and a potentially serious one, and that we need to
be open to the possibility of change even at the organizational level.
The same is true for the behavior of the state toward an organization.
Table 6 provides yearly observations of Israel’s behavior toward
Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza and Fatah’s behavior in the West
Bank and Gaza as it relates to attacks against civilians and security
forces from the beginning of the Oslo process in 1993 to 2004. This
table illustrates how state and organizational behavior can change and
strongly suggests the possibility of a delayed feedback between the
behavior of one actor and the behavior of the other actor.
Table 6. Select Years for Israel and Fatah
Negotiation and Violence
from the Beginning of the Oslo Process until 2004
Year

Negotiation
Between
Fatah and Israel

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004

some concessions
some concessions
some concessions
negotiation
some concessions
some concessions
some concessions
negotiation
negotiation
no negotiation
negotiation
no negotiation

Israel’s Attacks Fatah Attacks
on Fatah
on Civilians
yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

Fatah Attacks
on Security
Forces
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

Organizations clearly choose from a menu of various
strategies but they rarely choose or commit to one strategy alone.
Many organizations in the Middle East will often switch between
violent and nonviolent contentious strategies as well as traditional
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political activity. Moreover, the choice of strategies can be impacted
by the type of regime and the behavior of the government as well as
by the ideologies of the organizations themselves.
III. GENERALIZATION LEADS TO BAD POLICY—AND
ORGANIZATIONAL DATA CAN HELP GROUND ANALYSIS
Policymakers need to realize that the structure of the
government and the way governments treat organizations and the
populations they claim to represent will often have a direct impact on
how those organizations behave. This brief overview examining
examples of Middle Eastern ethnopolitical organizations is of equal
importance, as it highlights the importance of disaggregating the
behavior of organizations from the groups they claim to represent
and the importance of not assuming that what is now true in terms of
an organization’s behavior was always true—or always will be. The
MAROB data allows us to underline the importance of specificity in
policy making and the need to check general assumptions. It also
facilitates analysis that can allow policymakers to get a handle on the
various factors that will impact outcomes not just based on one case
or anecdotal evidence, but on data that can be used to accept or
reject our own assumptions.14
CONCLUSION
Ethnopolitical organizational behavior in the Middle East is
complex, and our ability to understand such behavior and identify the
right policy choices is often ill-served by generalizations expounded
by scholars and journalists. Often multiple organizations claim to
represent the same ethnic group, and while some will engage in
violence and even terrorism to achieve their goals, others will persist
in more traditional avenues for addressing grievances such as
electoral politics (and arguably, this is something to be encouraged).
Furthermore, organizations will change their tactics over time, or
See generally, e.g., Victor Asal, Richard Legault, Ora Szekely &
Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Gender Ideologies and Forms of Contentious Mobilization in Middle
East, J. PEACE RES. (forthcoming 2013); Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown & Angela
Dalton, Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle
East, 56 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 94 (2012).
14

101

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:1

adopt more than one tactic at the same time. While ethnopolitical
violence is a continuing problem as the headlines from Iraq, Israel
and various other countries in the Middle East illustrate all too often,
our ability to understand and address these problems are hampered
by over aggregation and simplification. The international
community’s ability to better understand ongoing conflicts and the
potential avenues for solutions would be best served by taking a
more nuanced and rigorous approach to collecting and analyzing data
at the organizational level where important distinctions between
organizations can be identified and key shifts in tactics can be
followed and thus encouraged or discouraged.
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MEDIATION—ITS POTENTIAL AND ITS
LIMITS: DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE
DISCOURSE ON THE RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE OF PEACEMAKING
Dennis C. Jett*
The articles in this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law &
International Affairs summarize analytic research relevant to conflict
situations and offer recommendations for how conflicts can more
effectively be brought to an end. It is therefore worth considering
how policymakers might employ these recommendations as they
pursue the often elusive goal of peace.
THE “POLICYMAKER” DEFINED
One difficulty with that task is that “policymaker” is a title
that can be applied to many different people playing many different
roles in a conflict situation. The policymakers within a national
government will be comprised of politicians elected to office, officials
appointed by those politicians, and career bureaucrats. Each of them
will approach the problem with different perspectives and priorities
though they are nominally on the same team.

* Dennis C. Jett, Professor of International Affairs, School of
International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University.
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Policymakers can come from the governments that are party
to the conflict, neighboring states, regional and global powers, and
any other nation that believes it has a dog in a particular fight.
In a civil war, in addition to the policymakers of the regime in
power, there are those who have some degree of control over the
group or groups trying to overthrow that regime in order to take
power themselves. In any country in conflict, there are also the
noncombatants who make up the elements of civil society that are
trying to bring it to an end. They may not make policy, but the
decisions they do make can place pressure on the combatants and
help the cause of peace.
And then there are international organizations, where the
representatives of member states provide instructions to international
civil servants on how those organizations are to be involved. Even
with clear guidance, there is much policy to be made in implementing
a mandate including how to interpret it in the field and how
forcefully to pursue it. Whether any of that can be done competently
with the resources made available to these organizations by their
members is another question.
That does not exhaust the list of players of course.
Nongovernmental organizations are often instrumental in peace
accords, once they are reached, as they can have the capacity to
implement programs that bring into being many of the elements of
such accords.
When the official representatives of the governments and
rebel groups that are parties to the conflict fail to end it, a potential
role for a mediator is created. Representatives of many of the
organizations can attempt to serve in that capacity along with
virtually anyone else who wants to engage in what is known as Track
II diplomacy.1 The only real requirement is that the parties to the
conflict accept them as mediators. There is usually no shortage of
elder statesmen and retired politicians willing to serve as mediators,
A discussion of Track II diplomacy and its use in the case of U.S.Iranian relations can be found at: http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/track-iidiplomacy.
1
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especially if visions of a Nobel Peace Prize nomination are dancing in
their heads.
Even though all will agree that peace is the goal, each
policymaker will approach it from his or her perspective and be
encumbered by some limitations, which affect just how much policy
they are willing and able to make. With so many potential players, and
so many violent conflicts, it is therefore important to consider to
whom the policy recommendations are being made and what
constraints they may be operating under. It is with that preliminary
consideration in mind that I offer an evaluation as to whether the
recommendations contained in this journal issue are realistic and
useful.
MEDIATION RESEARCH IN PRACTICE
A. Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to
Fail but Actually Succeeds2
Improving mediation is important, but even the best
mediation is not a silver bullet solution. Wars can end in one of four
ways—through a military victory, when a halt to the fighting is
imposed by outside powers, when the parties to the conflict negotiate
a cessation of hostilities in good faith, and when they negotiate one in
bad faith.
When one side wins outright, there is no need for mediation.
A clear military victory is difficult in a civil war, however, as it usually
pits a government with a weak army against rebel forces that are even
weaker. Both sides will have the power to terrorize civilians, but
rarely enough to defeat each other.
When the international community steps in and forces an end
to the conflict, it does not remove the underlying reasons for why the
war started in the first place. That can imply a long-term commitment
to creating a solution and that, plus a general reluctance to use force

Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail
but Actually Succeeds, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 27 (2013).
2
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to end the use of force, means there is rarely any enthusiasm for that
outcome among other countries.
A negotiated end to conflict can often involve and be
facilitated by mediation. But as Scott Sigmund Gartner points out in
his article, success is not as elusive as it seems because the conflicts in
which mediators are involved are also the ones least likely to succeed.
If a peace accord were easy, the parties could reach it themselves.
This point is worth remembering, and the international community
and potential mediators should not avoid making the effort simply
because the chances for success are not good. While mediation can
be costly in many ways, they pale in comparison to the likely costs of
continued war. The parties to the conflict will measure the cost of
mediation as the potential it has for diminishing their chances to
obtain more power, often without much regard for the toll on
noncombatants should the war continue. Human suffering aside, the
costs of relief efforts for refugees and people displaced by the
fighting can easily and quickly amount to hundreds of millions of
dollars.
The need for local expertise is one of the reasons that
regional governmental organizations, with close ties, in-depth
knowledge, and shared regional identities, are becoming increasingly
utilized as mediators.3 On the other hand, while the countries in the
region are the ones most directly affected by the spillover when a
conflict’s impact starts to cross borders, they may not be the best
choice.
Regional organizations are often given the task of dealing
with a conflict because the wider international community wants to
avoid getting further involved rather than because they make ideal
mediators. There is a strong correlation between conflict and poverty;
civil wars occur more frequently in the least developed countries. The
neighbors of countries in conflict are also likely to be poor and
therefore the least able to support the cost of mediation and
intervention. The neighboring states may also profit from the chaos
by exploiting the resources of the country at war. And they will likely
have an opinion as to which side they would like to see win. This may
3

Id.
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be due to ethnic linkages, which can serve to make the conflict more
difficult to resolve. So the decision to rely on a regional organization
should be considered carefully and not assumed to be the best
outcome.
B. Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator
Leverage and Conflict Resolution4
Kyle Beardsley’s discussion of the use of leverage by
mediators in attempting to end conflicts is a useful reminder that
mediators can try to use too much leverage as well as too little
leverage. Using too little will not resolve the conflict and using too
much might only result in a short-term cessation of hostilities and not
address the root causes of the conflict.
By using just the right amount of leverage, the mediator can
in theory achieve an end to the bloodshed and the humanitarian
disaster it has caused and, at the same time, set the stage for a lasting
peace. That is easier said than done, however, and it seems to
assume mediators have a range of tools to use and the ability and
willingness to use them. That is rarely the case.
Mediators are almost always in an inherently weak position.5
Their role has to be accepted by the parties to the conflict and those
parties do not see such efforts as an opportunity to negotiate their
own demise. They will limit what the mediator can accomplish and
choose a mediator precisely because that person is weak. They are
generally unwilling to concede much power to the mediator and will
resist any efforts to force them to do things that they calculate are
not in their interests. Thus, it is hard to identify too much or too little
leverage ex ante facto, before its use, although the appropriate degree
of leverage might be more clear ex post facto, after the mediation.
A mediator can have significant leverage if there is a
willingness on the part of the international community to use military
force or economic pressure to end a particular conflict. In his choice
Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013).
5 See generally id.
4
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of examples, Beardsley mentions the recent case of Syria where, as he
notes, Russia and China have blocked any U.N. Security Council
resolutions that might have teeth. Given the absence of any real
leverage, Kofi Annan’s efforts at mediation were doomed from the
start. Since the Assad regime was not about to negotiate its own
removal from power and is indifferent to the number of civilians
killed, the only tool in Annan’s toolbox was his ability to persuade
both sides to stop fighting, and that obviously proved insufficient.
Beardsley uses the case of Rwanda as one where mediators
used too much leverage He believes this only resulted in a short-term
cessation of hostilities, which was then followed by genocide after
they resumed. A lower level of leverage implies less international
involvement. It seems unlikely that would have made the outcome
better and resulted in fewer deaths. In retrospect, most have
concluded that a much more forceful intervention by the
international community was required instead of an attempt at
mediation that was too weak to prevent mass murder.
The problem for any mediator, and the international
community as a whole, is that it is never clear whether hostilities are
going to get worse or better. Even when there is some indication
which direction the conflict is headed, unforeseen events—like the
shooting down of the plane carrying Rwandan President
Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart—can be a catalyst for
catastrophe. Habyarimana, had he lived, might have successfully
implemented the Arusha accords.
The international reaction to conflict situations is often based
on hope and the desire to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The
biggest problem in Rwanda, as Beardsley points out, was the
international community followed up the signing of the peace
accords with a tiny peacekeeping force and a weak mandate that only
allowed them to become bystanders, and at times victims, when the
violence resumed.
The role of Richard Holbrooke in ending the war in Bosnia is
cited by Beardsley as a compelling case in which the use of leverage
calmed a humanitarian disaster. Holbrooke had a very forceful
personality, however, and the military might of NATO to draw upon
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if he chose to use it. There is no greater source of leverage than the
ability to use force to punish an uncooperative party.
Having that power at the ready is not going to typically be the
case. The international community is rarely willing to use such force.
The fighting in Libya ended because the international community was
willing to use such force in that instance. The fighting in Syria
continues, however, because the international community is not
willing to use force, at least not as of the time this is being written.
Another problem is that some mediators are life-long U.N.
bureaucrats. One of the unwritten rules for a successful career at the
U.N. seems to be “never alienate anyone.” With 193 member states
as their bosses, those that work at the U.N. do not like to stick their
necks out. A U.N. mediator therefore may not be enthusiastic about
using leverage since it is bound to displease someone. Even
mediators who are not U.N. officials are unlikely to have as strong a
personality type as Holbrooke.
Beardsley’s fundamental point, however, is important for any
mediator to consider. It is always essential to look into the toolbox
and see what instruments of leverage it contains. Unfortunately, in
many real world instances, there may not be much in the toolbox and
the mediator may not be able or willing to use the tools available.
Given Beardsley’s argument, additional research might examine how
to expand the options available to mediators.
C. Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate6
In her essay on when states mediate, Molly Melin concludes
that states should offer to mediate “only in optimal circumstances”
and policymakers should “first consider the characteristics of the
third party, the conflict, and the disputants.” Both recommendations
may seem obvious but are they easily achieved?
States seek to act as mediators when their interests are at
stake or when they feel they have to become involved. A
6

Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 78

(2013).
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humanitarian crisis can create pressure for international action as it
did for Bosnia and Darfur even when the national interests of the
major powers are not directly threatened. If the suffering largely
escapes the media’s attention and the public’s concern, as it has in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the pressure and the resulting
action will be much less however.
Another reason states want to mediate is prestige. When a
conflict is somehow identified with a potential mediator, because of
colonial ties or other linkages, there will again be pressure, often from
the public and the media, to play such a role. Having an interest in a
conflict implies the mediator is not indifferent to the outcome,
however, and that can lessen the acceptability of the mediator to the
parties to the dispute. As Melin points out, in cases where the
decision to attempt to mediate stems from domestic politics, public
pressure, national interests, or politicians’ search for prestige, the
decision to get involved may have little to do with whether the
situation is optimal for mediation.
If the conditions are not optimal, but the pressure to do
something to end the conflict is significant, states will often look for
non-state actors like international organizations or prominent former
statesmen willing to play the role. That way any blame for failure,
when it comes, can be shifted to the mediator and the damage to
national pride and political risk can be minimized.
As Melin points out, nation states are the most frequent
mediators of international disputes. Thus it is critical to understand
the factors affecting their involvement. As she suggests, it is the
parties involved in a conflict that decide whether there is to be a
mediator and they will do that only when they think it serves their
interests. The problem is that the disputants may not reach the stage
until what I. William Zartman has characterized as a “hurting
stalemate”7 has been achieved. The combatants will then see further
military efforts as impossible or unproductive. Arriving at that point
may take years and is why there are more conflicts every year than

See I. William Zartman, Conflict and Resolution: Contest, Cost, and Change,
518 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 11, 16 (1991).
7
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there are mediation efforts and not because states considering
becoming mediators are pondering their strategic choices.
D. Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and
Adjudication8
Wars come in two flavors—the international kind where the
opposing sides are nation states (interstate conflicts), and internal
ones, where the regime in power is pitted against those who seek to
overthrow it (intrastate conflicts). Wars between countries are usually
over territory, though there are usually other factors involved as well.
Wars within countries are almost always about political power. In the
former, if the parties are willing to accept the outcome, those
imaginary lines on maps called borders can easily be drawn to divide
territory. Resolving the latter type of conflict is harder, however,
because political power is not as easily divided, especially in a poor
country where elites are either in power or out of luck. When a
faction does take control of the government, even through legitimate
elections, the majority tends to rule with little regard for the rights of
minorities. And there is no Heritage Foundation or American
Enterprise Institute where ideologues can hang out until their side
can return to power.
The difference between interstate wars over territory and
intrastate wars over political power also has implications for
alternatives to mediation. As Gent points out in his essay,
international arbitration and adjudication is often the most effective
means of producing long-lasting settlements and certainly should be
considered as an alternative means of dispute resolution.
Such a binding mechanism, however, is unlikely to be used
when the challenge is dividing political power in a country where that
has never been achieved before. Dividing territory is something
international arbitrators are good at because there is usually some
legal basis on which to proceed, but it does not always end the
problem. Having an international body mandate a solution provides
cover to political elites who have to defend against charges that they
Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 66 (2013).
8
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have given up too much. Even that may not be enough to ease the
pain of wounded national pride, as Gent demonstrates in his
description of how Ethiopia rejected an international boundary
commission’s demarcation of its frontier with Eritrea.
Gent also points out that the losing side in the finding of an
arbitration panel is more likely to reject the decision if it possesses a
clear power advantage. That means either other, more flexible
mechanisms should be considered as he suggests, or at a minimum,
the international community needs to throw its weight behind
supporting the outcome and provide incentives for both sides to
respect it. One advantage of having elections as part of the process
that brings a civil war to end is that it confers legitimacy on the
winner. The loser will have an easy excuse for rejecting the result if
the winner is chosen by an international arbitrator and not by the
voters. To avoid that tendency, the international community must use
the carrots and sticks at its disposal to ensure the outcome is
accepted if the parties agree to arbitration.
Interestingly, international arbitration has increasingly
become the rule in international commercial disputes. While its use is
growing in non-commercial international disputes, it is still not
common. So while policymakers should certainly look carefully at all
aspects of the conflict—including who should mediate and when—
decisions are often made not on the basis of an objective and
detached assessment of what can be achieved. Rather decisions are
made on the basis of what is necessary and what is possible given the
political pressures they are operating under.
In order for
international arbitration to expand from economic to political
disputes actors will have to address these types of political pressures.
E. Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications9
Isak Svensson discusses the policy implications of bias in
mediators and concludes that even biased ones can play a useful role.
He notes that rebel-biased mediators tend to create peace settlements
that include power-sharing arrangements while government-biased
Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2 PENN ST.
J.L. & INT’L AFF. 17 (2013).
9
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mediators opt for amnesties. Both the mediators and the outcomes
that are deemed acceptable are up to the parties in the conflict. The
bias in play may therefore result from the selection process rather
than a preference toward a particular solution on the part of the
mediator. Mediators “create” only those solutions that the
combatants will agree to and are able to consider solutions that might
be accepted by both sides.
Svensson’s central premise—that bias is not an inherent
disqualifying feature of mediation—is an important one. However,
and as Svensson points out, a little bias may not be a bad thing. The
real test is whether the mediator is capable of guiding the parties to
an agreement and not whether he or she is absolutely neutral. This
also represents a major distinction between domestic mediation—
which seeks neutrality among mediators—and international
mediation. For example, it not only took Begin and Sadat to create
peace between Israel and Egypt but it also took Carter, the leader of a
pro-Israel state, to convince Israel to give up territory in exchange for
a U.S. assurance of security. Mediators will often be charged with
bias, especially by the side playing the weaker hand, whether it exists
or not. The parties to the conflict have to have some sense that the
mediator will act fairly even if not necessarily impartially. The bias
may even help get the stronger side to a deal as it probably did at
Camp David.
F. Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking10
Birger Heldt, of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, examines the
growth in the number of efforts at peacemaking in emerging conflicts
and in particular the lack of coordination that results from so many
different actors becoming involved. To address this problem, he
suggests policymakers adopt a long-term strategy focused on
coordination. In addition, he urges policymakers not to be
discouraged by the failures of initial peacemaking attempts. He
cautions that the need for coordination should not crowd out
attempts at further peacemaking. He also emphasizes that if violence

Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking, 2 PENN
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 9 (2013).
10
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is going to escalate dramatically, it normally does so in the first two
years of the conflict.
That two-year window when effective peacemaking has a
chance to prevent a significant expansion of hostilities is critical for
policymakers to acknowledge and incorporate into planning efforts.
The problem, of course, is that senior officials in any busy capitol or
international body are almost always consumed by the crisis of the
moment and long-term planning rarely gets beyond next week. The
paradox and the tragedy is that until the violence does escalate, the
conflict is likely to fail to grab the attention of the media and the
policymakers.
The International Crisis Group and other organizations have
long tried to direct the attention of officials to crises in need of
attention and alert policymakers before the conflicts escalate. The
U.N. has discussed ways to improve crisis management and to take
advantage of constantly evolving information and communications
technology.11 It would be useful if each government and international
organization had an internal group that was designed to prioritize
mediation needs. And those groups should try and stay ahead of the
curve by engaging in a continuing dialogue with those who make the
study of mediation efforts their academic specialty.
The coordination of peacemaking efforts is made difficult by
the fact that there are no barriers to entry, especially to potential
Track II mediators. That may account for the growth in such efforts
as much as any other factor. It is still worthwhile to attempt to bring
coordination, as well as long-term planning, to peacemaking. The
biggest obstacle is perhaps a lack of time and attention to the
problem by policymakers as much as anything else. Heldt’s policy
recommendations offer an important reminder of the value of
preventative measures and of the critical timeframe for such action.

See generally Daniel Stauffacher, Strengthening Crisis Information
Management, 48 UN CHRONICLE (2011), http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/
chronicle/home/archive/issues2011/thedigitaldividend/strengtheningcrisisinforma
tionmanagement.
11
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G. Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An
Organizational Perspective12
Victor Asal and Jonathan Wilkenfeld provide a convincing
argument that assumptions about a conflict always need to be
checked and that generalizations expounded by scholars and
journalists can lead to the wrong policy choices. True experts in a
region need to convey the complexity of each situation to
policymakers without making it seem so difficult that any
involvement is unwise. Academics and other analysts need to keep in
mind that no data set can substitute for in-depth knowledge when it
comes to a particular conflict. Some humility is required in making
assessments of conflicts and policy recommendations regarding
them. If they are made simply on the basis of number crunching of
past conflicts, ideology or a lack of knowledge about the motivations
of the combatants, an illusion of understanding will be created and
could lead to poor decisions.13
H. David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and
Peace Processes in Civil War14
David Cunningham cautions that too many players can spoil
the peace process and urges that those without a veto be excluded
from it. It will not be only the mediator that decides who gets a seat
at the table, but to the extent that this recommendation can be
followed, it should be. While civil society may not participate in the
actual negotiations, it would also be useful to think of ways to help
them pressure the parties to come to an agreement. Leymah Gbowee,
the Liberian activist who won the Nobel Peace Prize, is one example
of how such pressure can be used to encourage politicians to
negotiate seriously.

12 Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational
Perspective, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 91 (2013).
13 Richard Synge’s book “Mozambique” is a good example of bad
analysis and the U.S. Institute of Peace should be embarrassed by its publication.
See RICHARD SYNGE, MOZAMBIQUE: UN PEACEKEEPING IN ACTION, 1992-94
(1997).
14 David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace
Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).

115

2013

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2:1

Cunningham notes the problem with a strategy of threatening
to exclude the main combatants from the negotiations is not
effective. If they are not included there are no benefits from peace,
because peace won’t be possible. The parties must always reach a
decision that their interests are better served by peace than by
continued war for any talks to begin. And there must be some
common ground that is reachable, which it is not when the aims of
those doing the fighting are diametrically opposed and nonnegotiable.
I. J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature
on the Failure of Mediation15
J. Michael Greig is the co-author of one of the most
comprehensive books on international mediation.16 Here, Greig
applies his strong analytical understanding of mediation not to one
issue, but to one case. In his assessment of Syria, he quotes one
Middle Eastern analyst as saying that President Assad will go down
fighting. If that is the case, there is little that can be done by the
international community. If active military engagement is ruled out,
the international community can do little more than encourage
opposition forces to discuss and coordinate what will happen after
the fighting stops. Efforts have been made and conferences held to
try to avoid the post-conflict chaos that has been seen in Libya. It is
unfortunate that more was not done to help Libya make the difficult
transition from dictatorship to democracy, but it is hard to anticipate
if and when regime change is going succeed and therefore hard for
the international community to know what to do and the best timing
for doing it. And if, as in the case of Syria, those in power have
strong allies like Russia and Iran encouraging them to fight on, a
mediator will have little chance of success as Kofi Annan finally
admitted. Whether his successor, Lakhdar Brahimi, will do any better
will depend on circumstances beyond his control more than his
ability to mediate.

J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on
the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).
16 J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
(2012).
15
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CONCLUSIONS - MEDIATORS AND THE REALITIES THEY FACE
Mediators almost always play a weak hand unless, like
Richard Holbrooke in the case of Bosnia, they represent an entity
that is willing to take an active part in the conflict. Whether dealt a
weak hand or a strong one, mediators play a crucial role in reaching a
peaceful resolution to a conflict and have a significant effect on the
durability of the settlement that ends the fighting. Mediators do not
simply add “grease” to the “squeaky wheel” but can redefine issues,
reshape debates, and restructure negotiations in ways that lead to
successful and peaceful outcomes. It is therefore important that
mediators carry out their responsibilities with the utmost skill and
access to the relevant research, as that will enhance the chances for
success.
At the same time, mediation often occurs in a crises situation
where it is virtually impossible to reach out and learn about past
patterns, new theories and innovative approaches. In that regard it is
useful for policymakers, to draw on the cumulative knowledge of
mediation scholars, both represented here and throughout the
research community before they get to the work of mediating. Even
if such general learning is not possible, whatever their relationship to
the situation and their power to affect it, mediators and policymakers
should consider the research-based recommendations outlined in this
collection of essays.
The journal’s goal in constructing this issue—to develop a
more robust and interactive dialogue between researchers and
practitioners—should be received as a call to the members of both
communities. It is important for researchers, who have the time to
study these matters in depth without being forced to rapidly turn
their attention to the next crisis, to share their findings on what
works and what does not with more than other academics. And those
who have served as mediators need to share with researchers their
views on the constraints they face in the field. There are a number of
ways to accomplish this kind of direct dialogue on peacemaking,
which will draw the communities together and produce mutually
beneficial results—and this issue serves as an important launch point
to begin that discussion.
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WE CAN WORK IT OUT: PUTTING OUR
BEST FOOT FORWARD IN
INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION
INITIATIVES
Julie Rowland*
INTRODUCTION
Student movement across national borders is increasing
rapidly as a result of globalization, marketplace competition, and
programs aimed at student mobility.1 International higher education
can be described as “the conscious effort to integrate and infuse
international, intercultural, and global dimensions into the ethos and
outcomes of postsecondary education.”2 For the U.S., this broad
description encompasses a variety of actors and programs: American
students and professors at universities abroad, foreign students and
professors at American universities, American universities’ branch
campuses abroad, efforts to incorporate cosmopolitan and global

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State
University, M.A. in Education Theory and Policy Candidate, 2013, College of
Education, Pennsylvania State University. The author wishes to thank Professor
Laurel Terry and the JLIA editorial board for their advice and assistance and her
family and friends for their constant support.
1
About Project Atlas, PROJECT ATLAS, http://www.iie.org/Research-andPublications/Project-Atlas/About (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
2 About NAFSA, NAFSA, http://nafsa.org/about/default.aspx?id=
23912 (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
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dimensions into university curriculum, joint curriculum and degrees
between universities, and more.3
Most scholars agree that two significant historical events in
world history, World War II and the Cold War, contributed
significantly to American policymakers’ interest in issues of
international education.4 American interest in international and
comparative education can be viewed as a corollary to the more
pressing concern of U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace.5
In particular, “Sputnik Shock” ignited concern for the quality and
competitiveness of the American education system mid-century.6 The
1983 publication of A Nation at Risk,7 an extremely influential report
detailing the failure of American schools to produce globally
competitive students, further compounded public awareness of
competition from abroad.8 The report declared that America’s failing
education system was “eroding the economy,”9 creating a perceived

3 Brian J. Garavalia, International Education: How It Is Defined by U.S.
Students and Foreign Students, 70 CLEARING HOUSE 215, 217-18 (1997); Anneke
Luijten-Lub et al., On Cooperation and Competition: A Comparative Analysis of National
Policies for Internationalisation of Higher Education in Seven Western European Countries, 9 J.
STUD. IN INT’L EDUC. 147, 153, 157 (2005).
4 HANS DEWIT, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND EUROPE: A HISTORICAL, COMPARATIVE,
AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 19 (Philip G. Altbach, ed., 2002).
5 FRANK NEWMAN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE AMERICAN
RESURGENCE: A CARNEGIE FOUNDATION SPECIAL REPORT 13-15 (1985).
6 Michael Dobbins & Kerstin Martens, A Contrasting Case—The U.S.A.
and Its Weak Response to Internationalization Processes in Education Policy, in
TRANSFORMATION OF EDUCATION POLICY 179, 182 (Kerstin Martens et al. eds.,
2010) (defining “Sputnik Shock” as occurring when “the Soviet Union launched
the first satellite in 1957,” which demonstrated to American policymakers “the
Soviet Union’s technological superiority or at least its equality with the U.S.A. in
this area”).
7 NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983), http://datacenter.spps.org/
uploads/SOTW_A_Nation_at_Risk_1983.pdf.
8 DAVID TYACK & LARRY CUBAN, TINKERING TOWARD UTOPIA: A
CENTURY OF PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORM 13-14 (1995); but see MICHAEL B. KATZ,
RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN EDUCATION 130 (1987) (explaining the
controversial nature of A Nation at Risk).
9 TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 8, at 34.
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crisis in American education.10 In light of growing global
competition, policymakers viewed the education crisis as a “national
security risk.”11 Education in the U.S. is largely a state issue, but a
national security risk required a federal government response. Faced
with opposition from state policymakers, the Reagan administration
made a strategic decision to elevate the crisis to an international
level.12 The administration pushed the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to compile comparative
statistical data on student achievement,13 allowing the U.S. to focus
education policy decisions on competition with other nations. This
event marked the beginning of the education system’s use as an
important tool for maintaining America’s global competitive edge.
Today, the Obama administration’s education policy programs
continue to reflect an awareness of international competition,
especially competition as demonstrated by international test scores.14
The U.S.’s uncertain position in the global education
competition has led to reform movements in compulsory education,
such as the No Child Left Behind Act.15 Over the past several
decades, the comparative data generated through the OECD’s
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)16 has
pushed other nations to make significant improvements in their
Id. at 78.
Kerstin Martens & Stephan Leibfried, The PISA Story: How Educational
Policy Went International: A Lesson in Politics Beyond the Nation-state, ATLANTIC TIMES
(GER.) Jan. 2008, http://www.atlantic-times.com/archive_detail.php?recordID=
1132.
12 Id.
13 Martens & Leibfried, supra note 11.
14 Tonia Bieber & Kerstin Martens, The OECD PISA Study as a Soft Power
in Education? Lessons from Switzerland and the US, 46 EUR. J. EDUC. 102, 109-10
(2011); but see TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 8, at 34-37 (exploring the controversy
around sources of comparative education data).
15 Id. at 109.
16 OECD Programme for International Student Assessment, AUSTL. COUNCIL
FOR EDUC. RESEARCH (2012), http://www.acer.edu.au/ozpisa/assessment/
(“PISA assesses the extent to which students near the end of compulsory education
have acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full
participation in society. In all cycles, the domains of reading, mathematical and
scientific literacy are covered not only in terms of mastery of the school curriculum,
but in terms of important knowledge and skills needed in adult life.”).
10
11
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education systems to remain globally competitive.17 In the realm of
higher education, the U.S. has consistently been a leader in attracting
foreign talent.18 Since 9/11,19 however, the international dimension of
U.S. higher education has contracted.20 At the same time, many other
nations have rapidly expanded the international dimension of their
higher education through participation in international initiatives.21
These initiatives seek to increase student mobility by harmonizing
higher education systems.22
To demonstrate how the U.S. can become more involved in
international higher education initiatives, this comment will first give
an overview of the history of these initiatives globally.23 Section III
will explore the legal and soft governance mechanisms involved and
their feasibility of application to the U.S.24 A description of the
structures of these initiatives and the difficulties associated with each
will follow, aiding in the understanding of how the U.S. can fit into
the international picture.25 Section IV will examine examples of
harmonization in the U.S. to demonstrate the feasibility of U.S.
participation in international initiatives.26 This comment will conclude
by considering possible courses of action for U.S. in this area.27
Bieber & Martens, supra note 14, at 108.
ACE CTR. FOR INT’L INITIATIVES, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC.,
STUDENTS ON THE MOVE: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES (Oct. 2006) http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/
IssueBrief-2006-Students-on-the-Move-The-Future-of-International-Students-inthe-United-States.pdf.
19 Rodolfo Altamirano, Viewpoint: The Impact of 9/11 on International
Education, MICH. DAILY, Sept. 8, 2004, http://www.michigandaily.com/content/
viewpoint-impact-911-international-education (explaining how the Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System database, additional border security, and the
difficulty of obtaining visas impact international student mobility); see also David A.
Urias & Card Camp Yeakey, International Students and U.S. Border Security, NEA
HIGHER EDUC. J. 187, 187 (Fall 2005).
20 Dobbins & Martens, supra note 6, at 189.
21 Id. at 188-89.
22 See infra Section II.
23 See infra Section II.
24 See infra Section III.
25 See infra Sections IIIB - D.
26 See infra Section IV.
27 See infra Section V.
17
18
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American education policy remains largely decentralized and
focused on local control.28 Politicians consistently address global
education competitiveness, but the U.S. has yet to respond
significantly to international initiatives.29 This is in part because the
U.S.’s decentralized education system makes policy-making on a
national level challenging.30 While individual higher education
institutions can and do participate in international mobility efforts by
accepting and sending students across borders, a unified and
consistent policy does not currently exist in the U.S.31
Participation in international initiatives to increase student
mobility is said to have a significant impact on the competitive edge
of nations.32 These mobility enhancing initiatives can increase
economic cooperation, the prestige of a nation’s institutions,
goodwill between nations, and the quantity and quality of data
available to comparative education researchers.33 However,
international initiatives in education would likely require cooperation
on all governance levels—state, federal, and international. Initiatives
by international organizations such as the European Union (E.U.)
affect not only national governments, but also regional or state
entities and individual higher education institutions.34 Individual
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW 6 (2005), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ous/international/
edus/index.html; Dobbins & Martens, supra note 6, at 180.
29 Dobbins & Martens, supra note 6, at 180.
30 Id.
31 HUM. RES. DEV. WORKING GRP., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HIGHER
EDUC. AT THE UNIV. OF MELBOURNE, HIGHER EDUCATION DIPLOMA
SUPPLEMENTS AMONG APEC MEMBER ECONOMIES 7 (2010) [hereinafter APEC
DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT], http://hrd.apec.org/images/c/cc/APEC _
Higher_Education_Diploma_Supplement_-_Final_Report.pdf.
32 Luijten-Lub et al., supra note 3, at 150; Laurel S. Terry, The Bologna
Process and its Impact in Europe: Much More than Degree Changes, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 107, 210 (2008) [hereinafter Terry 2008].
33 MINISTERS ATTENDING THE ASIA-PACIFIC EDUC. MINISTERS’
MEETING, THE BRISBANE COMMUNIQUE (2006), http://shelbycearley.files.
wordpress.com/2010/06/thebrisbanecommunique.pdf; Alexander W. Wiseman &
David P. Baker, The Worldwide Explosion of Internationalized Education Policy, in
GLOBAL TRENDS IN EDUCATION POLICY 10-11 (Alexander W. Wiseman & David
P. Baker, eds., 2005).
34 APEC DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at v-vi, 27.
28
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higher education institutions, acting through unifying organizations
such as the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) or
the Association of American Colleges and Universities (AACU), can
affect the policies made by national and international actors. 35
Additionally, national policymakers may use international
organizations’ initiatives as way of legitimizing their own national
goals or promoting particular approaches to international policy in
general.36 International higher education initiatives, in short, require
significant coordination and transparency among a variety of entities
with sometimes greatly differing motivations.37
The U.S. is capable of this level of cooperation and
coordination internationally.38 Current domestic programs
demonstrate this capability by slowly harmonizing the qualification
frameworks of higher education among states.39 For the purposes of
this comment, qualification frameworks refer to the systems that
classify higher education by “level, workload, quality, profile and
learning outcomes.”40 The common framework in the U.S., for
example, allows students to transfer from one institution to another
while retaining many of their credits because the institutions
recognize curricular similarities and account for the differences.
In harmonizing qualification frameworks across nations,
international initiatives seek to make key connections between
frameworks so that qualifications are treated relatively equally in all
35 Barbara Brittingham, Accreditation in the United States: How Did We Get to
Where We Are?, in NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INST’L QUALITY & INTEGRITY,
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REPORT OF THE FEBRUARY 3-4, 2011 MEETING 14, 14 (Feb.
3, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/naciqi-dir/2-11-presenters.
html.
36 SACHA GARBEN, EU HIGHER EDUCATION LAW: THE BOLOGNA
PROCESS AND HARMONIZATION BY STEALTH 213 (2011).
37 Id. at 212.
38 Wiseman & Baker, supra note 33, at 4 (“Being open to external forces,
like common worldwide understanding about how sectors like education should
work in all nations, makes national policymaking ripe for internationalizing.”).
39 See infra Section III.
40 DANIELA ULICNA ET AL., EUR. COMM’N & AUSTL. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
STUDY ON THE (POTENTIAL) ROLE OF QUALIFICATIONS FRAMEWORKS IN
SUPPORTING MOBILITY OF WORKERS AND LEARNERS 57 (Oct. 2011), http://
ec.europa.eu/education/more-information/doc/2011/australia_en.pdf.
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nations.41 The U.S. has slowly moved toward coordination with other
nations by continuing international harmonization but thus far has
refused to be bound by international initiatives.42 Unlike the U.S.,
many of the member nations of the Asian-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) and the E.U. have begun processes of
international harmonization through their respective international
organizations.43
In the U.S., higher education policy is moving toward a more
internally centralized and harmonized system on several fronts. 44
While the U.S. has not yet engaged significantly with current
international higher education initiatives, it has employed similar
harmonization programs internally among states and across North
American borders.45 These programs have come both from
grassroots organizations and agencies (the ground-up approach) and
from the Department of Education and other national policy making
entities (a top-down approach).46 The U.S. has yet to take significant
steps toward cooperation with international initiatives. As a global
leader, it is time for the U.S. to seriously consider further
international harmonization in the increasingly globalized world of
higher education.
I. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION
INITIATIVES
To create international higher education initiatives, member
nations of international organizations may enter into formal
agreements.47 Many of these agreements are not legally binding in the
OLUSOLA OYEWOLE, HARMONISATION OF DEGREE STRUCTURES,
AND REGIONAL QUALIFICATIONS FRAMEWORKS IN THE AFRICAN HIGHER
EDUCATION SPACE 1 (2011).
41

42 Laurel S. Terry, International Initiatives that Facilitate Global Mobility in
Higher Education, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 305, 329 (2011) [hereinafter Terry 2011].
43 Id. at 318, 330.
44 See infra Section III.
45 DEWIT, supra note 4, at 30-31, 39; see also Program for North American
Mobility in Higher Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.
gov/programs/fipsenortham/index.html (last modified June 16, 2011).
46 See infra Section III.
47 GARBEN, supra note 36, at 5-7.
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ordinary sense.48 The purposes of these agreements are to coordinate
institutions to facilitate increased student mobility and to encourage
participation in international education projects and programs.49
Initiatives include the European Community Action Scheme for the
Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS), the European Credit
and Transfer System (ECTS), the Bologna Process, and various
efforts of APEC.50 The U.S. has also been peripherally involved in
international higher education initiatives and has strengthened its
student mobility framework.51 The selected initiatives below are a
sampling of key programs and do not represent an exhaustive list of
the programs around the world.
A. ERASMUS
The ERASMUS program, initiated in 1987 by the E.U.’s
European Commission,52 has been moderately successful at its goal
of promoting student mobility across higher education institutions in
Europe.53 To participate in ERASMUS, institutions are required to
have an ERASMUS University Charter.54 This charter helps the
institution coordinate with the European Commission by providing
the basic framework, principles, and requirements for participation.55
ERASMUS uses both centralized and decentralized efforts to
coordinate institutions with the E.U.56 After its establishment,
Id. at 174.
Id.
50 Terry 2011, supra note 42, at 305.
51 DEWIT, supra note 4, at 30-31; see also U.S. Network for Education
Information, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ous/international/usnei/edlite-index.html (last modified Dec. 22, 2007).
52 The European Commission is the European Union’s executive body.
See About the European Commission, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/
about/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012).
53 Heather Field, Higher Education in the Twenty-First Century: Integrating
Tertiary Education in Europe, 585 ANNALS 182, 187 (2003).
54 The ERASMUS Programme – Studying in Europe and More, EUR. COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-programme/doc80_en. htm (last
updated Jan. 9, 2013).
55 Id.
56 Id. (“[S]o called ‘decentralised actions’ that promote individual mobility
are run by national agencies in the 33 participating countries and ‘centralised’
actions, such as networks, multilateral projects and the award of the ERASMUS
48
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ERASMUS expanded to encompass countries outside Europe,
including the U.S. via the Atlantis program.57 Through competitive
grants, the Atlantis program promotes mobility and a “transatlantic
dimension” to higher education.58 The Atlantis grant competition was
cancelled for fiscal year 2011 due to Congressional budget
reductions.59
B. The European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS)
ECTS was created in response to the needs of newly mobile
students in the ERASMUS program.60 As a system promoting crossinstitution degree and credit recognition, ECTS marks the first of
several mechanisms developed to harmonize higher education
institutions across Europe.61 A recent report, Problems of
Recognition in Making Erasmus (PRIME), showed that fifty-nine
percent of European higher education institutions surveyed use
ECTS as their only credit system, and thirty-seven percent use ECTS
with a national credit system.62 In addition to ECTS, the European
University Charter, are managed by the EU’s Education, Audiovisual and Culture
Executive Agency.”).
57 Terry 2011, supra note 42, at 314.
58 European Union-United States Atlantis Program, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fipseec/ index.html (last modified June 16, 2011).
59 Id.
60 Terry 2011, supra note 42, at 315 (explaining that “the needs of the
ERASMUS programme led directly to the creation of another EU initiative that has
been highly influential,” ECTS).
61 EUR.COMM’N, ECTS USER’S GUIDE 7 (2009) [hereinafter ECTS
USER’S GUIDE], http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/doc/ects/
guide_en.pdf (describing ECTS as “a tool that helps to design, describe, and deliver
programmes and award higher education qualifications. The use of ECTS, in
conjunction with outcomes-based qualifications frameworks, makes programmes
and qualifications more transparent and facilitates the recognition of qualifications.
ECTS can be applied to all types of programmes, whatever their mode of delivery
(school-based, work-based), the learners’ status (full-time, part-time) and to all
kinds of learning (formal, non-formal and informal).”).
62 EREN
DICLE ET AL., PRIME REPORT 2010 16 (2010),
http://prime.esn.org/sites/prime.esn.org/files/PRIME20Report%202010_0.pdf
(“In order to facilitate recognition of degrees and study achievements; a clear
system of accreditation, the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System
(ECTS) has been introduced to replace various local systems.”); Key Results,
PRIME, http://prime.esn.org/content/key-results (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
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Commission, the Council of Europe and UNESCO collectively
created the Diploma Supplement.63 This supplement provides a
“standardised[sic] description of the nature, level, context, content
and status of the studies” completed by each graduate.64 ERASMUS
and ECTS are implemented through national agencies equivalent to
the U.S. Department of Education.65 ECTS exemplifies a
classification framework implemented through an international
initiative, ERASMUS.
C. The Bologna Process
The Bologna Process was not initiated by a centralized
authority like the European Union. Rather, through the Bologna
Declaration of 1999, twenty-nine countries agreed to facilitate
mobility for students, graduates, and higher education faculty.66
Essentially, the process of the Bologna Agreement consists of
creating the European Higher Education Area by “ironing out”
national idiosyncrasies and slowly “Europeanizing” higher
education.67 Key areas of attempted harmonization are both
substantive, as with the Europeanization of curriculum,68 and
procedural, as demonstrated by the creation of a framework for
comparable or uniform credits and degrees.69 The Bologna Process
uses the ECTS framework as one mechanism of harmonization.70

Terry 2008, supra note 32, at 136.
The Diploma Supplement, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/education
/lifelong-learning-policy/doc1239_en.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2013).
65 DICLE ET AL., supra note 62, at 23 (“The National Agencies (NAs) are
the link between the European Commission and Higher Education Institutions.”).
66 Field, supra note 53, at 183.
67 Id.
68 See generally EUR. COMM’N, EU RESEARCH ON SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
HUMANITIES: HIGHER EDUCATION
INSTITUTIONS’ RESPONSES TO
EUROPEANISATION,
INTERNATIONALISATION
AND
GLOBALISATION.
DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN A MULTI-LEVEL POLICY CONTEXT
(June 2005).
69 Id. at 184, 186.
70 ECTS USER’S GUIDE, supra note 61, at 9.
63
64
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The Bologna Process is entirely voluntary,71 and participating
countries include all E.U. member nations and twenty non-E.U.
countries.72 The U.S. is not presently a participant, though
policymakers are closely monitoring its progress.73 Scholars view the
Bologna Process as a response to the view that European universities
could not compete in a “global ‘knowledge-based economy’” because
of “brain-drain, the poor international reputation of national
universities, low graduate outputs and success rates, rising academic
unemployment, [and] insufficient financial resources.”74 This
description could easily describe the motivation behind the initiatives
of the E.U. and APEC as well.
D. APEC’s Efforts
APEC is an organization of twenty-one member economies
including the U.S., Canada, Mexico, China, Singapore, Japan, Korea,
and Russia.75 According to the White House, the total U.S.-APEC
trade has reached at least $2.3 trillion in goods and services since
APEC’s inception.76 A 2010 study by the University of Melbourne
explains that APEC member economies are increasingly
incorporating their own Diploma Supplement into their higher
education systems.77 The structure and content of supplements in
APEC economies are highly influenced by those of Europe,
Australia, and New Zealand.78 The study also reports “widespread
support” for an APEC-developed Diploma Supplement.79 Currently,
71 Eva M. Voegtle et al., To What Extent Does Transnational Communication
Drive Cross-national Policy Convergence? The impact of the Bologna-process on Domestic Higher
Education Policies, 61 HIGHER EDUC. 77, 78 (2010).
72 Terry 2011, supra note 42, at 318.
73 Terry 2008, supra note 32, at 111.
74 Voegtle et al., supra note 71, at 77-78.
75 Member Economies, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOP., http://www.apec.org
/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
76 Office of the Press Sec’y, APEC: Fact Sheet on 19th Annual Leaders
Meeting Outcomes Creating Jobs, Growth, and Economic Opportunity with AELM Declaration
& Annexes, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 13, 2011), http://www.whitehouse. gov/thepress-office/2011/11/13/apec-fact-sheet-19th-annual-leaders-meeting-outcomescreating-jobs-growt.
77 APEC DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at 6-7.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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member economies may also use Memoranda of Understanding—
government-to-government agreements—to assure that higher
education meets mutual standards of quality.80
E. U.S. Movement
In 1995 the U.S., in collaboration with Canada and Mexico,
created the Program for North American Mobility in Higher
Education, a competitive grant program designed to encourage
mobility and a “North American dimension” to higher education.81 A
byproduct of this program has been a movement toward
development of mutual credit recognition and joint curricula and
degrees across Mexico, the U.S., and Canada.82 However, the grant
competition was cancelled for fiscal year 2011 due to Congressional
budget reductions.83
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the U.S. is engaging with
the higher education initiatives of international organizations on its
own terms. For example, the U.S. and Canada, two APEC member
economies, signed the Council of Europe’s Convention on the
Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the
European Region (Lisbon Convention).84 The Council of Europe is
an organization of forty-seven countries that focuses on promoting
human rights and the rule of law in Europe.85 The Lisbon
Convention promotes the use of the Council of Europe/UNESCO

80 Id.; AUSTL. UNIVS. QUALITY AGENCY, ENHANCEMENT OF QUALITY
ASSURANCE SYSTEMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN APEC MEMBER ECONOMIES 3738 (2006), http://m.apec.org/Press/Features/2007/~/media/Files/Press/Feat
ures/2007/2007Par0001Filev2.ashx.
81 Program for North American Mobility in Higher Education, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fipsenortham/index.html (last modified
June 16, 2011).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education
in the European Region, CETS No.: 165, COUNCIL OF EUR. [hereinafter, CETS No.
165], http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=165&CM
=&DF=&CL=ENG (last updated Nov. 18, 2012).
85 Who We Are, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/
index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
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Diploma Supplement.86 Russia and Australia have signed and ratified
the Lisbon Convention.87 The U.S., as a non-member with observer
status, signed without accession, i.e. agreeing to be legally bound.88 In
conjunction with signing the Lisbon Convention, the U.S.
Department of Education initiated the U.S. Network for Education
Information (USNEI) purportedly as a response to requests from
within the federal government and from education associations.89 The
USNEI provides information for U.S. students or workers seeking
education abroad and to foreign students or workers seeking U.S.
education.90
II. SOFT GOVERNANCE
A. Definition
The international higher education initiatives discussed above
are forms of soft governance. Soft governance is typical of
international agreements because of the absence of a centralized
authority.91 The definition and significance of soft governance, and its
accompanying term “soft law,” are debated and elusive. However,
soft law can be identified by distinguishing it from hard law, or what
is commonly thought of as binding law in domestic legal systems.92
Soft law typically lacks some element of “obligation, precision, [or]
delegation.”93 A more flexible form of governance, soft law may
more readily facilitate cooperation between distinct, autonomous
entities, but it is criticized for the ambiguity it leaves in its wake.94
Typical instruments of soft governance include: “norm setting,
opinion formation, financial means, coordinative activities, [and]
The Lisbon Recognition Convention, COUNCIL OF EUR. http://www.coe.
int/t/dg4/highereducation/recognition/lrc_EN.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
87 APEC DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at 7.
88 CETS No. 165, supra note 84.
89 About USNEI, ED.GOV, http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ous/international/usnei/edlite-about.html (last modified Feb. 11, 2008).
90 Id.
91 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 423 (2000).
92 Id. at 422-23.
93 Id. at 422.
94 Id.
86

130

2013

Comment

2:1

consulting services.”95 The international education initiatives
described above typically consist of declarations of intended action,
rather than treaties that can bind the signatory nations.96
B. Feasibility of an Initiative
If the U.S. seeks to participate in international higher
education initiatives, it is necessary to examine the feasibility of soft
governance in the U.S. context. In general, the degree to which a
nation participates in a soft governance initiative can be examined
using two different approaches: 1) the veto players in the state and
national governments; and 2) the nation’s guiding principles.97
First, veto players include people or institutional components
within a national government that have the ability to hinder the
progress of an initiative.98 Essentially, the greater the number of
players who agree with or are somehow advantaged by the initiative’s
policy, the greater the likelihood that the nation will successfully
harmonize with the international initiative. In the U.S., potential veto
players at the national level—Congress, the President, leaders in the
Department of Education—must contend with potential veto players
at the state and local level, both public and private, because of the
decentralized nature of U.S. education.99 Therefore, any discussion of
the U.S.’s international dimension to higher education must always
include an examination of the multiple players involved. This
complexity may explain U.S. policymakers’ hesitance to address an
American approach to international higher education. However,
because of the decentralized nature of American education, a veto

Alexander-Kenneth Nagel et al., Introduction—Education Policy in
Transformation, in TRANSFORMATION OF EDUCATION POLICY 3, 10-12 (Kerstin
Martens et al. eds., 2010).
96 GARBEN, supra note 36, at 90.
97 Nagel et al., supra note 95, at 13-14.
98 Id.
99 PETER D. ECKEL & JACQUELINE E. KING, AN OVERVIEW OF HIGHER
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DIVERSITY, ACCESS, AND THE ROLE OF THE
MARKETPLACE 3 (2004), http://www.acenet.edu/news-room/Documents/
Overview-of-Higher-Education-in-the-United-States-Diversity-Access-and-theRole-of-the-Marketplace-2004.pdf.
95
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player in the U.S. is not likely to impede efforts to cooperate with
international organizations.100
Instead, the U.S.’s guiding principles are likely to determine
its willingness to engage in international higher education initiatives.
Important guiding principles in the context of this discussion may
include beliefs about the purposes, significance, and expected
outcomes of higher education and international cooperation.101 In the
U.S., state and federal policymakers consistently link education with
economic success on a personal and national level.102 However,
organizations like the Association of American Colleges and
Universities (AACU) promote the ideals of a liberal education.103 The
AACU defines a liberal education as one in which “students develop
a sense of social responsibility” and which promotes “broad learning
in multiple disciplines and ways of knowing.”104 The philosophy of
American education has historically alternated between an emphasis
on liberal and vocational styles of education.105
International scholars have identified a positive correlation
between the cultural, institutional, and socioeconomic similarities
among nations and the similarity of policymakers’ interpretation and

Nagel et al., supra note 95, at 265.
Id. at 14-15.
102 Matt Compton, The Blueprint for an America Built to Last,
WHITE
HOUSE (Jan. 24, 2012, 11:19 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012
/01/24/blueprint-america-built-last (“We need to promote new skills and better
education so that all Americans are prepared to compete in a global economy.”);
Regional Economic Development Councils, N.Y. ST., http://regionalcouncils. ny.gov/faq
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (“Public and private higher education institutions are
essential components of the State’s economic engine, serving as centers of
innovation and research, teaching the business leaders of tomorrow, anchoring our
communities, and creating jobs.”).
103 Liberal
Education, ASS’N OF AM. COLLS. & UNIVS.,
http://www.aacu.org/resources/liberaleducation/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 28,
2013).
104 What is a 21st Century Liberal Education?, ASS’N OF AM. COLLS. & UNIS.,
http://www.aacu.org/leap/what_is_liberal_education.cfm (last visited Mar. 28,
2013).
105 See generally DIANE RAVITCH, LEFT BACK: A CENTURY OF BATTLES
OVER SCHOOL REFORM (2000); KATZ, supra note 8; TYACK & CUBAN, supra note 8.
100
101
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implementation of international policies.106 In other words, similar
participating nations are more likely to participate in an initiative in
similar ways. Because cultural, institutional, and socioeconomic
considerations shape how a nation addresses welfare issues such as
education, these factors may dramatically influence how a nation
filters the international initiative down through national, state or
regional, and local government.
C. Structuring an Initiative
International soft governance measures can be initiated by
international organizations, such as the E.U.’s ERASMUS program,
or they can be initiated outside of one formal body, such as the
Bologna Process. The E.U.’s initiative can be characterized as a topdown effort to harmonize higher education institutions. The E.U.’s
powers, called competences, are set forth in treaties such as the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 107
Member nations grant competences and give legitimacy to the E.U.,
and treaties take effect only with the consent of the signatory
nations.108 The E.U. holds only the power granted to it, explicitly or
implicitly, and the remaining powers are retained by member
nations.109 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has interpreted the
E.U.’s competences broadly to include education as it relates to the
internal market.110 Additionally, Article 165 TFEU delineates the
E.U.’s education competence.111
In addition to the flexible and ambiguous powers of
international organizations in the E.U. and the national government
in the U.S., education is also affected by the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS).112 The U.S. and E.U., as well Japan, New
Torben Heinze & Christoph Knill, Analysing Differential Impact of the
Bologna Process: Theoretical Considerations on National Conditions for International Policy
Convergence, 56 HIGHER EDUC. 493, 495, 506 (2008).
107 GARBEN, supra note 36, at 57-59.
108 Id. at 58.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 100.
111 Id. at 59.
112 KEMAL GÜRÜZ, HIGHER EDUCATION AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDENT MOBILITY IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 189 (2011).
106
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Zealand, and Australia, voluntarily participate in GATS to “expand
the opportunities for global trade in services by removing barriers.” 113
GATS has raised controversy because it may supersede national and
institutional authority, leaving academic autonomy vulnerable to
future repercussions of the agreement.114 Additionally, some higher
education institutions balk at the valuation of higher education as
good to be traded rather than a beneficial social service.115 A tension
exists between the economic and socio-cultural values of
education.116 While globalizing education advances a nation’s place in
the knowledge economy, nations tend to protect national education
strategies because of their socio-cultural value.117
In contrast to E.U. initiatives, the Bologna Process can be
characterized as a ground-up initiative in the sense that no single
international organization coordinates and guides the process.118 The
participating nations have proceeded in a purposefully ground-up
manner to avoid granting control to any international organization.119
Nevertheless, many would argue that national education agencies
compelled individual institutions to comply with the Bologna
Process’s changes without soliciting views from those most affected,
i.e., the institutions themselves.120 The distinction between top-down
and ground-up initiatives is further complicated by the increasing
reliance of both public and private institutions on funds from
students and corporate partners.121 Increased reliance on the private
sector leads to increased demand for accountability, often through
quality assurance measures.122 Additionally, many Bologna Process
changes intersect with other initiatives of international organizations

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
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GARBEN, supra note 36, at 137.
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Id. at 211.
Id.
Id.
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like the E.U., causing confusion for those charged with implementing
changes.123
D. Difficulties Encountered by Initiatives
Scholars have criticized both the top-down and ground-up
approaches to international higher education initiatives. The E.U.’s
higher education initiatives are controversial because the E.U.’s legal
authority in education issues is attenuated and unclear.124
Additionally, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has repeatedly
expanded E.U. authority in education to an unprecedented degree.125
In this way, the E.U.’s influence on higher education may be said to
lack democratic legitimacy, as well as transparency and openness. 126
Similarly, the Bologna Process lacks transparency and the checks and
balances inherent in formal organizations’ structures.127 Some
scholars have noted that the “not-so-hidden agenda” of the Bologna
Process participant nations is to mold European higher education
institutions to resemble American higher education institutions. 128
Others claim that Bologna has contributed to European higher
education outpacing American higher education in attractiveness to
foreign students because of its greater transparency of degrees and
qualifications.129
Beyond these broader governance issues, harmonization
efforts have encountered implementation problems as well. A 2010
report identified the following difficulties with implementing the
ERASMUS program: incompatibility of study programs, problems
with credit calculation, problems with grade transfer, bureaucratic
issues, attitude of professors who refuse to recognize courses, and a
lack of information exchange.130 While the Diploma Supplement has
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been a popular harmonization mechanism, only half of participating
European countries had fully implemented it as of 2009.131
A 2010 APEC report noted similar problems with
implementing its own international initiative.132 The report lists as key
issues the need to convince institutions of the value of additional
documentation and the difficulty of providing diploma supplements
to nations with different qualifications frameworks.133 These issues
highlight how diploma supplements that make mobility more feasible
are distinct from qualifications frameworks, which aim to harmonize
levels of education, content of levels, and learning outcomes.134
Diploma supplements may be better suited for individual institutions
that want to add an international dimension. On the other hand, the
structures and classifications provided by qualifications frameworks
are meant to be grafted onto national systems.135 By interfering with
the national structure of higher education—for example, by changing
the number of years necessary for bachelor’s degree equivalent—
qualification frameworks can have consequences for a nation’s
economy and culture.136 Despite governance and implementation
difficulties, and despite the differences in culture and language
involved, these harmonization efforts are inspiring nations around
the world to discuss, plan, and implement new strategies to join the
harmonized higher education of the future.137

APEC DIPLOMA SUPPLEMENT REPORT, supra note 31, at 25 (“Despite
the commitment to issuing the [Diploma Supplement] to all graduates . . . by 2005,
only half of the countries have managed to implement it fully by 2009.”).
132 Id. at 15.
133 Id.
134 DANIELA ULICNA ET AL., supra note 40, at 5.
135 Id.
136 Wiseman & Baker, supra note 33, at 5. The economic and cultural
consequences of implementing a qualifications framework are beyond the scope of
this comment.
137 Dobbins & Martens, supra note 6, at 188 (“Bologna has proven to be
more than just a voluntary declaration, but has also created a platform for policy
exchange and the emulation of best practice.”).
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III. ON THE GROUND IN THE U.S.
A. Accreditation
The debate over whether higher education should become
increasingly centralized is similar in the U.S and the E.U.. Looking
specifically at accreditation provides an example of the issues
surrounding centralization. In the U.S., hundreds of billions of
taxpayer dollars are tied up in the accreditation of higher education
institutions.138 Accreditation is a key area affected by international
initiatives to harmonize higher education because of its relation to the
structure and content of higher education. Leaders in higher
education organizations recently began to debate the merits of
domestic harmonization, which could lead to participation in
international harmonization.139 Education scholar Philip Altbach
explains that the “accreditation process is becoming internationalized
and commercialized,” making it easier and more acceptable for an
accreditation agency in, for example, the U.S. to offer its services to a
higher education institution abroad.140
American accreditation is defined by the Council for Higher
Education Accreditation (CHEA) as “a collegial process of selfreview and peer review for improvement of academic quality and
public accountability of institutions and programs.”141 The
distribution of power in accreditation in the U.S. is often referred to
as “the triad” because power is divided relatively evenly between the
state governments, federal government, and private accrediting

National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., http://ed.gov/about/ bdscomm/list/naciqi.html (last modified
Feb. 13, 2013); Brittingham, supra note 35, at 21.
139 Scott Jaschik, Wake-Up Call for American Higher Ed, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (May 21, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/
05/21/bologna.
140 Philip G. Altbach & Jane Knight, The Internationalization of Higher
Education: Motivations and Realities, 11 J. OF STUD. IN INT’L EDUC. 290, 301 (2007).
141 COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION, STRENGTHENING
HIGHER EDUCATION THROUGH STRENGTHENING ACCREDITATION 1-2 (Jan.
2000), http://www.chea.org/pdf/chea_glance_2003.pdf.
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agencies.142 The triad is a unique approach that requires the
cooperation and mutual trust of many actors.143 State government
roles vary, but generally the state government oversees licensing and
consumer protection.144 The federal government’s oversight is
directly linked to the funding it provides in the form of financial aid
to institutions.145 Accreditation agencies set standards for and
measure quality of institutions, allowing the federal government to
determine which institutions are eligible to receive funding.146 These
accrediting agencies are thought to act as a “bulwark” against
potential government over-reaching.147 Finally, the Tenth
Amendment protects states’ higher education choices, fostering the
rich diversity that is unique to American higher education.148
In the United States, the Department of Education’s National
Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI)
is a key body for policy questions of higher education accreditation.149
Since its creation through the Higher Education Act’s 1992
amendments, NACIQI has made recommendations to the Secretary
of Education regarding accreditation.150 Each of the Secretary of
Education, the Senate, and the House appoints six members to form
the eighteen member committee.151 In general, NACIQI determines
the criteria for establishing and maintaining accrediting agencies that
are reliable and maintain high standards.152 Individual accreditation
Peter Ewell & Dennis Jones, Higher Education Quality Assurance in
America: Approaching a Crisis, in NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INST’L QUALITY &
INTEGRITY, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REPORT OF THE FEBRUARY 3-4, 2011 MEETING
42, 42 (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/naciqi-dir/2-11presenters.html.
143 Brittingham, supra note 35, at 14.
144 Id. at 21.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 24.
147 ECKEL & KING, supra note 99, at 4.
148 Ass’n of Specialized & Prof’l Accreditors, What is the “Triad,” in
NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INST’L QUALITY & INTEGRITY, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
REPORT OF THE FEBRUARY 3-4, 2011 MEETING 76, 76 (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/naciqi-dir/2-11-presenters.html.
149 Ewell & Jones, supra note 142.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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agencies often cover a region or a particular kind of university or
program.153
At a recent NACIQI forum, stakeholders representing key
organizations and researchers highlighted the current debate over the
involvement of the federal government in the traditionally grassroots
industry of accreditation.154 Clifford Adelman, a leading education
researcher, explained that, using grants as an incentive, the federal
government is encouraging accreditation agencies to try their own
version of a Degree Qualifications Profile (DQP).155 In response to
this federal push, Adelman advises the federal government to “please
stay away and let this be a ground-up phenomenon, as the
competency based DQP is truly a transformational challenge to U.S.
higher education.”156
The technical and philosophical challenges to a national
qualifications framework that could extend beyond U.S. borders are
immense. The U.S. accreditation system is praised for its costefficiency, self-governed and partly volunteer-based structure, and
flexibility.157 Judith Eaton, president of CHEA, observed that
taxpayers are pressuring the federal government to become more
involved in the higher education system in which it invests so many
taxpayer dollars.158 Yet the U.S. accreditation and higher education
systems can become internationalized without losing their grassroots
nature. Similarly, the federal government should not react to public
pressure by involving itself in accreditation with a heavy hand.

Id.
Judith Eaton, Roles and Relationships: Accreditation and the Federal
Government, in NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INST’L QUALITY & INTEGRITY, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., REPORT OF THE FEBRUARY 3-4, 2011 MEETING 37, 37 (Feb. 3,
2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/naciqi-dir/2-11-presenters.html
(“However unexpectedly, we have arrived at a decision point about accreditation
and the federal government.”).
155 Clifford Adelman, Remarks on the Next Reauthorization of the Higher
Education Act, in NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INST’L QUALITY & INTEGRITY, U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., REPORT OF THE FEBRUARY 3-4, 2011 MEETING 1, 1 (Feb. 3,
2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/naciqi-dir/2-11-presenters.html.
156 Id.
157 Brittingham, supra note 35, at 11.
158 Eaton, supra note 154, at 3.
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Rather, the federal government can use its position in relation to
both international and domestic education to harness the invaluable
experiences and expertise of U.S. accreditors and other stakeholders.
B. Additional Examples
Other efforts to harmonize higher education demonstrate the
U.S.’s capacity for implementing programs similar the harmonization
initiatives abroad. The Carnegie Classifications and Complete College
America (CCA) are ground-up phenomena that demonstrate how
classifications and an emphasis on accountability and transparency
have already led to an increasingly harmonized higher education
system at home. The Carnegie Classifications, first published in 1973,
represent the “leading framework” used by U.S. higher education
institutions to classify and organize higher education.159 These
ubiquitous classifications are used to determine qualification for
grants and other funding, as well as to categorize a wide variety of
institutions for comparison in widely-read publications such as the
U.S. News and World Report’s college and university rankings.160 The
Carnegie Foundation itself has noted that the value placed on its
classifications can create significant pressure on institutions to
maintain or change their classification.161 The mutual interests of
individual institutions and the federal government in these
classifications make them well suited for use in future harmonization
initiatives, as a model or a starting point.162

Carnegie Classifications, CARNEGIE FOUND., http://classifications.
carnegiefoundation.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
160 ALEXANDER C. MCCORMICK & CHUN-MEI ZHAO, RETHINKING AND
REFRAMING
THE
CARNEGIE
CLASSIFICATION
55
(2005),
http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/downloads/rethinking.pdf;
Alexander C. McCormick, Hidden in Plain View, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 10, 2007,
4:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered. com/views/2007/05/10/mccormick.
161 MCCORMICK & ZHAO, supra note 160, at 55.
162 JOHN AUBREY DOUGLASS, CTR. FOR STUD. IN HIGHER EDUC., THE
CARNEGIE COMMISSION AND COUNCIL ON HIGHER EDUCATION: A
RETROSPECTIVE 14 (2005), http://cshe.berkeley.edu/publications/docs/ROP
.Douglass.Carnegie.14.05.pdf .
159
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Complete College America, a nonprofit organization, works
with the National Governors’ Association (NGA)163 to improve
college graduation rates in each state and to “build consensus for
change” among key players at the state and national levels.164 CCA
was founded in 2009 and is supported by organizations like the
Carnegie Corporation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and
the Lumina Foundation.165 Through the Complete to Compete
program of CCA, states use common metrics to measure progress
and outcomes.166 Progress metrics measure enrollment and success in
remedial education, success in first year college courses, credit
accumulation, retention rates, and course completion.167 Outcome
metrics measure degrees awarded, graduation rates, transfer rates, and
time and credits necessary to achieve a degree.168 CCA recommends
that states generate common definitions for certain metrics terms,
such as “remedial education courses.”169 The technical guide to the
common metrics also lists disciplines and defines which categories of
courses fall into each discipline.170 By beginning this process of
common definitions, states are already taking steps toward a more
coordinated and cooperative system. Other key examples of
harmonization efforts in the U.S. include the Association of
American Colleges and Universities’ Liberal Education and America’s
Promise (LEAP) initiative,171 the Lumina Foundation’s Tuning USA

163 Common Metrics, COMPLETE COLL. AM., http://www.completecollege
.org/path_forward/commonmetrics/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
164 Complete College America, COLL. BOARD, http://completionarch.
collegeboard.org/content/complete-college-america.
165 About Us, COMPLETE COLL. AM., http://www.completecollege
.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
166 Common Metrics, supra note 163.
167 NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, COMPLETE TO COMPETE: COMMON
COLLEGE COMPLETION METRICS: TECHNICAL GUIDE
2
(2010),
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1011COMMONTECHGUI
DE. PDF.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 12.
170 Id. at 18.
171 Liberal Education and America’s Promise (LEAP), ASS’N OF AM. COLLS.
& UNIVS., http://www.aacu.org/leap/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
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project,172 and the Common Core State Standards Initiative, which is
also a project of the NGA.173
Through these programs, the U.S. demonstrated a strong
capacity to create common terminology, standards, and qualification
frameworks. These programs also demonstrate that, on a state and
regional level, certain common classifications already exist despite the
absence of formal measures.
IV. COMING TOGETHER: CONSIDERATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
A. What We Measure Signals What We Value174
International soft governance can help unify national policies,
but often at the price of transparency and accountability found in the
policies of a legitimate, binding authority.175 In the U.S., higher
education institutions and organizations are accustomed to dealing
with the federal government on a voluntary basis.176 Over time
federal power in K-12 education has expanded, requiring increased
cooperation on the local and state levels.177 Similar to international
organizations’ influence over national education policies, the U.S.
federal government influences local and state entities that act
relatively independently.178 In higher education, the federal

172 TUNING EDUC. STRUCTURES USA, http://tuningusa.org/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2012).
173 COMMON
CORE ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.
corestandards.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
174 Quoted from COMPLETE COLL. AM., UNIFORMLY MEASURE
PROGRESS AND SUCCESS: ESSENTIAL STEPS FOR STATES 1 (no date),
http://www.completecollege.org/docs/CCA%20Essential%20Steps%20Common
%20Measu res%20of%20Progress%281%29.pdf.
175 GARBEN, supra note 36, at 181.
176 ECKEL & KING, supra note 99, at 3-4.
177 GAIL L. SUNDERMAN & JIMMY KIM, EXPANSION OF FEDERAL
POWER IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIPS UNDER THE
NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT, YEAR ONE 12 (2004), http://civilrightsproject.
ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/nclb-title-i/expansion-of-federal-power-inamerican-education-federal-state-relationships-under-the-no-child-left-behind-actyear-one/sunderman-kim-expansion-federal-power-american.pdf.
178 Id. at 15.
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government uses the provision of financial aid funds to dictate
certain requirements, thereby involving itself in higher education
policy-making.179 This soft governance-like control allows the federal
government to mold higher education like it molds K-12 education.180
This is especially true when higher education policy relates to areas
like international affairs or economic competitiveness, which are
constitutionally assigned powers of the national government.181
On both national and international levels, soft governance
control can lead to the setting of norms in higher education. These
norms might determine how we view quality of education, the value
of particular subject areas, or the legitimacy of institutions or higher
education structures. Moreover, specific educational practices not
deemed valuable and legitimate by the policy-making entity may go
unnoticed and eventually be lost. In this way, the unique
characteristics of individual institutions, states, or nations may not
survive an increasingly harmonized higher education system.
Nevertheless, on an international scale nations are
incentivized to fall in line with the harmonization process. The
incentive may come from the international organization itself, or the
international aspect may be an attractive shell for national policies
that have received prior resistance but became legitimized through an
international organization’s support.182 As the global movement
toward harmonization continues, it is important for the U.S. to
become an active participant in shaping the future of higher
education. Equally important, however, is that the U.S. examine its
own motives for participation. While the U.S. may be accustomed to
a position of leadership, even dominance, in its foreign affairs, this
approach is unlikely to yield positive results in an area already
dominated by the efforts of other nations.183

ECKEL & KING, supra note 99, at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
181 Carol E. Head, Comment, The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power:
Constitutional Implications for State and Local Investment Restrictions Impacting Foreign
Countries, 42 B.C. L. REV. 123, 124 (2000).
182 GARBEN, supra note 36, at 213-15.
183 Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 105, 112
(2005).
179
180
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The American harmonization measures described above
demonstrate that the U.S.’s values correlate with those of
international organizations. These values in the higher education
context emphasize reaching a consensus on classification measures
and stress accountability and transparency. Consensus, accountability,
and transparency lend legitimacy to initiatives.
B. Recommendations
At present, the U.S. has three options with regard to
international higher education initiatives: 1) continue its policy of
abstinence on the national level and mild participation on an
institutional level, 2) attempt to supersede current efforts by
generating its own qualification framework and popularizing it with
other nations, or 3) engage cooperatively with international
organizations as a key partner.
1. Options One and Two
Given the potential benefits of participation, the first option
is not recommended. Participation can provide a streamlined means
for bringing students to U.S. colleges and universities, thus
contributing to the U.S.’s competitive edge in a global economy, and
it would allow the U.S. to be an integral part of a key area of
international development. The second option, which calls for
attempting to supersede current efforts with a new, perhaps blended,
framework, is feasible. The U.S. is uniquely positioned for this
approach because of its connection to first-world APEC and
European nations. Specifically, the U.S. is a member nation of APEC
and also maintains significant cultural similarities and economic links
to European nations. Additionally, the U.S. already is heavily
involved with the World Bank and the OECD in education research,
which contributes to the spread of an “institutionalized world
culture” of education.184 The U.S. and other wealthy nations produce
the most education research, which in turn allows them to have the
most influence on education trends.185 Most importantly for U.S.
impact on APEC nations, western (U.S. and European) higher
184
185

Wiseman & Baker, supra note 33, at 5.
Id. at 6.
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education credentials are given the most weight and legitimacy
around the world.186 By blending the experimental efforts in
European and APEC nations, the U.S. could provide the missing link
in harmonizing higher education across the globe.
Implementing a blended harmonization framework could
provide U.S. higher education with an opportunity for mutually
beneficial partnerships with other nations’ higher education systems
and individual institutions. European harmonization frameworks are
still at an experimentation stage and have not been universally
adopted, leaving room for U.S. influence. The U.S. system, specially
adapted to encompass diverse institutions and function on a
voluntary basis, is ideal for international expansion.
The U.S., APEC, and E.U. nations have already demonstrated
sufficiently similar guiding principles in terms of education. All three
place a premium on global competition and preparation for the
changing job market, as well as emphasize goals of quality and equity
in education generally.187 The U.S. must consider all of the domestic
veto players that might object to international participation. Adding
an international dimension to higher education necessarily requires
that the federal government act as liaison between the domestic and
the international education communities.188 Through NACIQI,
however, the federal government already has in place the beginnings
of a representative group. Additionally, organizations like CHEA

Id.
Laurie Halverson, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
issues/education (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (“Our nation’s economic
competitiveness and the path to the American Dream depend on providing every
child with an education that will enable them to succeed in a global economy that is
predicated on knowledge and innovation.”); Strategic Framework for Education and
Training,
EUR.
COMM’N,
http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learningpolicy/framework_en.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2013) (“Politicians at the European
level have recognised that education and training are essential to the development
of today’s knowledge society and economy.”); 4th APEC Education Ministerial
Meeting
(AEMM)
in
Lima
Peru,
ASIA-PACIFIC
ECON.
COOP.,
http://hrd.apec.org/index.php/4th_APEC_Education_Ministerial_Meeting_%28
AEMM%29_in_Lima_Peru (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).
188 Richard F. Grimmett, Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress,
U.S. DEPT. OF ST. (June 1, 1999), http:// fpc.state.gov/6172.htm.
186
187
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have already been strengthening their international dimension in
response to a globalizing world.189
Because of the complexity of American higher education, a
combined ground-up and top-down approach to development would
be preferable. The federal and state governments, regional
accreditors, and other stakeholders such as professional organizations
would need to be persuaded of the necessity of framework
development. Because effective persuasion could require significant
time and resources, higher education organizations and accreditation
agencies ought to develop a framework at a series of Bologna-style
meetings. Institutions should be allowed to opt out of the framework
to retain their independence. The federal government may consider
offering financial incentives to institutions for participation, but this
is not recommended. Financial incentives may present institutions
with a false choice because they cannot in reality afford to dismiss a
valuable funding source. Therefore, any financial incentives would
ensure a largely top-down approach which might not reap the full
benefits of the U.S.’s diverse higher education system.
U.S. policymakers strive to maintain America’s leadership role
in higher education.190 A blended global qualifications framework
would allow the U.S. the control it needs to participate in
international harmonization while permitting other nations to share
and contribute to the wealth of knowledge in the U.S. However,
there are crucial concerns over taking a leadership role. Domestically,
one of the higher education community’s main concerns has been the
loss of the value of a uniquely American, diverse higher education
system. This concern could be addressed by requiring that developers
and implementers are experts who are sensitive to the many unique
qualities of higher education. A framework that seeks to incorporate
the diverse higher education systems of nations around the world

189 CHEA International Quality Group, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUC.
ACCREDITATION, http://www.cheainternational.org/default.asp (last visited March
17, 2013).
190 CHERYL OLDHAM, SEC’Y OF EDUC.’S COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF
HIGHER EDUC., A TEST OF LEADERSHIP: CHARTING THE FUTURE OF U.S. HIGHER
EDUCATION vi-vii (2006), http://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/hiedfuture/
reports/pre-pub-report.pdf.
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would by necessity be broad and likely encompass the unique
qualities of American higher education. Internationally, an Americanled framework could easily lead to the dominance of American values
in higher education, which in turn could lead to the homogenization
of higher education globally. These concerns should not be
minimized and should weigh heavily in favor of U.S. involvement in
this area.
2. Option Three
The U.S. is also uniquely positioned to make a tremendous
show of good faith to the international community by engaging
cooperatively with international organizations as a key partner. Rather
than taking the lead, the U.S. can take steps to join existing initiatives
that best support its goals. With the preeminent higher education
network in the world, the U.S. is in a position to be influential
without being aggressive. American universities are more likely to
attract top students from around the world and influence the higher
education of other nations.191 The U.S. manages to combine both
quality and quantity of universities, while maintaining an atmosphere
of academic freedom and freedom of expression that fosters diversity
and growth.192 Significant time and resources would be necessary to
emulate this approach in other nations.193
The benefits of an American cooperative effort with other
higher education systems are plentiful. By demonstrating a
willingness to compromise, cooperate, and contribute our nation’s
strengths to a global system, the U.S. makes a show of good faith to
the world that could be invaluable in future international relations.
Additionally, other participating nations are aided by increased
mobility to the U.S. for students and educated workers. With
increased mobility, students from all nations have the opportunity to
learn skills and different perspectives abroad that can contribute to
191 Phil Baty, The World University Rankings: Measure by Measure: the US is the
Best
of
the
Best,
TIMES
HIGHER EDUC.
(Sept.
16,
2010),
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-rankings/2010-2011/an
alysis-usa-top-universities.html.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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the human capital at home. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized
the importance of diversity in higher education for contributing to a
“robust exchange of ideas.”194
The same parallels between the U.S. and other nations that
support the feasibility of an American-led blended framework can
also support the feasibility of U.S. cooperation with other nations and
international organizations. Because this is an equally viable
alternative to taking the reins of international initiatives, the next step
should be significant investigation on the part of U.S. policymakers
into the will and capacity in the U.S. for harmonization. Research
should focus on joint studies with key players like the E.U. and
APEC. The U.S. should consider how countries outside of APEC
and the E.U., especially South American and African nations, could
fit into the new scheme. Additionally, research into a future
framework should reflect a growing movement toward massive open
online courses (MOOCs) and the potential for the traditional
structures of higher education to be revolutionized as a result of the
internet. Armed with knowledge, the U.S. will be better equipped to
choose an appropriate approach to the international higher education
of the future.
Technology and increased mobility have contributed to
greater interaction between national economies, politics, and cultures.
As a leader in higher education, the U.S. is in a position of influence
for the future of international higher education mobility initiatives.
Participation and leadership in this as yet unsettled area of higher
education should be a part of a broader push to revolutionize higher
education through technology and a global perspective. Higher
education institutions should not fear losing their unique
characteristics in the face of globalization, as part of this broader
push should include enhancing the connection between institutions
and their surrounding communities to combat the pull of
homogenization. Higher education must bear the tension inherent in
globalization between viewing other nations as competitors or as
respected, equal partners. Though controversial, globalization can
occur peacefully and bring positive change if nations are willing to
proceed thoughtfully and are open to compromise. The U.S. should
194

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
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be training a generation of empathetic leaders for a globalized world,
and the efficient movement of students across borders is crucial to
exposing future leaders to one another in a structured learning
environment.
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARAB SPRING:
HOW SHARI’AH LAW AND THE
EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION WILL IMPACT
IP PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Stephen S. Zimowski*
INTRODUCTION
On February 11, 2011, thousands of Egyptians in Tahrir
Square celebrated Hosni Mubarak’s departure and, with him, thirty
years of rule by an oppressive regime.1 While Egyptians celebrated,
political commentators considered the impact of the Egyptian
revolution on peace in the Middle East.2 Some feared that an extreme
sect of Islamic fundamentalists might be behind the revolution and
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State
University. Special thanks to Professor William F. Fox and Professor Flynt Leverett
for their guidance and recommendations throughout the writing process, and to
Mark McCormick-Goodhart and the entire Penn State Journal of Law & International
Affairs editorial staff for their editorial contributions to this comment.
1 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/
world/middleeast/12egypt.html?pagewanted=all.
2 E.g., Douglas Bloomfield, Will Egypt’s Revolution Trample the Peace Process?,
JERUSALEM POST, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=
206445 (last updated Feb. 2, 2011); Jennifer Rubin, Egypt’s Revolution Has Nothing to
Do with Israel, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.
com/right-turn/2011/02/egypt_has_nothing_to_do_with_i.html; Jack Shenker,
Egypt Protesters Play Down Islamist Party’s Role, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 31, 2011
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/31/egypt-protesters-islamistsmuslim-brotherhood.
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pondered the impact of replacing the “Arab world’s first secular
dictatorship”3 with a traditionalist regime, likening Egypt to Iran
thirty years before.4
Egypt’s pivotal role in maintaining stability in the Middle East
over the last forty years makes its current instability a source of
trepidation for and businesspersons.5 This comment addresses these
concerns relating to intellectual property (IP) rights under Islamic
law.6 Section II defines the IP protection requirements of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) under the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and examines the
sources and schools of Islamic jurisprudence.7 Section II also
considers the harmony between a nation’s obligations under the
TRIPs agreement and Islamic law.8 Section III expands upon Egypt’s
role in international business and policy, including its membership in
the WTO and ratification of the TRIPs agreement.9 In addition,
Section III compares the implementation of IP protection in Jordan
and Saudi Arabia, the former a secular Islamic nation and the latter a
more traditionalist regime.10 Section IV addresses the application of a
secular or traditionalist approach under Egypt’s new government, and
how either could affect IP rights.11

Kirkpatrick, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Richard Allen Greene, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: A Force to be
Feared?, CNN (Jan. 31, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-31/world/egypt.mu
slim.brotherhood_1_egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-ayman-nour-protests?_s=PM:W
ORLD; Michael Slackman, Islamist Group is Rising Force in a New Egypt, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2011, at A1.
5 See The Global Fallout from the Middle East Crisis, BUS. STANDARD (Mar.
14, 2011, 6:44 AM), http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/the-globalfallout-frommiddle-east-crisis/428442/.
6 The author uses Islamic Law in the sense of governmental application
of the principles of the Shari’ah as applied to the nation’s system of justice. Islamic
law and Shari’ah law are used interchangeably throughout this comment.
7 See discussion infra Parts II.A-B.
8 See discussion infra Part II.C.
9 See discussion infra Part III.C.
10 See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
11 See discussion infra Part IV.
3
4
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This comment concludes that IP rights find substantial
protection in Islamic nations.12 Many Islamic law nations have
implemented IP protection laws and have become members of the
WTO.13 Commentators concerned about the future of IP rights in
Egypt can remain confident that changes in Egypt’s governmental
structure will not substantially affect its IP protection scheme.14
II. IP, TRIPS, AND ISLAMIC LAW
To competently discuss IP rights under Islamic law, one must
understand the nature of Islamic jurisprudence and the role of IP
rights in international trade. This section explores the requirements
imposed upon WTO member nations under the TRIPs agreement,
the sources and schools of Islamic law, and the interaction of Islamic
jurisprudence and IP protection. This section concludes with a
discussion of the Islamic law of contracts and the role international
treaties play in Islamic lawmaking.
A. TRIPs
In 1986, in an extended negotiation known as the Uruguay
Round, members of the international community considered creating
a global trade organization.15 The goal was to stabilize international
trade by improving the established guidelines of the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947).16 The Uruguay
Round’s conclusion in 1994 established the WTO along with several
binding agreements for WTO member nations.17 The TRIPs

See infra Part V.
See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://wto.
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jul. 23, 2008).
14 See discussion infra Part IV.
15 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf.
16 Id.
17 Id.
12
13
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agreement defines the minimal IP protection required of WTO
members.18
The TRIPs agreement is split into seven parts.19 Part I
provides the basic principles of the agreement, requiring a nation to
provide non-nationals with IP protection equal to that afforded
nationals.20 Part II provides specific protection requirements for
copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets, among others.21
Part III requires a signatory nation to implement domestic laws for
the enforcement of IP right and remedies for IP infringement.22 Parts
IV through VII discuss IP related procedures, dispute resolution, and
other signatory arrangements.23
Specifically, the TRIPs agreement requires that copyright
protection be extended to literary and artistic works in all forms,
including books, pamphlets, lectures, musical compilations,
choreographic works, drawings, paintings, sculptures, architecture,
and maps.24 The agreement also adds computer programs to the list
of protected copyright media and requires that the author be afforded
protection for at least fifty years.25 In addition, the TRIPs agreement
requires that patent protection be available for products or processes
that “are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application.”26 However, the agreement permits a nation to exclude
protection for certain medical methods and other inventions

18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm.
19 See id.
20 Id. arts. 1-8.
21 Id. arts. 9-40.
22 Id. arts. 41-61.
23 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 62-73.
24 See id. art. 9. Article nine implements the requirements of the Berne
Convention, which protects the listed media. Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris on July 24,
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Berne Convention], http://www.wipo.int/
treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html.
25 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 10, 12.
26 Id. art. 27.
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“necessary to protect ordre public or morality.”27 Inventors must be
afforded at least twenty years of patent protection under the TRIPs
agreement.28
The TRIPs agreement also requires trademark protection be
provided for signs and symbols “capable of distinguishing [] goods
and services.”29 Third parties may not use an identical or similar mark
for identical or similar business activities if such use would cause a
“likelihood of confusion” for consumers.30 Adhering nations must
create a system for trademark registration, and registration must be
indefinitely renewable for terms of at least seven years.31 Finally, the
TRIPs agreement requires protection of trade secrets, defined as
information (1) that is “not . . . generally known among or readily
accessible to” competitors, (2) that “has commercial value because it
is secret,” and (3) for which the holder of the information has taken
steps to keep it secret.32
Some commentators criticize the TRIPs agreement for its
adverse effect on developing countries.33 Others34 assert that IP
protection in developing nations increases innovative activities and
foreign investment, thereby benefiting developing economies.35 What

Id.
Id. art. 33.
29 Id. art. 15.
30 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 16.
31 Id. arts. 15, 18.
32 Id. art. 39.
33 E.g., Sean Pager, TRIPS: A Link Too Far? A Proposal for Procedural
Restraints on Regulatory Linkage in the WTO, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 215,
221-22 (2006) (asserting that the WTO has over-exercised its authority by enacting
affirmative regulations on member nations); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents,
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 370-71 (2006) (arguing that the TRIPs
agreement needs reform to advance the agenda of developing nations).
34 Supporters of the TRIPs agreement are, for the most part, pundits of
developed nations that benefit from the international enforcement of IP rights.
35 See Danielle Tully, Prospects for Progress: The TRIPS Agreement and
Developing Countries After the DOHA Conference, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129,
137 (2003).
27
28
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is clear is that any nation wishing to benefit from membership in the
WTO must enact IP laws in accordance with the TRIPs agreement.36
B. Islamic Jurisprudence
This section explores the primary and secondary sources of
Islamic law and the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence:
Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali.37 The sources of Islamic law and
the schools of jurisprudence require concurrent discussion because
each school uses different terminology to reflect similar principles.38
Accordingly, discussion of a source is difficult without also
referencing the related school.
1. Sources of Islamic Law
The Qur’an and the Sunnah (and Hadith) are the primary
sources of Islamic law.39 The Qur’an is the word of Allah as spoken
to the prophet Muhammad.40 Because the Qur’an is the highest
source of law under Shari’ah, no other source may contradict its
principles.41 The Sunnah is a recording of the manner and practice of
the Prophet Muhammad’s life and provides a guide for Muslim
behavior.42 Similarly, Hadith refers to the recorded sayings and
opinions that the Prophet Muhammad verbalized during his life as
well as his approval or disapproval of activities he witnessed.43

See WTO Agreement, supra note 15; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18.
M. Charif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources,
Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 142 n.18
(2002).
38 See Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origin and
Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27, 57 (2002) (noting the different Arabic
terms meaning interpretation in the public interest).
39 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 139.
40 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 45.
41 Silvia Beltrametti, The Legality of Intellectual Property Rights under Islamic
Law, in THE PRAGUE YEARBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2009 55, 59 (Mach, T. et
al. eds., 2010), http://www.digitalislam.eu/article.do?articleId=2729.
42 Id. at 60.
43 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 46-47.
36
37
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Islamic scholars use the Sunnah and Hadith in combination to
provide the second primary source of Shari’ah law.44
Where the principles of the Qur’an and Sunnah do not
adequately adjudicate a legal issue, Islamic scholars and jurists use
Fiqh45 —the process of deducing and applying Shari’ah principles—
to reach a legal determination.46 The methodologies of Fiqh are
numerous, and it is in the application of Fiqh that the several schools
of Shari’ah diverge.47 However, all four schools recognize the
fundamental methodologies of Ijma and Qiyas: reasoning by
consensus and analogy, respectively.48
Ijma is a consensus regarding the interpretation or application
of Shari’ah.49 Where Islamic scholars or members of the community
reach a consensus regarding a legal issue, their interpretation receives
deference for future generations.50 This legal principle is not
dissimilar to stare decisis51 under American common law. All schools
of Shari’ah recognize the consensus of the Sahaba (followers of the
Prophet Muhammad); however, not all schools recognize the
consensus of scholars from later eras.52
Qiyas is reasoning by analogy.53 Each individual necessarily
reasons by analogy in reaching a consensus.54 Because Ijma represents

Id. at 47.
This term can also be used in reference to the collective body of laws
arising from Fiqh. Id. at 36. However, for the purposes of this comment, Fiqh is
used in reference to the method of reasoning.
46 Id. at 36.
47 See id. at 54-58; Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 140-41.
48 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 73.
49 Id. at 54-55.
50 Id.
51 Latin in origin, stare decisis means “to stand by things decided.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). The legal doctrine in American
common law requires judges to follow the precedent set by previous courts. Id.
Stare decisis helps to ensure that society can rely on court decisions to guide future
behavior, an important aspect of a common law legal system. See id.
52 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 55-56.
53 Id. at 56.
44
45
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the consensus of several individuals reasoning by analogy, Islamic
scholars grant Ijma greater authority in the hierarchy of Fiqh
methodology.55 The schools of jurisprudence differ in the level of
authority provided by Qiyas as well as their willingness to engage in
the methodology.56
Although there are numerous other Fiqh methodologies,57
this comment additionally considers only Istislah. The term used to
represent this methodology varies by school,58 but the principle
invoked is interpretation in the public interest.59 Like public policy
considerations in American common law, Islamic jurists use Istislah
to establish legal doctrines and reach legal determinations where the
other methodologies fall short.60
2. Schools of Islamic Law
The four Sunni61 schools of Islamic jurisprudence—each
named after the founding scholar of its methodological principles62
—are Hanbali, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanafi.63 Each school differs in its
application of Fiqh, either by recognizing different doctrines, by

54 All secondary sources provide legal principles in the absence of
primary source authority. In reaching a consensus, therefore, each individual uses
an analogy to a primary source principle and agrees on the legal result. See id. at 56.
55 Id.
56 For example, Hanbali scholars employ Qiyas only as a last resort. Id. at
73.
57 For a discussion of additional Fiqh methods such as Istihab—
presumption of continuity, Urf—local custom, and Ijtihad—individual reasoning,
see Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 58-59.
58 Istislah is known as Istihsan in the Hanafi School and Masalih AlMursalah in the Maliki School. Id. at 57.
59 Id.
60 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 38, at 158-59.
61 The Jafari School is an additional Shiite school of jurisprudence.
Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 74. Because the nations discussed herein are
predominantly Sunni, this comment does not discuss the Shiite school.
62 Id. at 67-68.
63 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 142 n.18.
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giving greater or lesser authority to them, or by applying them
differently.64
Hanbali is the school from which Saudi scholars base their
system of methodology and reasoning.65 The Hanbali School uses a
more literal interpretation of the primary sources.66 Additionally,
Hanbali scholars recognize Ijma (consensus) only of the Sahaba67 and
refuse to apply Ijma to subsequent eras because of the divergence of
thought.68 Finally, Hanbali scholars seldom undertake Istislah and
resort to Qiyas only as a last resort.69
The Shafii School is the predominant school in Egypt and
throughout the western regions of the Middle East.70 Shafii, the
school’s founder, is credited with the initial “systemiz[ation] of the
fundamental principles of Fiqh.”71 Shafii scholars entirely reject
Istislah and undertake Qiyas only to the extent a legitimate analogy
can be drawn.72 Shafii scholars accept Ijma of the Sahaba as well as
other eras, separating themselves from Hanbali scholars.73
Many commentators regard the Maliki School as the most
moderate of the four schools because it permits methods of
interpretation beyond those of the other three.74 In interpreting
Shari’ah, Maliki scholars place special emphasis on the historical
custom and practices of the Medina75 people who lived among the
Prophet Muhammad during the final ten years of his life.76 In fact,
Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 70-75.
Id. at 72.
66 Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63.
67 The Sahaba were the followers of the Prophet Muhammad. AbdalHaqq, supra note 38, at 55.
68 Id. at 73.
69 Id. at 72-73.
70 Id. at 71.
71 Id.
72 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 71.
75 Medina is a city in what is now Saudi Arabia. It is the center of the
Maliki School and was the home of the Prophet Muhammad for the final ten years
of his life. Id. at 70-71.
76 Id.
64
65
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Maliki scholars place those customs above Ijma, Qiyas, and Istislah
on the Fiqh hierarchy.77 The Maliki School is found predominantly
throughout northern and western Africa, including parts of northern
Egypt.78
Hanafi is the final Sunni school of Islamic jurisprudence. It is
prevalent throughout the central region of the Middle East, including
Jordan and some parts of Egypt.79 Like Maliki scholars, Hanafi
scholars interpret Shari’ah based on local customs and practices.80
However, unlike Maliki scholars, Hanafi scholars consider custom
only after interpretation through Ijma, Qiyas and Istislah fails to
provide a suitable resolution.81 The Hanafi School tends to be more
moderate in its interpretation and application of Shari’ah.82
Because each of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence
interprets Shari’ah differently, laws in Islamic nations can vary
substantially.83 To appreciate these differences, it is helpful to
understand the Islamic schools of jurisprudence and their varying
applications of the Fiqh methodologies.
C. Islamic Law’s Effect on IP Protection
After the discussion of Islamic jurisprudence above, this
Section briefly explores the effect of Shari’ah on IP laws and the
Abdal-Haqq, supra note38, at 71.
Id. at 70-71; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 62.
79 Id. at 69; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 62.
80 Id. at 70.
81 Id.
82 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63.
83 For example, family law and criminal law issues are often dependent
on the interpretation of Shari’ah employed in a region, as are human rights
considerations. Compare Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment
Under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal Law, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2004)
(discussing certain Jordan laws relating to human rights), with Frank E. Vogel, The
Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2002)
(comparing differences in treatment of criminals in various Islamic nations); see also
Katherine M. Weaver, Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law: A Workable Reality? An
Examination of Possible International Human Rights Approaches Through The Continuing
Reform of the Pakistani Hudood Ordinance, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 483 (2007)
(discussing the plight of woman under the law in some Islamic nations).
77
78
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requirements under the TRIPs agreement. Because the primary
sources of Shari’ah do not explicitly support IP rights, an Islamic
lawmaker must rely on Fiqh methodologies to justify IP protection. 84
There is substantial support for protecting personal property rights
under Shari’ah; protecting IP rights follows naturally by analogy.
Personal property rights derive from both the Sunnah85 and the
Qur’an: “And among His Signs Is . . . the quest that ye (Make for
livelihood),”86 recognizing the acquisition of property through
personal undertakings.87 Whether through research, composition,
ingenuity or some combination thereof, IP, like personal property,
derives from the efforts of the discoverer. The same justifications for
tangible personal property rights therefore extend to intangible IP
rights.88
Neither of the primary sources (the Qur’an and the Sunnah)
limits its discussion of property to tangible property.89 This fact is
important because scholars employ Fiqh reasoning only for
clarification when the primary sources are silent or ambiguous.90
Some scholars interpret the silence of the primary sources on this
issue to be a rejection of intangible property rights.91 However, this
interpretation conflicts with the generally accepted practice of
See generally Steven D. Jamar, The Protection of Intellectual Property Under
Islamic Law, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 1079 (1992) (asserting that Shari’ah is silent on IP
rights); Beltrametti, supra note 41 (arguing that Shari’ah supports IP rights, however
does so through principles of Fiqh interpretation outside the primary sources).
85 Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 65 (quoting Translation of Sahih Muslim,
Book 7, The Book of Pilgrimage (Kitab Al-Hajj) ch. 17, No.2803) (asserting that
recognition of personal property can be found in the recorded words of
Muhammad: “[Y]our property are as sacred and inviolable as the sacredness of this
day of yours.”).
86 Qur’an, 30:23.
87 See Jamar, supra note 84, at 1083 (“The act of making unproductive
land productive, of using something unused, creates ownership.”).
88 See id. at 1086 (arguing that, at worst, Islamic jurisprudence is silent on
protecting IP, and IP rights may be specifically supported through the
methodologies of Shari’ah interpretation); see generally Beltrametti, supra note 41
(exploring the relationship between IP law and Shari’ah).
89 See Qur’an, 30:23; Jamar, supra note 84, at 1083; Beltrametti, supra note
41, at 65-66.
90 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 140.
91 See Jamar, supra note 84, at 1085.
84
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applying Fiqh to “fill in the gaps” left by the primary sources.92
Drawing an analogy between tangible and intangible property is
consistent with accepted methods of Shari’ah interpretation.93
Certain schools of Islamic jurisprudence are more likely to
draw such an analogy.94 Scholars of the Hanbali and Shafii Schools
disfavor Qiyas (reasoning by analogy) and instead prefer a literal
translation of the primary sources.95 By contrast, scholars of the
Maliki and Hanafi Schools apply Qiyas more liberally and are likely to
accept IP as analogous to personal property. 96 Support for IP laws
may therefore depend on the prevailing practice of the region, at least
insofar as support depends upon interpretation through Qiyas.
Istislah (public interest) further supports protecting IP rights.
There are significant benefits, both economic and societal, in
providing IP protection.97 Recognizing IP rights allows innovators to
profit from their ingenuity.98 The financial benefits encourage further
innovation and technological advances,99 in turn improving quality of
life.100

Id. at 1082.
Note that there is some support in historical Islamic jurisprudence for
recognizing intangible property. Id. at 1085 (“[O]ne does not amputate the hand of
a thief for stealing a book because the thief’s intention is not to steal the book as
paper, but the ideas in the book . . . . [T]his particular rule is not Quranic, does not
come from the traditions, is not based on consensus, and is not from the qiyas type
of reasoning. That is, this rule comes from a commentary on the law written by a
prominent jurist.”).
94 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
95 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 69-74.
96 See id.
97 See generally Intellectual Capital and Intellectual Property, KLM, INC. MGMT.
CONSULTATION (Jul. 1, 2011), http://klminc.com/intellectual-capital/intellectualcapital-and-intellectual-property (discussing the assessment of the value of a
business’s intellectual property).
98 See id. (“On average, in successful organizations Brands, Intellectual
Property, and other Intangible Assets are two to three times the value of physical
assets.”).
99 Why Intellectual Property Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/e/eb/tpp/ipe/why/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
100 Id.
92
93
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Some scholars argue that IP protection harms the public
interest. “If public interest is drawn too broadly and too powerfully,
it can be [used] to remove protections for IP on the grounds that the
whole society has need of or could benefit by unrestricted use of the
item.”101 Pharmaceutical patents present the most obvious support
for this proposition.
The owner of a pharmaceutical patent has a monopoly over
the medication’s production.102 With complete control over
production, the patent owner can manipulate both the price and
supply of the medication. Such manipulation can result in high prices
and limited supply, which together harm public health.103
Accordingly, developing countries often advocate against
pharmaceutical patent protection.104 In response, many developed
countries have argued that pharmaceutical patents incentivize drug
development, improving health care overall.105
Furthering the pharmaceutical patent debate’s importance is
the WTO’s requirement under the TRIPs agreement that member
nations enact laws protecting pharmaceutical patents.106 If Islamic law
Jamar, supra note 84, at 1090-91.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 28 (“A patent shall confer on its
owner the following exclusive rights . . . to prevent third parties not having the
owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, [or] selling . . .
[the patented] product.”).
103 For example, the petitioning of Pfizer Inc. to reduce the price of its
AIDS treatment drug Diflucan for use in high-risk, poor countries has resulted in
about forty-seven percent of those infected receiving treatment. See Kate Kelland,
HIV Numbers Hit New High as AIDS Drugs Save Lives, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2011,
6:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/us-aids-global-unaids-idU
STRE7AK0KX20111121.
104 See Jonathan Lynn, Developing Countries Form Intellectual Property Group,
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/04/26/id
INIndia-48011820100426 (reporting the dissatisfaction of developing countries
with many IP schemes because they “deprive poor people of access to essential
medicines”).
105 See id. (noting the assertion by developed countries that “strong [IP]
rights are needed to encourage invention”).
106 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 70 (requiring laws enacting
“patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products
commensurate with [the member nation’s] obligations under Article 27”); but cf.
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 27 (“Members may exclude from patentability
101
102
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prohibits pharmaceutical patent protection, Islamic nations would be
ineligible for WTO membership.107 Due to these concerns, WTO
members are currently engaged in negotiations concerning
pharmaceutical patent protection requirements under the TRIPs
agreement.108 To date, the WTO has not reached a resolution.109
Indeed, the implications of this debate on Islamic nations
could be severe. If lawmakers employing Istislah believe
pharmaceutical patent protection harms the public interest, they may
refuse to accept the TRIPs agreement110 and reject WTO
membership.111 This result is surprising given the reputation of
moderation enjoyed by Shari’ah scholars willing to engage in Istislah
in comparison to their unwilling counterparts.112
Scholars of the Shafii and Hanbali Schools rarely engage in
Istislah; in fact, Shafii Scholars outright reject the methodology.114
In part because of their reluctance to employ Istislah, many
commentators believe the Shafii and Hanbali Schools to be more
traditionalist than the Maliki and Hanafi Schools.115 However,
lawmakers guided by the Shafii and Hanbali Schools who disfavor
113

inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of
which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human,
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment,
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by their law.”).
107 If a nation refuses to implement IP protection, they cannot adopt the
TRIPs agreement and are therefore ineligible for WTO membership. See supra Part
II.A.
108 The Doha Round, or Doha Development Agenda, is designed to
address the concerns of developing WTO members. See The Doha Round, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#develop
ment (last visited Mar. 22, 2013).
109 See Paige McClanahan, Doha Round Trade Talks – Explainer, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 3, 2012, 5:17 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/
sep/03/doha-round-trade-talks-explainer.
110 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 70 (requiring a WTO
member nation to protect pharmaceutical patents).
111 See discussion supra Part II.A.
112 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 71; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63.
113 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72-73.
114 Id.
115 See id. at 71; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63.
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interpreting Shari’ah in the public interest will not encounter the
pharmaceutical patent debate and will therefore have no compelling
argument for rejecting IP rights.
Overall, Fiqh methodology tends to support recognizing IP
rights. Nevertheless, Shari’ah law does not compel such
recognition.116 Islamic lawmakers might therefore reject the
arguments supporting IP rights, leaving them to determine the
wisdom of undertaking IP protection statutorily and without
significant guidance from Shari’ah.
D. Contracting to Protect IP Rights
Many considerations will influence the decisions of Islamic
lawmakers. These influences include international trade, where
treaties with foreign nations can significantly benefit an Islamic
nation’s economy.117 International treaties represent binding
contractual agreements between two or more nations.118
Islamic law commands individuals to uphold their obligations
under contractual agreements.119 Likewise, Islamic nations must fulfill
their contractual agreements.120 In fact, the Qur’an explicitly compels
practitioners to honor both contractual agreements121 and treaties.122
Therefore, if an Islamic nation enters an international agreement to
116 See generally Jamar, supra note 84 (asserting that Shari’ah is silent on IP
law); Beltrametti, supra note 41 (arguing that Shari’ah supports IP law, however
does so through principles of interpretation outside the primary sources).
117 See, e.g., Jordan: GDP (Purchase Power Parity), INDEX MUNDI, http://
www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=jo&v=65 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (stating
that Jordan’s GDP has more than doubled since 1999, which is the same period
Jordan began reforms in IP law, joined the WTO, and entered the US-Jordan
FTA).
118 Frederick L. Kirgis, Treaties as Binding International Obligation, AM. SOC’Y
OF INT’L LAW (May 1997), http://www.asil.org/insight9.cfm.
119 Qur’an 5:1.
120 Jamar, supra note 84, at 1087.
121 Qur’an 5:1 (“O ye who believe! Fulfill (all) obligations.”).
122 Qur’an 9:4 (“(But the treaties are) not dissolved with those Pagans
with whom ye have entered into alliance and who have not subsequently failed you
in aught, nor aided any one against you. So fulfill your engagements with them to
the end of their term: for Allah loveth the righteous.”).
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protect IP rights, it is obligated to enact laws in accordance with that
treaty’s provisions.
Shari’ah interpretation undoubtedly plays a significant role in
the legal decisions of any Islamic nation. Lawmakers may differ with
respect to Fiqh methodologies and may debate whether Shari’ah
supports IP protection.123 However, there is little, if any, support for
prohibiting IP protection.124 If an Islamic nation contracts to protect
IP rights through an international treaty or some other agreement, it
must fulfill its contractual obligations.125
III. IP UNDER ISLAMIC LAW: JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND PREREVOLUTION EGYPT
Shari’ah interpretation varies considerably among Islamic
jurists. Consequently, Islamic lawmaking can be unpredictable.
This section considers the effects of two separate implementations of
Shari’ah: the secular approach, taken in the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan (Jordan), and the traditionalist approach, taken in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia). Additionally, this section
reviews IP law in Egypt under the Mubarak regime and sets the stage
for a discussion on the future of IP protection in Egypt.
126

A. IP Protection in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
By enacting new laws and regulations, Jordan has substantially
expanded its IP protection over the past fifteen years.127 As a result,
IP rights now find significant protection in the Hashemite kingdom.

See discussion supra Parts II.B-C.
See generally Beltrametti, supra note 41; Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38;
Jamar, supra note 84.
125 See infra Part III.C.
126 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
127 E.g., Law No. 9 of 2006 (Trade Names), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 2 Feb.
2006 (Jordan); Law No. 9 of 2005 (Amending the Copyright Protection Law), AlJarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 2005 (Jordan); Law No. 28 of 2007 (Amending the
Patents Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 31 Mar. 2007 (Jordan). Each of these laws can
be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO.
123
124
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Jordan’s legal system combines Islamic law with a civil code
adopted from and similar to many European countries.128 The
Jordanian Constitution of 1953 establishes “an independent
sovereign Arab State” and a “parliamentary [system] with a hereditary
monarchy.”129 Although the Constitution adopts Islam as the state
religion,130 Article 14 provides for freedom of religion.131 However,
this provision is limited to the “exercise of all forms of worship and
religious rites in accordance with the customs observed in the
Kingdom, unless such exercise is inconsistent with public order or
morality.”132 Despite the constitutional declaration of religious
tolerance, Jordan prohibits conversion from Islam and provides that
the king must be a member of the Islamic faith.133 In effect, Islam
remains a substantial influence on Jordan’s legal system.
Given Islam’s influence, Jordan’s interpretation of Shari’ah is
critical to its implementation of IP protection. As discussed
previously, Jordanian lawmakers predominantly follow the Hanafi
School of Shari’ah interpretation.134 Hanafi scholars’ emphasis on
Qiyas (analogy) and Istislah (public interest) provide significant
support for IP rights.135 An array of recently enacted Jordanian laws
reflects this support. These laws protect patents,136 copyrights,137
See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 69.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN Jan.
8, 1952, art. 1, [hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF JORDAN], http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=9789.
130 Id. art. 2.
131 Id. art. 14.
132 Id.
133 Id. art. 28(e) (“No person shall ascend the Throne unless he is a
Moslem . . .”); see also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, JULY-DECEMBER, 2010 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
REPORT (Jordan) (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/
168267.htm (“[T]he government’s application of Sharia infringes upon the religious
rights and freedoms laid out in the constitution by prohibiting conversion from
Islam and discriminating against religious minorities in some matters.”).
134 See supra Part II.B.2.
135 See supra Part II.C.
136 Law No. 32 of 1999 (Patents), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 20 Sept. 1999
(Jordan); Law No. 28 of 2007 (Amending the Patents Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 31
Mar. 2007 (Jordan). Each of these laws can be found at http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO.
128
129
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trademarks,138 trade names,139 trade secrets,140 plant varieties,141
integrated circuits,142 and industrial designs.143
Not surprisingly, Jordan’s IP law reformation coincides with
its entry into the WTO and its adoption of the TRIPs agreement.144
Notably, the current patent statute protects pharmaceutical patents
after its amendment in 2001.145 In addition to WTO membership,

137 Law No. 22 of 1992 (Protection of Copyright and its Amendments)
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 19 Mar. 1992 (Jordan); Law No. 88 of 2003 (Amending the
Copyright Protection Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 30 Sept. 2003 (Jordan); Law No. 8
of 2005 (Amending the Copyright Protection Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb.
2005 (Jordan); Law No. 9 of 2005 (Amending the Copyright Protection Law), AlJarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 2005 (Jordan). Each of these laws can be found at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO.
138 Law No. 33 of 1952 (Trademarks), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 20 May 1952
(Jordan); Law No. 19 of 1953 (Marks of Goods with its Amendments), Al-Jarida
Al-Rasmiya, 16 Feb. 1953 (Jordan); Law No. 34 of 1999 (Amending the Trademarks
Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 22 Sept. 1999 (Jordan); Law No. 29 of 2007 (Amending
the Trademarks Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 31 Mar. 2007 (Jordan); Law No. 15 of
2008 (Amending the Trademarks Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 Mar. 2008
(Jordan). Each of these laws can be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/
profile.jsp?code=JO.
139 Law No. 9 of 2006 (Trade Names), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 2 Feb. 2006
(Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO.
140 Law No. 15 of 2000 (Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets), Al-Jarida
Al-Rasmiya, 2 May 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?
code=JO.
141 Law No. 24 of 2000 (Protection of New Varieties of Plants), Al-Jarida
Al-Rasmiya, 11 June 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?
code=JO.
142 Law No. 10 of 2000 (Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated
Circuits), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 14 Feb 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex
/en/profile.jsp?code=JO.
143 Law No. 14 of 2000 (Industrial Designs and Models), Al-Jarida AlRasmiya, 24 Feb. 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?
code=JO.
144 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jul. 23, 2008).
145 Temporary Law No. 71 of 2001 (Amending Patents Law), Al-Jarida
Al-Rasmiya, 9 Oct. 2001 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?
code=JO.
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Jordan signed a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the United
States146 (US-Jordan FTA) in 2000.147
Jordan’s recent ingress into the international trade arena
coincides with the rise of King Abdullah II (Abdullah) in 1999.148
Jordan’s GDP has more than doubled from sixteen billion in 1999 to
an estimated thirty-four billion in 2010, reflecting economic progress
as a result of the Abdullah administration’s secular approach to
international politics and trade.149 Assuming the Abdullah
administration retains power, Jordan’s secular approach to IP
protection will likely continue.150
Jordan’s recently enacted legislation reflects lawmakers’ belief
that Islamic law supports IP rights.151 Further demonstrating this
belief, Jordanian lawmakers have adopted a number of IP-related
international treaties,152 including the WIPO Copyright Treaty,153 the
Berne Convention,154 and the Paris Convention.155

146 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct.
4, 2000, 41 I.L.M 63 [hereinafter USJ FTA], http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agree
ments/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005607.asp.
147 Mohammad El Said, Jordan, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAWS, 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Jordan-1, Jordan-24 (Roger Blanpain &
Hendrick Vanhees eds., 2005).
148 Id. at 23.
149 Jordan: GDP (Purchase Power Parity), INDEX MUNDI, http://www.index
mundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=jo&v=65 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
150 See generally Ranya Kadri & Ethan Bronner, Government of Jordan is
Dismissed by the King, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A8, http://www.nytimes.com/20
11/10/18/world/middleeast/king-abdullah-ii-of-jordan-fires-his-government.html
(facing political pressure and accusations of slowing political change, King
Abdullah II fired his prime minister and members of his administration).
151 E.g., Law No. 28 of 2007 (Amending the Patents Law), Al-Jarida AlRasmiya, 31 Mar. 2007 (Jordan); Law No. 9 of 2005 (Amending the Copyright
Protection Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 2005 (Jordan); Law No. 15 of 2008
(Amending the Trademarks Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 Mar. 2008 (Jordan).
Each of these laws can be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?
code=JO.
152 See Jordan: IP Laws and Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO (last updated Aug. 15, 2011).
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The Jordanian government also endorsed IP rights by
undertaking the US-Jordan FTA.156 Article 4.3 of the US-Jordan FTA
requires that each state must provide IP protection “no less
favorable” than the protection provided to “its own nationals.”157 In
addition, Articles 4.24 and 4.25 encourage the enforcement of IP
rights against infringers from either country by awarding monetary
damages “sufficiently high to deter future acts of infringement.”158
Finally, contemporaneous to the US-Jordan FTA, both the
U.S. government and the Jordanian government signed an important
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).159 The MOU begins by stating:
The Government of the United States of America . . . and the
Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan . . . recognizing the
need to promote adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, to
provide enhanced intellectual property protection to account for the
latest technological developments, and to promote greater efficiency
and transparency in the administration of intellectual property
systems in order to strengthen the international trading system;
Agree . . .160
This language unequivocally reflects Jordan’s recognition of
IP rights. Because the Qur’an commands adherence to treaties and

153 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997), http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/trtdocs_wo033.pdf.
154 Berne Convention, supra note 24.
155 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last
revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, Jul. 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 305, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf.
156 USJ FTA, supra note 146.
157 Id. art. 4.3.
158 Id. art. 4.24-4.25.
159 Memorandum of Understanding on Issues Related to the Protection
of Intellectual Property Rights Under the Agreement Between the United States
and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000
[hereinafter IP MOU], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreemen
ts/fta/jordan/asset_upload_file120_8462.pdf.
160 Id. (second emphasis added).
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contractual agreements, this agreement compels the Jordan
government to protect IP rights.161
Given Jordan’s secular implementation of Islamic law, it is
not surprising to find significant protection for IP rights. The
prevalence of Hanafi Scholars has likely contributed to Jordan’s
secular approach, and there is little reason to expect any change in the
near future considering the continued surge in Jordan’s economy. As
will be discussed, the adoption of a similarly secular approach in
post-revolution Egypt would likely benefit its economy and its
citizens.
B. IP Protection in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Unlike Jordan, many commentators view Saudi Arabia as a
fundamentalist government because of its substantial lack of progress
with respect to human rights.162 According to the Saudi Basic Law,
“The state protects human rights in accordance with the Islamic
Shari’ah.”163 Consequently, one might expect the fundamentalist Saudi
regime to be hesitant to implement IP protection. Nevertheless,
Saudi Arabia has passed numerous IP statutes in the last decade.164
Although Saudi Arabia has failed to progress significantly in the area

See discussion supra Part II.C.
See, e.g., Saudi Arabia Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.
amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/saudi-arabia?id
=1011230 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, JULY-DECEMBER, 2010 INTERNATIONAL
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (Saudi Arabia) (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter SA RF
REPORT 2011], http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168275.htm.
163 BASIC SYSTEM, Mar. 5, 1992, art. 26 (Saudi Arabia) [hereinafter SA
BASIC LAW] (emphasis added), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=
7973. Because the Saudi Constitution is literally the Qur’an and Sunnah, the Saudi
Basic Law acts as would a typical national constitution. Id. art. 1.
164 See Law of Trade Names, Umm al-Qura, 20 Nov. 1999 (Saudi Arabia);
Law of Patents, Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits, Plant Varieties, and
Industrial Designs, Umm al-Qura, 16 July 2004 (Saudi Arabia); Copyright Law, Umm
al-Qura, 30 Aug. 2003 (Saudi Arabia); Law of Trademarks, Umm al-Qura, 7 Aug
2002 (Saudi Arabia) [hereinafter SA IP Laws]. Each of these laws can be found at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=SA.
161
162
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of human rights,165 the same is not true of its progress in international
trade.
Today, Saudi Arabia remains as one of only three Middle
Eastern nations that uses Shari’ah as the sole basis for its legal
system.166 Article 1 of the Saudi Basic Law states: “The Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its
religion; God’s book and the Sunnah of His Prophet . . . are its
constitution.”167 The Saudi Basic Law also states that the
“[g]overnment in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Qur’an
and the Prophet’s tradition” and that the “Government . . . is based
on the premise of justice, consultation, and equality in accordance
with the Islamic Shari’ah.”168 These examples, among others, 169
demonstrate the emphasis on Islamic law found in Saudi Arabia’s
Basic Law. Accordingly, Islamic law is paramount to lawmaking in
Saudi Arabia.
The Fiqh methodology employed by Hanbali scholars
provides the basis for Saudi law.170 Hanbali scholars place little
emphasis on Istislah (public interest), and they undertake Qiyas
(reasoning by analogy) only as a last resort when guidance cannot be
found through the literal words of the primary sources.171 As a result,
Saudi lawmakers will most likely avoid significant use of Fiqh
methodologies; instead, they will construct laws using the
traditionalist view of Shari’ah interpretation.172

165

See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 162; SA RF REPORT 2011, supra

note 162.
Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 68. The other two nations that use
Shari’ah law as the sole basis for their legal system are Sudan and Iran. Id.
167 SA BASIC LAW, supra note 163, art. 1.
168 Id. art. 7-8.
169 For example, showing the government’s commitment to preserving
Islamic ideals in its citizens, children “shall be brought up on the basis of the
Islamic faith.” Id. art. 9; see also id. art. 14 (“[E]ducation will aim at instilling the
Islamic faith in the younger generation.”).
170 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72.
171 See id. at 72-73.
172 The traditionalist view of Shari’ah interpretation looks less to Fiqh
interpretation methodologies and more to the literal language of the Qur’an and
Sunnah for guidance. See supra Part II.B.1.
166
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Despite this traditionalist view, Saudi lawmakers have passed
several laws protecting IP rights.173 These laws indicate their belief
that IP rights are consistent with Shari’ah without significant
interpretation through Fiqh. Saudi laws protect copyrights,174
trademarks,175 trade names,176 patents,177 integrated circuits,178
industrial designs,179 and plant varieties.180 Like Jordan, Saudi Arabia
passed the majority of these laws shortly before joining the WTO in
December 2005.181 Saudi Arabia’s willingness to adopt TRIPs, given
its traditionalist reputation, indicates that Islamic law supports IP
rights irrespective of the jurist’s method of Shari’ah interpretation.
Notwithstanding Saudi Arabia’s traditionalist reputation and
its lack of progress on human rights issues,182 lawmakers have
provided substantial IP protection.183 Although Saudi Arabia may not
agree with Jordan’s secular approach to Shari’ah,184 both nations
agree that Islamic law should protect IP rights.

See SA IP Laws, supra note 164.
Copyright Law, Umm al-Qura, 30 Aug. 2003 (Saudi Arabia), http://
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3593.
175 Law of Trademarks, Umm al-Qura, 7 Aug 2002 (Saudi Arabia), http://
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3595.
176 Law of Trade Names, Umm al-Qura, 20 Nov. 1999 (Saudi Arabia), http
://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7890.
177 Law of Patents, Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits, Plant Varieties,
and Industrial Designs, Umm al-Qura, 16 July 2004 (Saudi Arabia), http://www.
wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3596.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 See Accession Status: Saudi Arabia, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_arabie_saoudite_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2012).
182 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 162; SA RF REPORT 2011, supra
note 162.
183 See SA IP Laws, supra note 164.
184 Compare Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment
Under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal Law, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2004)
(discussing certain Jordan laws relating to human rights), with Frank E. Vogel, The
Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2002)
(considering certain Saudi laws and human rights implications); see also Katherine
M. Weaver, Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law: A Workable Reality? An Examination of
173
174

172
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C. IP Protection in Pre-Revolution Egypt
Since the Camp David accords and the peace treaty between
Egypt and Israel in 1978,185 Egypt has shown stability in an otherwise
volatile region.186 Moreover, Egypt has been a leader in the secular
Islamic movement.187 As the “Arab world’s first secular
dictatorship,”188 Egypt represented a significant shift toward tolerance
and away from the traditionalist views many believe to be the primary
source of Middle Eastern instability.189 For example, Egypt was one
of the first Middle Eastern members of the WTO190 and has been a
leading advocate for developing nations in the Doha Round of WTO
negotiations.191 With the departure of President Mubarak, Egypt’s
role as a stable leader in the Middle East is now uncertain.

Possible International Human Rights Approaches Through The Continuing Reform of the
Pakistani Hudood Ordinance, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 483 (2007).
185 In September 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter invited Israeli Prime
Minister Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to Camp David for secret
negotiations. As a result, Egypt and Israel have remained at peace for the last three
decades. See Camp David Accords, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/91061/Camp-David-Accords (last visited Oct.
30, 2012).
186 See Jane Friedman, Hosni Mubarak Brought Stability to Egypt, At a Price,
VOICE OF AM., http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/MubarakEgypts-Controversial-Former-Leader-115924004.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2011)
(reflecting on the Mubarak presidency and the stability of the Egypt-Israel peace
treaty over the last three decades).
187 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 1; see also Jamar, supra note 84, at 1080
(noting that Egypt’s IP laws have been adopted by many other Islamic nations).
188 Kirkpatrick, supra note 1.
189 See Mary Kate Cary, Democracy Must be the Future of the Middle East, US
NEWS, Mar. 2, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/03/02/
democracy-must-be-the-future-of-the-middle-east (noting that “violent extremism”
is a “source[] of tension in middle eastern nations”); Terrorism, Concerns about
Extremism & Foreign Policy, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/section-6-terrorism-concerns-aboutextremism-foreign-policy/ (discussing concerns about violent extremism in the
Muslim American community).
190 See Egypt – Member Information, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/egypt_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
191 See Lynn, supra note 104 (noting that Egypt is “coordinator” of
developing countries’ intellectual property group).
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Prior to the revolution, the Egyptian legal system combined
Islamic law with a European style civil code.192 Like Jordan’s
Constitution and Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law, the Egyptian
Constitution193 established “Islam [as] the Religion of the State”194
and declared “the principal source of legislation [to be] Islamic
Jurisprudence.”195 Significantly, the Egyptian Constitution made “[a]ll
citizens [] equal before the law”196 with respect to “sex, ethnic origin,
language, religion or creed”197 and “guarantee[d] the freedom of belief
and the freedom of practicing religious rights.”198 Such provisions are
unusual for Islamic law constitutions199 and reflect the secularist
governing approach adopted in Egypt.
Shari’ah interpretation in Egypt derives primarily from Shafii
scholars, although Hanafi and Maliki scholars have some influence.200
Shafii scholars reject Istislah (public interest) and consider Qiyas
(analogy) to be “the farthest legitimate extent” of Shari’ah
interpretation permissible.201 However, the more moderate Hanafi
and Maliki Schools permit consideration of Istislah, and Egypt’s
legislative actions reflect this influence.202

Hossam A. El Saghir, Egypt, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAWS, 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Egypt-1, Egypt-16 (Roger Blanpain &
Hendrick Vanhees eds., 2009).
193 Note that, throughout this section, the Egyptian Constitution,
statutes, international treaties, and other agreements created under the former
Egyptian government will be referenced. Although it will not be specified in each
instance, any reference to governmental documents in this section should be
understood as relating to the former Egyptian government, and not to the postrevolution government.
194 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as
amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 2 [hereinafter
CONSTITUTION OF EGYPT], http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=
189854.
195 Id.
196 Id. art. 40.
197 Id.
198 Id. art. 46.
199 See supra Parts III.A-B.
200 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 70-73.
201 Id. at 72.
202 E.g., CONSTITUTION OF EGYPT, supra note 194, art. 2 (providing
multiple clauses denoting considerations of public interest as well as considerations
192
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Egypt began its IP protection scheme near the end of the
1800s, earlier than most nations in the region.203 More recently, Egypt
enacted a comprehensive IP statute that protects copyrights,
trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, patents, integrated circuits,
and plant varieties.204 It is significant that Egypt had IP laws in place
before any international agreement so required.205 Egyptian
lawmakers chose to protect IP independent of any contractual
obligation, thereby showing that they “believed intellectual property
to be compatible with Shari’ah.”206
Furthermore, Egypt is among the first Islamic nations to have
joined the WTO207 and has adopted several IP related international
treaties.208 Egypt’s adherence to TRIPs is especially significant given
that Egyptian scholars are willing to engage in Istislah (public
interest).209 As discussed previously, the TRIPs agreement requires
protecting pharmaceutical patents,210 and some scholars argue that
this protection is harmful to the public interest.211 In effect, Egypt has
of the rights and privileges of the individual and public order and morality); Law
No. 82 of 2002 (Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights), Al-Jarida
Al-Rasmiyya, 3 Jun. 2002 (Egypt), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_
id=126540 (noting the interests of public order and morality).
203 Heba A. Raslan, Shari’a and the Protection of Intellectual Property – The
Example of Egypt, 47 IDEA 497, 498 (2007).
204 Law No. 82 of 2002 (Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 3 Jun. 2002 (Egypt), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/
en/text.jsp?file_id=126540. The statute consists of four books. Book one covers
patents and integrated circuits; book two covers trademarks, trade names and trade
secrets; book three covers copyrights; and book four covers plant varieties.
205 Raslan, supra note 203, at 498.
206 Chad M. Cullen, Can TRIPs Live in Harmony with Islamic Law? An
Investigation of the Relationship Between Intellectual Property and Islamic Law, 14 SMU SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 45, 62 (2010).
207 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jul. 23, 2008).
208 For a list of Egypt’s IP related multinational treaty agreements, see
Egypt: IP Laws and Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=EG (last updated July 2, 2012).
209 Egyptian scholars are willing to engage in Istislah because of the
influence of the Hanafi and Maliki Schools. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 7073.
210 See supra Part II.C.
211 See supra Part II.C.
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rejected this argument, and its role as a leading nation in the Middle
East makes this rejection quite influential.
In fact, Egypt had been a leading advocate on behalf of
developing nations in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, 212
where pharmaceutical patent protection is a principle concern.213
Although Egypt disfavored pharmaceutical patent protection,
lawmakers did not assert that such protection conflicted with Islamic
law. Instead, Egypt enacted complying legislation and thereafter
petitioned the WTO for a change in TRIPs requirements.214 In
essence, Egypt asserted that the benefits of IP protection outweigh
the harm that might result to public health.215 Through these actions,
Egyptian lawmakers demonstrated their belief that Istislah does not
forbid IP protection.
Like the Islamic nations considered previously, Egypt has
asserted harmonization of IP protection and Shari’ah through its legal
and political actions. Finding neither convincing theoretical support
against IP rights nor a real world example of an Islamic nation
rejecting them, Islamic law appears to support IP protection.
IV. THE FUTURE OF EGYPT
With new government comes change. Indeed, change is
precisely what Egyptian citizens want, and rightly so.216 However, not
all change is for the better. This section discusses the potential
changes coming to Egypt through a new democratically elected
Lynn, supra note 104.
See The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/eng
lish/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#development (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
214 See Lynn, supra note 104.
215 See discussion supra Part II.C.
216 The Mubarak regime’s human rights violations against the Egyptian
people are well documented. See Emily Loftis, Mubarak’s Human Rights Legacy,
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 1, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/
01/mubaraks-human-rights-record (commenting on accusations of torture, police
violence, and other human rights violations in Egypt); see also Egypt: Impunity for
Torture Fuels Days of Rage, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/01/31/egypt-impunity-torture-fuels-days-rage (asserting that human
rights violations by the Mubarak administration fueled the revolution).
212
213
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government and how different applications of Islamic law might
affect Egyptian IP protection and international trade relations.
The traditional argument against IP rights begins by asserting
that “the concept of ownership in Shari’a is confined to tangible
objects only.”217 This assertion is based on the idea that, because the
primary sources (Qur’an and Sunnah) do not mention intangible
property, Shari’ah does not support its recognition.218 Such a
construction essentially rejects Fiqh interpretation methodologies
entirely.219 Even the most traditionalist Shari’ah scholars rarely accept
this extreme position.220
In the past, Egyptian lawmakers have demonstrated a
willingness to engage in Fiqh primarily under the Shafii School of
interpretation, with some influence from the Hanafi and Maliki
Schools.221 Because the same scholars continue to predominate in
Egypt, there is no reason to expect any shift in the theology of
Egyptian lawmakers causing the rejection of IP rights.
Although Shafii scholars are more traditional in their
application of Fiqh reasoning, they have always accepted Qiyas
(reasoning by analogy) as a legitimate interpretation method.222 There
is a clear analogy to be drawn between tangible and intangible
property, especially because the Qur’an justifies property
accumulation through individual undertaking.223 Like tangible
property, IP arises from such undertakings, making IP rights equally
justified.
Raslan, supra note 203, at 502 (quoting Mufti Taki Usmani, Copyright
According to Shariah, ALBALAGH, http://www.albalagh.net/qa/copyright.shtml (last
visited Oct. 30, 2012)).
218 See supra Part II.C.
219 See supra Part II.C.
220 All schools of Shari’ah interpretation accept the fundamental Fiqh
methodologies of Ijma (consensus) and Qiyas (analogy). Abdal-Haqq, supra note
38, at 73.
221 See supra Part III.C.
222 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72.
223 The Qur’an recognizes accumulation of wealth and property through
the efforts of the individual. Qur’an, 30:23 (“And among His Signs Is . . . the quest
that ye (Make for livelihood).”).
217
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A second argument against IP rights arises from the Shari’ah
prohibition of gains disproportionate (and therefore dishonest) to the
property holder’s efforts.224 Some scholars argue that although IP
rights arise from personal efforts, they provide disproportionate
wealth to undeserving persons.225
This argument ties in with another similar argument against
IP rights: Shari’ah prohibits usury, or interest.226 Some Islamic
scholars view interest as unwarranted financial gain and argue that it
is therefore prohibited.227 These prohibitions derive from the main
justification of property under Islamic law—that individuals should
accumulate in wealth and property an amount proportionate to their
efforts.228
Some traditionalist scholars therefore argue that Islamic law
prohibits IP protection because the owners of IP rights often receive
royalties far greater than their investment.229 Additionally, these
scholars argue that licensing fees are comparable to interest, and
represent an unjustified markup, or usury.230
While such arguments may have found support in historical
Islamic interpretation, they have proved far less useful in modern
Islamic society.231 An absolute ban on interest would render banking
224 Qur’an 104:1-2 (“Woe to every (kind of) scandal-monger and
backbiter, who pileth up wealth and layeth it by.”).
225 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75; Amir H. Khoury, Ancient and
Islamic Sources of Intellectual Property Protection in the Middle East: A Focus on Trademarks,
43 IDEA 151, 167 (2003).
226 Qur’an 2:275 (“But Allah hath permitted trade and forbidden usury.”);
Qur’an 2:278 (“O ye who believe! Fear Allah, and give up what remains of your
demand for usury, if ye are indeed believers.”).
227 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75-76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 19091.
228 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75-76; Jamar, supra note 84, at 1083;
Khoury, supra note 225, at 168.
229 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75-76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 189.
230 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 191.
231 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 86; see also Khoury, supra note 225, at
191 (asserting that Shari’ah principles supporting IP protection outweigh those
rejecting it); Raslan, supra note 203, at 557 (asserting that Shari’ah principles and its
main objectives support IP rights).
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impracticable, and, as such, the Shari’ah prohibition of usury is
normally limited to excessive interest.232 Furthermore, the
disproportionate gains argument represents a subjective
determination, and rejecting IP rights entirely on such a basis is
improbable at best. A more likely solution would be statutory
limitations on royalties.
Today, neither moderate nor traditionalist Shari’ah scholars
find much support for the outright rejection of IP rights.233 The
realities of modern society encourage IP protection.234 The number
of Islamic nations who have enacted IP protection legislation reflects
this reality.235 There is little room remaining in modern Islamic
society for the type of literal interpretation that would preclude IP
rights under Shari’ah.
Whatever the political nature of the new Egyptian
government, lawmakers will most likely continue to protect IP rights.
Egypt has historically been among the leaders in the secular Islamic
movement,236 which indicates the progressive mindset of many
Egyptian citizens. With a populace that supports continued
advancement in the global marketplace, an Islamic traditionalist
government rejecting IP rights would be incompatible.
Moreover, Egypt will continue to protect IP rights because it
must adhere to the international agreements of the previous
government. Islamic law commands practitioners to fulfill their
contractual obligations.237 Even if the new Egyptian government
See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 190;
Raslan, supra note 203, at 531-32.
233 See discussion supra Part III.
234 It is generally accepted that IP protection provides incentive for
innovation and is beneficial to a nation’s economy. See supra Part II.C.
235 Membership in the WTO requires ratification of TRIPs and IP
protection laws; the current Islamic members of the WTO include Bangladesh,
Egypt, The Gambia, Ghana, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, and
Saudi Arabia. Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Aug. 24, 2012).
236 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 1; see also Jamar, supra note 84, at 1080
(noting Egypt’s IP laws have been adopted by many other Islamic nations).
237 See discussion supra Part II.C.
232
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considered disregarding the obligations of its predecessor regime,
Islamic law compels it otherwise.238 International scholars and
businesspersons can therefore rest assured that Egyptian IP
protection will persevere.
Egypt’s future as a stable, secular leader in the Middle East
may be in doubt,239 but the revolution’s effect on IP rights and
protections should be minimal. The Egyptian people seek progress in
human rights and quality of life, and IP rights provide a vehicle for
that progress.
CONCLUSION
Historically, IP rights have contributed substantially to
economic advancement.240 The United States—the world’s
predominant economic power241 —has enjoyed the benefits of IP
protection since ratifying its Constitution in 1787.242 After
implementing similar policies, other nations have experienced similar

See supra Part II.C; see also Qur’an 5:1 (requiring fulfillment of
contractual obligations).
239 For a discussion of the current political instability in Egypt, see Egypt
News – Revolution and Aftermath Chronology, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/news/international/countriesandterritories/egypt/index.html (last updated
Mar. 20, 2013).
240 See generally Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property
Protection and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment, 78 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 181 (1996)
(analyzing the role a nation’s IP protection plays in encouraging investment from
U.S. businesses, thereby boosting economic growth).
241 The International Monetary Fund ranks the U.S. nominal GDP in
2011 (the most recent statistics available) at approximately 15 trillion, more than
double China’s 7.3 trillion as the world’s second largest economy. Data from the
World Bank and Central Intelligence Agency show similar results. List of Countries by
GDP (Nominal), WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_
by_GDP_%28nominal%29 (last modified Oct. 29, 2012).
242 The U.S. Constitution specifically provides for patent and copyright
protection. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. The U.S. legislature has protected other
forms of IP, such as trademarks, statutorily. E.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511141 (1946).
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economic gains.243 The impact of innovation on economic prosperity
is undisputable, and IP protection encourages this innovation.
The same economic interests inspire Islamic nations like
Egypt to protect IP rights. Shari’ah principles have progressed over
time, and few Islamic scholars now advocate against IP rights.
Perhaps the words of Steven D. Jamar244 reflect this progression best:
Regardless of whether Islamic law moves in the
direction of modern reformist theoreticians or toward
more fundamentalist traditionalists, there is no
compelling
reason
to
anticipate
dramatic
enhancement or reduction in the protections of
intellectual property based solely on the desire to
make them fit within the shari’a. Other political
concerns may result in sweeping changes or a
particular zealot’s view of the proper interpretation of
the Quran and the shari’a could result in dramatic
changes, but such changes are not compelled by
either traditional or modern understanding of the
shari’a.245
Without a prohibition on IP rights arising from Islam, Egypt
can continue IP protection and ride its revolution to economic
prosperity and social equality, a vision that the Egyptian people yearn
to experience.

See COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RTS., INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2002), http://www.iprcommis
sion.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf.
244 Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Institute of
Intellectual Property and Social Justice, Howard University School of Law.
245 Jamar, supra note 84, at 1106.
243
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“THE LIVING ARE GETTING RARER”:
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
WHITE RHINOCEROS HORNS UNDER
THE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
ENDANGERED SPECIES
Alisha Falberg*
INTRODUCTION
It is early Saturday morning, August 20, 2011, on the Aquila
Private Game Reserve in South Africa.1 Three rhinoceros are grazing
on the plain. Suddenly, a dart flashes. One of the rhinoceros is hit,
then another, then the third. They all go down. The poachers
approach with their chainsaws.
One of the rhinoceros is named Absa.2 Absa is an elevenyear-old male white rhino who acquired his name from a donor to
the reserve.3 The poachers want Absa and the other rhinos for their
* J.D. candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State
University. I would like to thank all those who were involved in the editing process
for their help and advice. I hope that this comment inspires readers to take action
to help save not only the white rhinoceros, but all endangered species.
1 Rebecca Meredith, Absa the Injured Rhino May Not Survive in the Wild,
CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), Aug. 25, 2011, at 6.
2 See id.
3 See id.

182

2013

Comment

2:1

horns, and after they are through butchering the other male rhino,
they move to Absa. The poachers use their chainsaw to saw off one
horn and part of his second.4 However, in the process reserve staff
notice the scene and the poachers flee leaving the other male dead,
Absa injured, and the third, a female, unharmed.5
Absa, whose leg may have been broken from being
tranquilized, was given immediate veterinary care.6 His potential leg
fracture troubled the veterinarians,7 and he struggled with
hypothermia and dehydration.8 Unfortunately, he died five days
later—a result of injuries sustained during the poaching.9
Even though Absa was unable to recover, veterinarians
questioned whether he would have survived in the wild had they been
able to treat his wounds.10 Without their horns, rhinoceros are more
susceptible to attacks by predators, and other rhinoceros often
ostracize hornless rhinos like Absa.11 Thus, the poachers’ inhumane
4 Murray Williams, Rhino Dies of Injuries After Poaching Attack, CAPE ARGUS
(S. Afr.), Aug. 25, 2011, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/rhino-dies-ofinjuries-after-poaching-attack-1.1124896#.UUeHb4VpfSk.
5 See id.
6 See Meredith, supra note 1.
7 See id (explaining that if Absa’s leg was broken, the veterinarians would
have had to put Absa down because a rhinoceros leg cannot be healed once it has
been broken).
8 See Williams, supra note 4.
9 See id.
10 See Meredith, supra note 1.
11 See
id.; see also Southern White Rhinoceros, PHILA. ZOO,
http://www.philadelphiazoo.org/zoo/Meet-Our-Animals/Mammals/Hoofed/
Southern-white-rhinoceros.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2013); Southern White Rhinoceros,
ZOOS S. AUSTL., http://www.zoossa.com.au/monarto-zoo/animals-exhibts/
animals?species=Southern%20White%20Rhinoceros (last updated July 28, 2011)
(explaining the significance and complexity of the social behavior and relationships
of the white rhinoceros. The white rhino has a more complex social relationship
than other rhinoceros. It lives in herds or “ranges,” of up to 14. It depends on its
herd to defend against threats. “Ranges” generally consist of maturing males and
females. Once a male rhino ages it becomes more solitary, but the “ranges” often
overlap. This overlap means that the rhinos often encounter one another and,
when they do meet, they greet each other by touching nose to nose and sometimes
by rubbing their horns together. Dominant adult males will guard their ranges from
other males but allow overlap of ranges with subordinate males. Males only breed
once they have achieved dominant status. In order to achieve this status, they must
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treatment of Absa likely would have destroyed his well-being even if
he survived the attack.
The tragic story of Absa the rhinoceros is regularly repeated
in South African wildlife reserves.12 The poachers who cut off Absa’s
horn made off with an estimated $554,020.00 United States Dollars
(USD)13 worth of rhinoceros horn. This cruelty is motivated chiefly
by money and leaves behind devastation for this beautiful and
endangered species.14
Because the white rhino is endangered, trade of its horns is
strictly regulated.15 Unfortunately, the current regulations have been
ineffective at limiting the activities of poachers, like those who
attacked and ultimately killed Absa. Why is this butchery happening?
The main reason is the large demand for rhinoceros horns on the
Asian black market,16 where the horns are used in traditional
medicines and are believed to cure cancer.17 The high demand for
these horns drives up prices and fuels the illegal trade,18 which in turn
leads to rhinoceros poaching in South Africa, where white rhinoceros
are predominately found and the largest supply is located.19 The high
claim a territory and defend it with their horns and other territorial markers and
noises, like snorts and deep roars. Clashing of horns is also used in mating).
12 See infra Part II.A.
13 See Meredith, supra note 1 (stating that the horns the poachers took
from Absa and the other male were worth R4 million—four million South African
Rand). Using the conversion rate on Nov. 30, 2012, four million South African
Rand is equivalent to 350,000 USD. Currency Converter, OANDA,
http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2012).
14 Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora apps. I-II, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.C. I-14537 (2011)
[hereinafter CITES], http://www.cites.org/ (listing rhinoceritdae ceratotherium
simum simum, the white rhinoceros, as an endangered species).
15 Id. arts. 3-4; see also infra Part III.A.
16 E.g., Richard Slater-Jones, The Economics of Rhino Poaching: Tipping Point,
FIN. MAIL (S. Afr.), Sept. 9, 2011; see also infra Part II.C.
17 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16.
18 See id.
19 See Press Release, S. Afr. Dep’t of Envtl. Affairs, Statement By
Minister Edna Molewa on the Ongoing Scourge of Rhino Poaching (Aug. 29, 2011)
[hereinafter Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge], http://allafrica.com/
stories/201108300180.html (stating that South Africa has the highest number of
white rhinoceros on the continent); see also infra Part II.C; Marianne Merten, Proposed
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demand for and comparatively low supply of white rhinoceros horns
creates a huge incentive for poachers. Some reports assert that
rhinoceros horns are worth more per kilo than diamonds, gold,
heroin, or cocaine.20
This comment will explain the legal causes and consequences
of the poaching and trading of this majestic, endangered species and
will convey the urgency of the need to put an end to this practice.
Part II will discuss, through examples, what is happening to white
rhinoceros like Absa.21 Part II will also discuss the primary countries
involved in the trade and identify the primary reasons for the traffic
of white rhinoceros horns.22 Parts III and IV will identify and
examine the laws, treaties, and actions being taken in the nations that
export and import rhinoceros horns23 and will show that the
poaching of rhinos like Absa continues despite the prohibitory and
regulatory laws and treaties.24 Additionally, Part IV will explore the
reasons why black market trafficking continues, such as the lack of
enforcement of existing laws and the bribery of park rangers and
game preserve owners.25 Part IV will also discuss current attempts by
the importing and exporting countries to resolve current problems
and to establish what needs to be done to prevent future poaching.26
Finally, this Comment will conclude by demonstrating how
individuals and other organizations are helping the white
rhinoceros.27

Freeze on Rhino-Hunting Permits to Stop Abuse, CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), Aug. 30, 2011, at
6 (stating that ninety-three percent of Africa’s white rhinoceros population reside in
South Africa); Traditional Medicine, SUN. OBSERVER (Sri Lanka), Oct. 2, 2011,
http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2011/10/ 02/spe01.asp (“South Africa is home to
the majority of the world’s rhinos.”).
20 E.g., UK Secures International Agreement to Combat Illegal Rhino Trade, EUR.
UNION NEWS, Aug. 26, 2011, http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2011/
08/20/rhinohorn/.
21 See infra Part II.A.
22 See infra Part II.B-C.
23 See infra Part III-IV.B.
24 See infra Part IV.C-D.
25 See infra Part IV.E.
26 See infra Part IV.F.
27 See infra CONCLUSION.
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II. BACKGROUND
Absa’s story is not atypical. In 2011, on average, one rhino
was butchered for its horn every 21-22 hours.28 These numbers have
only continued to escalate in 2012 and 2013.29 This section will
explain the problem of rhinoceros poaching and compare it to the
lessons learned from the elephant poaching crisis. This section will
also explain the primary locations of the illegal rhinoceros poaching
and trade and the main reasons behind the activity.
A. The Problem
The international community has proclaimed that rhinoceros
poaching has reached a crisis point.30 Rhinoceros have been classified
as an endangered species for the purposes of regulated international
trade since 1973.31 Because of the rhino’s endangered species status,
there are very strict regulations on whether, how, and when rhinos
can be traded internationally.32 However, because of high demand for
their horns, rhinoceros are being poached regularly. In 2011, almost
400 rhinoceros were killed.33 In 2012, poachers killed 668 rhinos and

28 E.g., Slater-Jones, supra note 16; Barbara Maregele, Protesters Seek More
State Assistance to Save Rhinos, CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), Sept. 23, 2011, at 6.
29 See Update on Rhino Poaching Statistics, S. AFR. DEP’T OF ENVT’L AFFAIRS
(Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.environment.gov.za/?q=content/stats_rhino_
poaching_update.
30 Jenna Bonella, Progress Made to Stop Illegal Wildlife Trade, WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND, Aug. 24, 2011, http://worldwildlife.org/press-releases/progressmade-to-stop-illegal-wildlife-trade (stating that rhinoceros and elephant poaching
was a major area of concern at the 61st meeting of the CITES Standing
Committee, where conservation groups urged the international community to take
further steps to prevent this illegal activity).
31 See CITES, supra note 14, apps. I-II.
32 See CITES, supra note 14, arts. 3-4.
33 See, e.g., WWF: Record Rhino Poaching in South Africa, VOICE OF AM.
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2011, http://www. voanews.com/content/wwf-record-rhinopoaching-in-south-africa-133173778/159118.html (claiming the number of rhino
killed in South Africa as of early November 2011 was 341—already eight more
than the total number in 2010—and predicting the number of rhinos poached in
2011 to reach 400); Slater-Jones, supra note 16 (stating that at least 279 rhino have
been butchered in 2011 and the total estimated for the end of the year is likely to be
around 400); Hunting Laws Abused, MERCURY (S. Afr.), Sept. 7, 2011, at 11 (stating
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158 have already been poached this year.34 With only about 20,000
white rhinoceros left in South Africa,35 the white rhinoceros may
soon become extinct if the poaching continues.
Like the white rhino, elephants are poached for their ivory
tusks. A comparison can be drawn, and lessons can be learned from,
the elephant poaching crisis.36 Both rhinoceros poaching and
elephant poaching come with common myths and misconceptions.
While rhinoceros poaching myths tend to center on the use of the
horn itself, elephant misconceptions stem from the belief that taking
the tusks is not hurting the animals: “Another problem . . . is that the
Chinese word for ivory is elephant’s teeth—xiang ya . . . . Seventy
percent thought tusks can fall out and be collected by traders and
grow back.”37 Thus, the common belief lies in the misconception that
elephants do not have to be killed for their tusks.38
While many people know about elephant poaching, white
rhinoceros poaching has been overshadowed. Since white rhinoceros
that at least 279 rhino have been killed as of early September 2011 and that the
estimated total death toll for the year will likely be the highest ever).
34 See Update on Rhino Poaching Statistics, supra note 29; see also Lynn
Herrmann, Eight Rhinos Killed in One Day in South Africa, First 2012 Deaths, DIGITAL
J. (Can.), Jan. 11, 2012 (noting that the first eight white rhino deaths of 2012 were
believed to be poached in one day, making it an unprecedented one-day total).
35 Lyse Comins, Wildlife Staff: Rangers Bust for Poaching: Questions Raised
about Senior Officials in Rhino Horn Syndicates, INDEP. ON SAT. (S. Afr.), Oct. 1, 2011,
at 2.
36 Elephant poaching peaked “[d]uring the great elephanticide of the
1970s and 1980s, [when] Africa’s elephant population was cut from an estimated
1.3 million to some 600,000 . . . . At the height of the slaughter, it is believed,
70,000 elephants a year were being killed continent-wide.” Alex Shoumatoff, Agony
and Ivory, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 2011), http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/
2011/08/elephants-201108. While elephant poaching has decreased due to
awareness, public outcry, and stricter enforcement of international laws and
regulations, it remains a problem. See id. Poachers continue to hunt elephants for
the ivory in their tusks. Like the rhino horn, obtaining an elephant’s ivory tusks is
worth the risk for poachers, pricing at about $700 USD per pound. See id. In 2010
alone, the ivory trade accounted for an estimated $114 billion USD. See id. There is
an estimated 450,000 pounds of ivory being traded per year, meaning more than
35,000 elephants are still being killed each year. See id.
37 See Shoumatoff, supra note 36 (internal quotations omitted).
38 See id.
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poaching is reaching a critical level, it is time this problem shared the
spotlight with elephant poaching. Otherwise, someday soon there
may not be any white rhinoceros left to save.
Veterinarians see the destruction of the white rhinos
firsthand. One veterinarian described a scene in Kariega Game
Reserve in the Eastern Cape in South Africa:
The horror of that first encounter remains branded in
my memory. In a small clearing . . . stood an animal
hardly recognizable as a rhino. His profile completely
changed by the absence of his horn. Skull and soft
tissue injuries extended down into the remnants of his
face, through the outer layer of bones, to expose the
underlying nasal passages . . . revealing pieces of loose
flesh which hung semi-detached from his deformed
and bloodied face . . . his left front leg . . . could only
be dragged behind him. To compensate, he used his
mutilated muzzle and nose as a crutch . . . [h]is one
eye was injured and clouded over, adding to his
horrific appearance . . . [his] blood was bubbling
inside his skull cavity and [I] wondered how every
breath must add to the agony, the cold air flowing
over inflamed tissues and exposed nerves . . . he had
little chance of healing.39
This is the state in which these poor rhinoceros are left once
the poachers are through getting the horn they came for. Most of the
time, poachers tranquilizer darts to bring the rhino down before they
take chainsaws and axes to the rhinoceros.40 However, the drugs are
generally not strong enough to kill the rhinos, so most are left to
bleed to death, or park rangers are forced to euthanize them when
found.41 The injuries to the rhinoceros are usually too severe to heal,
so they are forced to suffer, sometimes for days, before ultimately
passing away—Absa suffered such a fate.42

39 William Fowlds, Op-Ed., Revealing the Cruelty Inflicted on Rhinos,
MERCURY (S. Afr.), Aug. 29, 2011, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/revealingthe-cruelty-inflicted-on-rhinos-1.1127041#.UUpH3IVpcy8.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id.
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Additionally, many of the victims are female rhinoceros, who
may be leaving unweaned calves behind.43 Conservation groups have
tried to rescue and relocate orphaned calves,44 but sometimes they are
too late. The calves tend to remain by their dead mothers and are
often killed simply because they are in the poachers’ way.45
Sometimes the poachers immobilize the calves by cutting the tendons
in their back legs so that the calves do not bother the poachers while
they work; other times the calves themselves are butchered for their
small horns and toenails.46
The South African community recognizes three primary
classes of people who kill rhinoceros.47 The first is the owner of a
rhinoceros.48 Rhino owners may obtain a permit to kill rhinos;49 in
such cases, the killing is legal.50 However, some owners kill their
rhinos without a permit and sell the horns illegally, then claim they
were victims of poachers.51 Some reserve owners allow or even hire
poachers to come and kill their rhinoceros for illegal trading

43 See Tanya Waterworth, Stop Legal Rhino Hunting, It’s Fueling Poaching,
Says SanWild, INDEP. ON SAT. (S. Afr.), Sept. 10, 2011, at 10,
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/legal-rhino-hunting-couldbe-abolished-1.1134863#.UUpIgIVpcy8.
44 See id. (stating that many orphaned calves are taken to SanWild, a
wildlife sanctuary, where they are treated and hand raised).
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 Legalizing Rhino Horn Trade will Stop the Slaughtering of Animals, STAR (S.
Afr.), Sept. 24, 2011, at 14.
48 See Hunting Laws Abused, supra note 33 (stating that “more than a
quarter of [South Africa’s] rhinos are privately owned” on private game reserves).
49 See id. (stating that 140 rhino hunting permits have been issued by
national agencies); Marianne Merten, Move Afoot to Stomp Out Rhino Poaching, DAILY
NEWS (S. Afr.), Aug. 31, 2011, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/scitech/science/
environment/move-afoot-to-stomp-out-poaching-1.1127598#.UUspwYVpcy8
(reporting on South Africa’s rhino hunting permit system).
50 See Legalizing Rhino Horn Trade will Stop the Slaughtering of Animals, supra
note 47.
51 See Caryn Dolley, Some Rhino Owners Selling Horns, CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.),
July 19, 2012, at 7, http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/some-rhino-ownersselling-horns-1.1345156#.UUsp-IVpcy8 (reporting that some of the owners are at
the center of major rhino horn syndicates).
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purposes.52 These poachers make up the second class. The reserve
owner will generally take a portion of the proceeds generated from
the sale of the poached rhino horn.53 Finally, the true poachers make
up the third class.54 These poachers are generally indiscriminate about
the rhinos that they kill. This group is the largest, and is rapidly
growing.55
B. Where?
The overwhelming majority of the world’s white rhinoceros
population—ninety-three percent—is located in South Africa.56
Because most rhinos live in South Africa, the majority of the
poaching problem occurs there. However, poaching occurs in some
Asian counties, like India, as well.57
The main destination for the poached horns is Asia;
specifically, Southeast Asian countries like the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam [hereinafter Vietnam], which, according to the World
Wildlife Fund (WWF), is the biggest consumer of illegal rhinoceros
horns.58 Vietnam is not only a destination for the horns, but is also a
transit country—it serves as the hub where the horns are imported
and then sent to other Southeast Asian countries.59 Because Vietnam
is a critical country in the illegal trade of white rhinoceros horns, the
South African government recently met with Vietnamese officials to

52

See Legalizing Rhino Horn Trade will Stop the Slaughtering of Animals, supra

note 47.
See id.
See id.
55 See id.
56 See Traditional Medicine, supra note 19.
57 E.g., Kaziranga Takes Battle to Poachers’ Court, PIONEER (India), Sept. 23,
2011 (stating that poachers have been caught in Assam, India poaching the one
horned rhino).
58 See WWF: Record Rhino Poaching in South Africa, supra note 33; see also
WWF Calls for End to Rhino Poaching on World Rhino Day: At Least 287 Rhinos Have
Been Killed in South Africa as Crisis Escalates, PRWEB.COM (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.prweb.com/releases/World_Wildlife_Fund/World_Rhino_Day/prwe
b8816028.htm.
59 See Merten, supra note 19.
53
54
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sign a memorandum of understanding.60 This memorandum serves as
a means of cooperation between the two countries, and the goal of
the document is for the countries to work together to prevent the
illegal trade and smuggling of rhino horns.61
C. Why?
As previously stated, South Africa is the primary source for
horns and the demand is primarily in Southeast Asia.62 But why is the
demand so high in this region?
Crushed rhinoceros horns are used as an ingredient in ancient
Asian medicines.63 The horn is purported to have detoxifying
properties and is prepared by being ground up in a serrated bowl and
consumed with water or alcohol.64 Traditionally, the medicines have
been used to treat fever, high blood pressure,65 strokes,66 and as an
aphrodisiac.67 More recently, the medicines have also been used as a
cure for cancer.68 In fact, a Vietnamese government minister stated
that he was “cured of cancer through mixing a rhino horn

60 See Vietnam, South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horns,
VIET. NEWS BRIEF, Sept. 29, 2011; see also infra Part IV.F.
61 See Vietnam, South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horns,
supra note 60.
62 See Traditional Medicine, supra note 19; WWF Calls for End to Rhino
Poaching on World Rhino Day: At Least 287 Rhinos Have Been Killed in South Africa as
Crisis Escalates, supra note 58.
63 See Vietnam, South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horns,
supra note 60.
64 See Paul Ash, Rise in Vietnamese Use of Rhino, SUN. TIMES (S. Afr.), Aug.
26, 2012, http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/science/2012/08/26/rise-in-vietname
se-use-of-rhino.
65 See id.
66 See UK Secures International Agreement to Combat Illegal Rhino Trade, supra
note 20.
67 See Masoka Dube, South Africa: Poisoned Horn Won’t Deter Poaching in the
Kruger, ALLAFRICA.COM (Sept. 15, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201109
160364.html; but see Ash, supra note 64 (“[D]espite the pervasive media myth, rhino
horn has not previously been used as an aphrodisiac.”).
68 See, e.g., Smuggling of Rhino Parts Goes Online, CHANNEL NEWSASIA
(Sing.) (Sept. 5, 2011), http://wildsingaporenews.blogspot.com/2011/09/
smuggling-of-rhino-parts-goes-online.html; Slater-Jones, supra note 16.
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concoction.”69 This belief has spurred rhino poaching to such a
degree that the once critically endangered Javan rhinoceros, a
Vietnam native, was declared extinct in October 2011.70
The belief in the healing power of rhino horns, however, is
untrue— “rhino horn is made up of the same substance as our
fingernails and has no medicinal value whatsoever, so what people
say is a myth and not fact.”71 This false belief triggers the demand of
horns and is difficult to disprove for several reasons. First, the myth
is embedded in the ancient culture of Southeast Asia.72 To disprove
it, thousands of people must be convinced that much of their ancient
belief system is scientifically untrue. Such beliefs are difficult to
overcome.73 However, Vietnamese conservation groups are working
to remedy this lack of understanding by distributing medical reports
that definitively prove that rhino horns have no special medicinal
value.74 Second, people in countries like Vietnam often only know of
the therapeutic uses of the horns and not of the countervailing injury
to the animals and the environment.75

Anna Majavu, Big-Money Rhino Crime, TIMES (S. Afr.), Aug. 30, 2011
(internal quotation marks omitted).
70 See Mike Ives, Javan Rhino Now Extinct in Vietnam, WWF Says, NBC
NEWS, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45031207/ns/world_news-world_environ
ment/t/javan-rhino-now-extinct-vietnam-wwf-says/ (last updated Oct. 25, 2011,
10:24 AM).
71 Asha Muktar, High Price of Rhino Horn Fuels Poaching, NAIROBI STAR
(Kenya), Sept. 23, 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 See Sheree Bega, Vietnam Joins Anti-Poaching Rhino Campaign; Consumer
Countries Get on Board to Stem Change, STAR (S. Afr.), Oct. 3, 2011, at 4,
http://www.iol.co.za/saturday-star/vietnam-joins-anti-poaching-rhino-campaign1.1149550#.UUs2foVpcy8.
73 Such beliefs can be difficult to overcome especially because rhinoceros
horns are not only believed to be cures for ailments, but were once seen as a status
symbol. See id. For example, Asian royalty used to drink from cups made from
rhinoceros horn. Id. The horns are also given as gifts to “curry favor with socioeconomic and political elites.” See Ash, supra note 64. Arguments for how the
ancient belief system can be overcome are beyond of the scope of this comment.
74 See Bega, supra note 72.
75 See id.
69
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Due to the high demand, rhino horn’s reportedly sell for
roughly $5,813 USD to $7,556 USD per horn in Southeast Asia.76
Because trade in white rhino horns is illegal, the exact value of the
horn is hard to determine, but it is estimated that a large rhino horn
could potentially sell for $1,000,000 USD if sold in the United
States.77 The high sale price makes poaching worth the risk for many
poachers, which is a major factor contributing to the continuation of
the poaching problem.78
III. THE EXISTING LAW
Since illegal poaching and trade of the white rhinoceros
transpires across international boundaries, prevailing international
governance plays a large role. This section will discuss three
international legal structures that affect white rhinoceros poaching
and trade: the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP), and World Trade Organization
(WTO) agreements.
A. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora
On March 3rd, 1973, countries from around the world
gathered to create and implement CITES under the United Nations
Environment Programme.79 By 2009, 175 nations had signed this
treaty, including South Africa and Vietnam.80

76 Currency
Converter, OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/currency/
converter/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (converting R50,000 and R65,000 South
African Rand into U.S. Dollars using the date last visited as the conversion rate
date). For South African Rand value of rhino horns, see UK Secures International
Agreement to Combat Illegal Rhino Trade, supra note 20; Majavu, supra note 69; SlaterJones, supra note 16.
77 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16.
78 See id.
79 See generally CITES, supra note 14.
80 See Member Countries, CITES.ORG, http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/
parties/chronolo.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2013) (South Africa joined in 1975 and
Vietnam joined in 1994).
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The treaty’s purpose is to recognize and protect the diverse
and irreplaceable wildlife within each country.81 The preamble states
that each signing country should: (1) remain conscious of the
aesthetic, scientific, and cultural value of its wildlife; (2) recognize
that the country’s citizens are the best protectors of this wildlife; (3)
understand “that international co-operation is essential for the
protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora against overexploitation through international trade”; and (4) realize the urgent
need for taking appropriate steps to ensure the protection of the
endangered wildlife within each country.82
CITES defines “critically endangered species” as “any species
threatened with extinction which may or may not be affected by
trade.”83 The treaty divides the different species up into three groups:
Appendix One includes critically endangered species whose trade
must be strictly enforced and allowed only in exceptional
circumstances to prevent further endangering their survival;84
Appendix Two includes threatened85 species whose trade must be
strictly regulated so that such species will not become critically
endangered, as well as any species whose trade would affect the trade
of those threatened species;86 and Appendix Three includes any
species which the parties feel need to be regulated to prevent the
species’ exploitation.87
The white rhinoceros falls under Appendix Two, while all
other rhinoceros species fall under Appendix One.88 The white rhino
was listed under Appendix One when the treaty originated, but its

See CITES, supra note 14, pmbl.
See id.
83 See id. art. 2.
84 See id.
85 See id. (“Threatened” means those species that may not be on the verge
of extinction, but are still endangered).
86 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 2.
87 See id. art. 2.
88 See id. apps. 1-2.
81
82
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status was changed in 1995.89 This transfer occurred to permit the
international trade in hunting trophies.90
Article four of the treaty regulates the export and import of
the species listed in Appendix Two.91 To export an Appendix Two
species, such as the white rhino, the trader must acquire a prior grant
of permission and present an export permit.92 Export permits are
strictly regulated and are issued only if the following conditions are
met: (1) a “Scientific Authority”93 of the country issuing the export
permit has stated that the export of the species will not be
detrimental to its survival; (2) the specimen being exported cannot
have been obtained in violation of the exporting country’s laws; and
(3) if the trader is exporting a live animal, the means of export must
minimize any risk of injury or cruelty to the animal.94 The Scientific
Authority in the exporting country will monitor the local population
of the species and will limit export permits to avoid moving the
species into Appendix One.95 If the Scientific Authority finds that
export permits need to be further limited, it will advise the
appropriate managing authority of the exporting country.96 In
addition, to import any Appendix Two species one must present an
export permit or a re-export certificate.97

89 Listed
Species Database, CITES.ORG http://www.cites.org/eng/
resources/species.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
90 See id.
91 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 4.
92 See id.
93 “Scientific Authority” is defined as a scientific authority designated by
the member country. Id. arts. 1, 9.
94 See id. art. 4.
95 See id.
96 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 4.
97 See id. Re-export refers to the exportation of an animal that was already
exported and imported. A re-export certificate is needed to re-export any species
listed under Appendix Two. See id. A re-export certificate will be granted only if the
applicant meets the following conditions: (1) the government of the country of reexport is satisfied that the specimen was imported into that country in accordance
with the provisions of CITES; and (2) if the trader is exporting a live animal, the
means of export will be done in the best way possible to minimize risk or injury or
cruelty to the animal. Id.
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Article six further defines the criteria needed to obtain export,
import, and re-export permits and certificates.98 Article seven lists
exceptions to the regulations—including trade within the country
itself, household effects, and species bred in captivity—none of
which apply to the international trade in white rhinoceros horns. 99
Article eight states that the participating countries “shall take
appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of [CITES] and to
prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof.”100 Such measures
include penalizing trade in or possession of any species protected by
CITES, as well as confiscating and returning species and specimens
to the country of export.101 Additionally, each country shall keep
records of the export and import of any species listed in CITES,
including the contact information of traders, the number of permits
issued, and information concerning the species and specimens
traded.102 Every participating country must periodically update the
CITES Secretary with information on the country’s implementation
of the regulations of the treaty.103 If a country fails to effectively
implement the conditions of CITES, the next Conference of the
Parties104 will review the country’s laws and consider remedial
actions.105

98 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 6. An export permit has been granted, it
must be used within six months from the date on which it was granted. Id. Each
export permit must contain the following information: the CITES title, the name
and any identifying stamp of the granting country’s government, and a control
number assigned by that government. Id. All export permits and certificates must
be in the original form and separate permits are required every time a trader exports
a species or specimen. Id. The importing country cancels and retains the export
permit after the species or specimen arrives, as well as any corresponding import
permit. Id. When appropriate, a government may put a mark on specimens to help
in identification. Id. “For these purposes ‘mark’ means any indelible imprint, lead
seal or other suitable means of identifying a specimen, designed in such a way as to
render its imitation by unauthorized persons as difficult as possible.” Id.
99 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 7.
100 See id. art. 8.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See CITES, supra note 14, art. 11 (A Conference of the Parties is when
delegations from all of the countries participating in CITES have a meeting to
review the implementation of the treaty, to make any needed amendments, to hear
reports from participating countries, to make recommendations for better
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Since its inception, the parties to CITES have been
specifically concerned with the trade of rhinoceros.106 In November
1994, the Ninth Conference of Parties passed Resolution Conference
9.14, which effectively transferred the white rhinoceros from an
Appendix One species to an Appendix Two species.107 The reason
for the change was to allow trade in white rhinoceros hunting
trophies.108 The Second Conference of the Parties established the
general exception for trade in hunting trophies of species listed in
Appendix One in March 1979.109 The Resolution creating the
exception permits trading only according to Article Three’s
regulations.110 These regulations include the need for export and
import permits, which the state’s Scientific Authority may grant as

implementation, etc. The Conference of the Parties is held every two to three
years).
105 See id. art. 13.
106 See id. apps. I-II (Rhinoceros has always been listed as an Appendix
One endangered species).
107 CITES, Conservation Of and Trade In African and Asian Rhinoceroses, Res.
Conf. 9.14 (Rev. CoP15) (Nov. 7-18, 1994) [hereinafter CITES Res. Conf. 9.14],
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php.
108 See CITES, supra note 14, apps. I-II. While the reasons for the shift of
the white rhino from Appendix One to Appendix Two are not explicitly stated, a
reasonable comparison can be drawn to the movement of the black rhinoceros
from Appendix One to Appendix Two for hunting trophy purposes. In October
2004, the Thirteenth Conference of the Parties moved the black rhinoceros from
Appendix One to Appendix Two, ten years after the white rhino was similarly
moved. CITES, Establishment of Export Quotas for Black Rhinoceros Hunting Trophies,
Res.
Conf.
13.5
(Rev.
CoP14)
(Oct.
2-14,
2004),
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php. The Conference defined a hunting
trophy of a black rhinoceros as “the horns or any other durable part of the body,
mounted or loose.” Id. The Conference recognized that the black rhino is
threatened, but believed that its threatened status was recovering and that
conservation was being effectively managed. Id. Therefore, the Conference decided
that the financial benefits of permitting the trade in black rhinoceros hunting
trophies outweigh the potential danger of extinction, but that trade must be limited,
allowing only five black rhino hunting trophies to be exported from South Africa
per year. Id.
109 CITES, Trade in Hunting Trophies of Species Listed In Appendix I, Res.
Conf. 2.11 (Rev.) (Mar. 19-30, 1979) [hereinafter CITES Res. Conf. 2.11],
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php.
110 See id. at 1.
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long as exportation of the trophies is not “detrimental to the survival
of the species.”111
Since the white rhino’s reclassification by Ninth Conference
of the Parties’, there has been concern that some countries are not
effectively implementing the exportation regulations of Appendix
Two species, such as the white rhino.112 At the Fifteenth Conference
of the Parties—held between March 13th and 25th, 2010—delegates
expressed concern over the continued drastic decline of the
rhinoceros despite measures taken to protect it by member countries,
such as South Africa.113 The Conference recognized that the primary
reason for this continuing decline is the illegal trade in rhinoceros
horns and that this trade is a “global law enforcement problem.” 114
The globalization of the threat to the species is increasing the cost of
protecting the rhinoceros beyond some countries’ means;115 the
Conference therefore called upon other nations, international
organizations, non-profit aid groups, and others to help fund the
conservation and protection of rhinoceros.116 The Fifteenth
Conference further urged countries trading in rhinoceros horns to
adopt “more comprehensive and effective legislation and
enforcement controls, including international trade restrictions and
penalties, aimed at reducing illegal trade,”117 and to engage in more
vigilant law enforcement, early detection, and international law
enforcement cooperation.118

See id.
CITES, Review of Significant Trade in Specimens of Appendix-II Species, Res.
Conf. 12.8 (Rev. CoP13) (Nov. 3-15, 2002), http://www.cites.org/
eng/res/index.php.
113 See CITES Res. Conf. 9.14, supra note 107.
114 See id.
115 See id. (the trade in rhinoceros horns extends beyond the home
countries’ borders and CITES recognizes that many of these home countries may
be incapable of international law enforcement. Additionally, CITES recognizes that
many of the home countries do not have adequate resources to do all that is
necessary to end the trade).
116 See id.
117 See id. at 1.
118 See CITES Res. Conf. 9.14, supra note 107. The Conference also
recognizes the primary reason behind the continuing demand: traditional medicine
use. CITES, Traditional Medicines, Res. Conf. 10.19 (Rev. CoP14) (June 9-20, 1997),
111
112
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To address the growing concerns regarding the decline in
rhinoceros, the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties directed the
Secretariat119 to further examine the rhino conservation and trade
policies in countries where illegal killing of rhinoceros poses a
significant threat to the survival of the species.120 The Conference
also directed the Secretariat to examine efforts to reduce the illegal
trade in importing countries.121 The Conference stressed the urgency
of the problem and the great need for cooperation between countries
engaged in rhinoceros horn trading.122
However, if the problem is so urgent, and the decline in white
rhinoceros is so rapidly occurring, why hasn’t CITES placed the
white rhinoceros back on Appendix One where it cannot be hunted
at all? The black rhino, also switched from Appendix One to
Appendix Two for hunting trophy purposes, was declared extinct in
November 2011, and the white rhinoceros may be next.123 In fact, the
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php. The Conference acknowledges that East
Asian traditional medicines often use endangered species and that this use can be a
potential threat to such species. Id. While organizations, such as the World Health
Organization, and treaties, such as CITES, acknowledge the importance of
traditional medicine in Asian cultures, the Conference believes that measures need
to be taken to increase understanding, improve research, and further conserve the
wildlife used in these medicines, such as rhinoceros horn, so the threat to the
rhinoceros will not increase. Id.
119 The Secretariat shall be provided by the Executive Director of the
United Nations Environment Programme and shall arrange and service meeting of
the Parties, perform functions designated to him or her under CITES, request and
study reports submitted by Parties, call to the attention of the Parties any matter
pertaining to CITES, prepare annual reports for the Parties, publish amendments
and changes to appendices, make recommendations for the implementation of
regulations under CITES, and to perform any other function designated to him or
her by the Parties. See CITES, supra note 14, art. 12.
120 CITES, Conservation Of and Trade In African and Asian Rhinoceroses, 15.71
to 15.73 (Mar. 13-25, 2010), http://www.cites.org/eng/res/index.php.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See Black Rhino Extinct, White Rhinos Next, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2011,
http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/247342/20111111/black-rhinos-extinctwhite-javan-international-union.htm# (stating that the IUCN declared the black
rhinoceros extinct); see also Lewis Smith, The Last Charge as Western Black Rhino is
Declared Extinct, INDEP. (U.K.), Nov. 10, 2011, at 10, http://www.water
conserve.org/shared/reader/welcome.aspx?linkid=252993&keybold=extinction%2
0AN%20D%20%20species%20AND%20%20brink.
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International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) declared
that the white rhinoceros is “possibly extinct” in northern Africa and
the white rhinoceros in southern Africa is endangered.124
Likely because the southern white rhino came back from near
extinction,125 it was moved to Appendix Two. Nevertheless, the white
rhino population is now declining once again.126 The extinction of the
black rhino caused CITES Secretary-General John Scanlon “grave
concern.”127 He believes CITES can no longer rely on previously
used methods to combat rhino poaching and trafficking.128
Hopefully, concern about the survival of the white rhino will inspire
CITES members to move the white rhino back to Appendix One.
However, some advocates contend that legalizing the trade in
rhino horns is the only way to stop the abuse of the CITES permit
system.129 They argue that removing the illicit elements of the rhino
horn trade would reduce the market price, thereby de-incentivizing
poachers by lowering potential profits.130 Two-thirds of CITES
See Black Rhino Extinct, White Rhinos Next, supra note 123; Smith, supra
note 123; see also Black Rhinos, Two Other Species Extinct: The Economics of Conservation,
INT’L BUS. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011.
125 See Black Rhinos, Two Other Species Extinct: The Economics of Conservation,
supra note 124; Neo Maditla, We’re Stepping Up to Rhino War—Conservationists:
Prosecutors Getting Special Training, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Dec. 15, 2011 (stating that
in the 1930s there were fewer than 100 white rhino left in the world; today there
are about 20,000).
126 See Maditla, supra note 125; see also Slater-Jones, supra note 16.
127 See Head of UN-Backed Convention Urges Greater Effort to Combat Illegal
Rhino Trade, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.un.org/
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40361&Cr=endangered&Cr1=#.UNICp4VpfSk.
128 See id.
129 See Sheree Bega, Vietnamese Issued with 69% of Rhino Hunting Licenses,
SAT. STAR (S. Afr.), Nov. 19, 2011, http://www.security.co.za/
fullStory.asp?NewsId=19600; John Hume, Op-Ed., Seven Good Reasons to Legalize
Rhino
Horn
Trade,
TIMES
(S.
Afr.),
Mar.
28,
2012,
http://www.timeslive.co.za/ilive/2012/03/28/seven-good-reasons-to-legaliserhino-horn-trade-ilive (Mr. Hume lists seven reasons he believes the trade should
be legal. For example, he advocates giving consumers the option of buying from a
legal source; he argues the horn can be harvested sustainably; and he claims the
rhino numbers would increase).
130 See Bega, supra note 129; see also Parks Sitting on U.S. $10 Million Ivory,
HERALD (Zim.), Oct. 12, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201110130194.html;
Michael Eustace, Op-Ed, Legal Horn Trade Could Save Our Rhino 13 and Africa’s
124
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member nations in attendance at the meeting would have to agree for
CITES to lift the ban on rhino horn trade.131 Such a majority seems
unlikely given the current state of rhinoceros populations around the
world. South Africa considered lifting its ban on rhino horn trading
and commissioned a national study on the viability of legalization and
its potential impact on the global market.132 However, South Africa
has stated it is not ready to propose lifting the ban and has tabled any
proposal until 2016.133
In July 2012, CITES held its 62nd meeting of the Standing
Committee, in which over 350 participants—from parties, to
Parks, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), Jan. 20. 2012 (this opinion piece believes that the CITES
ban on rhino horn trading simply pushed the trade underground, where it has
flourished and created a black market. The trade has made criminals rich and has
degenerated Africa’s parks. If the rhino horn trade was legal, South Africa could
supply the market with approximately 600 rhino horns from natural deaths, as well
as from their private government stock, which would supply the market for several
years and effectively curb poaching. This would be the most cost-effective
approach for the countries involved. The article proposes a central selling
organization, with owners of rhinos, buyers, and sellers sharing in the profits,
meaning a lot money will go to the South Africa government, as the largest number
of rhinos is under national park control. The horns would be marked and have a
DNA signature so there would be no room for fraud. The article acknowledges the
opposing argument—that legalizing the trade will further stimulate the illegal trade
and that the demand for the horns is insatiable. But the author believes that there
will be no room for an illegal market if there is a legal one).
131 See Parks Sitting on U.S. $10 Million Ivory, supra note 130.
132 See Tony Carnie, Proposal to Lift Rhino Horn Trade Ban Revisited,
MERCURY (S. Afr.), Sept. 1, 2011; Masoka Dube, Study into Legalizing Rhino Horn
Trade, STAR (S. Afr.), Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/study-intolegalising-rhino-horn-trade-1.1148961; Statement by Edna Molewa, Minister of
Water and Environmental Affairs on Rhino Poaching After Engaging Provinces
(Oct. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Molewa Rhino Poaching Statement],
http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=22317&tid=45
856; see also Eustace, supra note 130.
133 See Tony Carnie, SA ‘Not Ready’ to Lift Ban on Horn Trade, MERCURY
(S. Afr.), Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/ mercury/sa-not-ready-to-lift-rhinohorn-trade-ban-1.1270655#.UUuxvIVpcy8 (reporting that South Africa is not
ready to propose a lift on the 30 year old ban on the rhino horn trade. The article
reports that South Africa still sees many hurdles in its way before it can consider
this option, such as legalities and formal support from the trade partners in Asia);
Sue Blaine, SA Defers Making a Decision on Trade in Rhino Horn, BUS. DAY (Oct. 4,
2012),
http://news.yahoo.com/sa-defers-making-decision-trade-rhino-horn053317954--finance.html
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intergovernmental bodies, to non-governmental organizations—met
to discuss the agenda for the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties.134
The committee made decisions concerning countries involved in the
ivory trade, trade in rhino horns, and trade in tigers. 135 Vietnam was
instructed to prepare a report on its progress, on measures taken to
supplant the illegal trade, and its current inventory of rhinoceros
hunting trophies.136 Failure to do so could result in a suspension of all
trade in any species listed under CITES.137 The Standing Committee
also instructed CITES’s Rhino Working Group138 to develop a
See CITES Meeting to Tackle Smuggling of Elephant Ivory and Rhino Horn,
UNEP NEWS CTR. (July 25, 2012), http://www.unep.org/newscentre/
default.aspx?DocumentID=2691&ArticleID=9234.
135 See CITES Bares Teeth, But Can It Bite?, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
GLOBAL (July 27, 2012), http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?205796=.
136 See id.; CITES Acts to Curb Smuggling of Elephant Ivory and Rhino Horn,
WEB NEWSWIRE (Aug. 10, 2012), http://htsyndication.com/htsportal/
article?arid=%2275460%22&pub=%22Web+Newswire%22.
137See id.
138 At its 61st meeting in August 2011, the Standing Committee
established a Rhinoceros Working Group tasked with identifying measures that
could be taken by CITES Parties to reduce the impact of illegal trade on the
conservation of rhinoceroses and to enhance existing controls on trade in
rhinoceros horn products. CITES Notification to the Parties No. 2012/014,
Conservation Of and Trade In African and Asian Rhinoceroses (Feb. 20, 2012),
www.cites.org/eng/notif/2012/E014.pdf. The Working Group acknowledged that
Vietnam was a major county involved in the trafficking problem and requested
Vietnam answer the following questions to present at the Sixteenth Conference of
the Parties: (a) the legislation governing rhino horn trade and penalties for illegal
trade; (b) measures implemented to prevent illegal import and trade in rhino horn;
(c) current ongoing activities to combat illegal rhino horn trade; (d) specific
enforcement actions over the past three years to prevent illegal trade in rhino horn
and the results of such operations; (e) is a multi-disciplinary approach followed to
prevent illegal rhino horn trade and if so which authorities are involved?; (f)
measures implemented to prevent rhino horns from going into commercial trade.
For example, are owners of such horns mandated to hold possession licenses? Are
they allowed to give away or sell the horn in their possession? Are there specific
legislation for this purpose?; (g) what measures are in place to monitor the retail
market?; (h) efforts to curtail advertising of rhino horn, including via Internet; (i)
are the use of rhino horn as a palliative medicine for cancer in any way allowed?; (j)
what are being done to curtail the use of rhino horn as an additive to drinks, etc.?;
(k) provision, in a table, detailing how many seizures of rhino horn they have made,
how many people have been arrested, how many convictions and the sentences
rendered, etc.; and (l) feedback with regard to progress made in the stock check of
rhinoceros hunting trophies to verify the use of such trophies. CITES, Interpretation
134
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“demand reduction strategy.”139 More than 50 countries submitted
proposals regarding species protection to the Standing Committee to
be heard at the Sixteenth Conference of the Parties.140
In March 2013, CITES celebrated forty years at its Sixteenth
Conference of the Parties held in Bangkok, Thailand.141 The
conference added to and toughened agreements on the trade of rhino
horns, including “measures to boost forensic testing of seized or
stockpiled contraband, a strategy that uses DNA and other scientific
clues to pursue poachers and smugglers.”142 Additionally, delegates
approved the requirement that the eight countries where most illegal
trade in rhino horns occurs—China, Kenya, Malaysia, Philippines,
Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda and Vietnam—must increase
enforcement efforts or risk sanctions.143 Based on the answers
Vietnam submitted to the Rhino Working Group, the delegates at the
Sixteenth Conference of the Parties decided the following: the South
African restriction against granting hunting permits to Vietnamese
citizens will remain in place, Vietnam must continue to monitor and
protect rhinos, Vietnam should increase surveillance at ports and
airports, and Vietnam must continue to report to the Secretariat all
measures it has taken to regulate the possession of rhino hunting
trophies and provide “updated details of seizures and prosecutions,
including details of penalties imposed.”144 The Conference also
recognized that Vietnam has made some strides, such as educating
rangers, customs officials, and the public, and collaborating with
and Implementation of the Convention: Species Trade and Conservation: Rhinoceroses, CoP16
Doc. 54.1 (Rev. 1) (Mar. 3-14, 2013), at 4 [hereinafter CITES CoP16 Doc. 54.1],
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/index.php.
139 See CITES Bares Teeth, But Can It Bite?, supra note 135.
140 See New Protections Sought for Polar Bear, Elephants, Manta Rays and Other
Species Under UN-Backed Treaty, UN NEWS CTR. (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43222; Drive for Legislation,
Control of Rhino Horn Sales, STAR (S. Afr.), May 22, 2012, at 6 (detailing one such
proposal by the KwaZulu-Natal conservation boss to create a legal global trade
organization for rhino horn).
141 CITES, http://www.cites.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
142 See Russell McLendon, 5 Big Breakthroughs at CITES 2013, MOTHER
NATURE NETWORK (Mar. 20, 2013, 3:55 PM), http://www.mnn.com/earthmatters/animals/blogs/5-big-breakthroughs-at-cites-2013.
143 See id.
144 See CITES CoP16 Doc. 54.1, supra note 138, at 5-8.
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international organizations; however, more needs to be done to
combat the poaching and trafficking problem.145
B. The United Nations Environment Programme
In 2002, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed a
strategic plan, proffered by the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CPCBD), to achieve a
“significant reduction in the current state of biodiversity loss at the
global, regional, and national levels” by 2010.146 In 2010, proclaimed
the International Year of Biodiversity, UNEP released reports on the
state of biodiversity147 in areas around the world.148 Since CITES falls
under the UNEP, UNEP’s biodiversity initiatives require discussion.
1. The State of Biodiversity in Africa
The report on Africa focuses primarily on the key threats to
African biodiversity.149 Africa was unable to meet its 2010
biodiversity goal because of its failure to implement biodiversity

145 See id. at 6. For a more in depth report on the findings of the
Secretariat, see CITES, Interpretation and Implementation of the Convention: Species Trade
and Conservation: Rhinoceroses, CoP16 Doc. 54.2 (Rev. 1) (Mar. 3-14, 2013),
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/16/doc/index.php.
146 See U. N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, STATE OF BIODIVERSITY IN AFRICA 1
(2010)
[hereinafter
UNEP
BIODIVERSITY
REPORT:
AFRICA],
http://www.cbd.int/iyb/doc/celebrations/iyb-egypt-state-of-biodiversity-inafrica.pdf; U. N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, STATE OF BIODIVERSITY IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC 1 (2010) [hereinafter UNEP BIODIVERSITY REPORT: ASIA],
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/regional%20brief%20for%20Asia%20and
%20Pacific.pdf.
147 The UNEP states “[t]he word ‘biodiversity’ is a contraction of
biological diversity. Diversity is a concept which refers to the range of variation or
differences among some set of entities; biological diversity thus refers to variety
within the living world. The term ‘biodiversity’ is indeed commonly used to
describe the number, variety and variability of living organisms. This very broad
usage, embracing many different parameters, is essentially a synonym of ‘Life on
Earth.’” What is Biodiversity?, U. N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, WORLD CONSERVATION
MONITORING CTR., http://www.unep-wcmc.org/what-is-biodiversity_50.html
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012).
148 See id.
149 UNEP BIODIVERSITY REPORT: AFRICA, supra note 146, at 1.

204

2013

Comment

2:1

strategies into government programs.150 Despite the failure to meet
biodiversity goals, forty-nine countries in Africa have national
biodiversity plans; many of these countries have reported on the
effectiveness of those plans, and many have expanded their protected
areas for biodiversity.151
The report encourages African nations to integrate
biodiversity into developing plans and policies to help effectively
manage the numerous threats to Africa’s biodiversity.152 While there
have been improvements, UNEP additionally urges expanding
awareness of biodiversity’s importance for the country, the economy,
and the welfare of society.153
2. The State of Biodiversity in Asia and the Pacific
Like Africa, the countries in Asia and the Pacific also failed to
achieve the CPCBD’s biodiversity goals.154 Asia and the Pacific are
home to the highest number of endangered species in the world as
well as the world’s highest concentration of people, creating unique
threats to Asia’s biodiversity.155 These nations have, however, shown
their awareness of biodiversity concerns by expanding protected
areas and preserving ecosystems.156
The awareness of and concern about biodiversity in both
Africa and Asia can serve only to strengthen protection for
endangered species, such as the white rhinoceros. With the increase
in protected areas for biodiversity on both continents, regulations,
and international treaties, hopefully the poaching of white rhinoceros,
as well as other endangered species, will decrease.

150
151
152
153
154
155
156

See id.
See id. at 1-2.
See id. at 9-10.
See id.
UNEP BIODIVERSITY REPORT: ASIA, supra note 146, at 2.
See id.
See id. at 4-5.
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C. The World Trade Organization Agreements
While there is no specific WTO agreement on the
environment,157 the goal of environmental protection has been
fundamental to the WTO since its inception.158 Because
environmental protection is an important goal, WTO rules encourage
member countries to create and implement trade-related measures
aimed at addressing environmental concerns.159 These measures must
not conflict with the overall objective of the WTO by restricting
trade or affecting the rights of other WTO members.160 Member
nations have the right to adopt regulations on trade to protect the
environment as long as these regulations comply with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).161 If such regulations are
exempt under GATT, the regulations may still be justified under
Article XX.162 During negotiations in the Doha Round,163 WTO
157 International trade in endangered species would most likely be
contained in a WTO agreement on environmental conservation, if such an
agreement existed.
158 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh
Agreement] (the goals of protecting and sustaining the environment are found in
the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement and they relate to the overall objectives
of the WTO, which are to reduce international trade barriers and eliminate
discriminatory treatment in international trade); see also An Introduction to Trade and
Environment
in
the
WTO,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_intro_e.htm (last visited Apr.
6, 2013).
159 See WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: Introduction, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_intro_e.htm (last
visited Apr. 6, 2013).
160 See id. (many exceptions to environmental protection rules have been
created to ensure a balance between member countries’ rights to basic trade and
their rights to create regulations concerning the environment and public health).
161 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947) [hereinafter GATT] (GATT is one of the founding
agreements of the WTO. Established in 1947, GATT sets forth many of the rules
and agreements followed by the WTO).
162 See WTO Rules and Environmental Policies: Introduction, supra note 159.
(Article XX of GATT lays out exceptions in which member countries may create
environmental regulations that are exempted from GATT rules, such as regulations
necessary to protect the health of humans, animals or plants.)
163 See
The
Doha
Round,
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013)
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member nations are currently addressing environmental issues
relating explicitly to multilateral trade negotiation for the first time,
with the overarching objective of enhancing the “mutual
supportiveness of trade and environment.”164
WTO rules do not take precedence over national regulations
respecting the conservation of endangered species.165 However, if
there is a conflict between WTO rules and a member nation’s
environmental regulations, the WTO will encourage collaboration to
solve the dispute.166 For example, the United States, a member
nation, enacted legislation to protect sea turtles, a species on the
brink of extinction due largely to incidental capture from commercial
fishing.167 This created a conflict between the member nations who
wished to protect the sea turtles, and other WTO members who
engage in commercial fishing.168 The dispute came before the WTO,
which urged all member nations to work together to create a mutually
acceptable solution.169
Could such an arrangement work with white rhinoceros?
South Africa could enact greater environmental legislation to
conserve white rhinoceros. Such legislation would most likely create
conflict between South Africa and other countries whose economies
rely, to some extent, on illegal rhino horn trading. Vietnam is likely
one such country. Is this conflict significant enough for the WTO to
(the Doha Round is the latest round of trade negotiations among WTO members,
and it seeks to reform twenty areas of international trade by revising trade rules and
barriers).
164 See An Introduction to Trade and Environment in the WTO, supra note 158.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 See An Introduction to Trade and Environment in the WTO, supra note 158;
India
etc.
Versus
US:
‘Shrimp-Turtle,’
WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/edis08_e.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2013).
168 See An Introduction to Trade and Environment in the WTO, supra note 158.
169 See id.; India etc. Versus US: ‘Shrimp-Turtle,’ supra note 167 (the WTO
encouraged a cooperative environmental solution for the protection of sea turtles
between the conflicting parties. It allowed the party member wishing to protect the
sea turtles to create legislation that would not, in good faith, prohibit other
countries from fishing. This “encouragement” worked and the parties ended up
implementing the suggestions of the WTO).
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get involved? Would the WTO encourage South Africa and Vietnam
to collaborate and resolve the dispute? Since WTO agreements
restrict Vietnam’s right to trade, the WTO would probably not
resolve such disputes between these countries, but a WTO resolution
is still a useful consideration. Additionally, the Doha Round
negotiations relating to trade and the environment may help eliminate
the illegal rhino trade.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE RHINOCEROS TRADE IN SOUTH
AFRICA AND VIETNAM
Member nations must enact domestic laws to enforce
international agreements like CITES. This section explores how
South Africa and Vietnam are domestically implementing CITES,
examining the current state of each county’s laws and enforcement
and how poachers are eluding those laws. This section also examines
each country’s response to illegal rhino poaching and trade.
A. Current South African Law
In South Africa, much of the rhinoceros hunting occurs
legally through the CITES permit system and most permitted hunters
are Vietnamese.170 Under this system, South African authorities are
often obliged to issue hunting permits because the permit application
meets the CITES criteria for trophy hunting.171 However, rhinoceros
poaching has increased drastically in recent years, largely a result of
abuses of the permit system by “pseudo-hunters.”172 As a result,
See CITES Res. Conf. 2.11, supra note 109; see also Saving the Rhino—
Now, STAR (S. Afr.), Aug. 31, 2011, at 14; Masood BoomGaard, Reports Reveal that
Most Hunters are Vietnamese, SUN. TRIBUNE (S. Afr.), Jan. 15, 2012, at 11.
171 See CITES Res. Conf. 2.11, supra note 109; Saving the Rhino—Now,
supra note 170; BoomGaard, supra note 170; Press Release, S. Afr. Dep’t of Envtl.
Affairs, Minister Edna Molewa Publishes Proposed Amendments to the Norms
and Standards for Marking of Rhinoceros Horn and Hunting of White Rhinoceros
for Trophy Hunting Purposes (Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Molewa Amendments
Press Release], http://www.environment.gov.za/?q=content/molewa_normsand
standards_rhinohunting.
172 See Bega, supra note 129 (stating that over sixty-nine percent of
hunting permits granted in South Africa have gone to Vietnamese “pseudohunters” who are fueling the rhino poaching crisis). Pseudo hunters, unlike classic
170
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South Africa’s Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, Edna
Molewa, has proposed several amendments to the current permit
system.173
Among Minister Molewa’s suggestions is the mandatory
micro-chipping174 of all rhinoceros horns, to be monitored and
maintained by South Africa’s Department of Environmental
Affairs.175 Currently, the Department is responsible for, inter alia,
maintaining environmental quality and protection, managing ocean
and coastal resources, and promoting conservation.176 Thus,
protecting the white rhino is clearly within the Department’s purview.
Minister Molewa has also suggested strengthening control over white
rhino hunts, creating a more stringent hunting permit called a
“TOPS” permit,177 and having a conservation official supervise all
hunts and provide full reports to the Department.178 All applicants
would be required to provide proof of membership to a hunting
organization recognized by their home country to even be considered

hunters truly engaged in trophy hunting, hunt the rhinos and take the horns back
with them to Vietnam to sell on the black market, thus abusing the CITES permit
system. Id.
173 See Molewa Amendments Press Release, supra note 171.
174 See id. Under the micro-chipping proposal, the permit issuing
authority would implant one micro-chip into all rhinoceros, whether state owned or
privately owned, as well as all the horns obtained from dehorning; the micro-chip
numbers would be put into the Traffic Rhino Horn Stockpile Database, and would
be kept on the Department of Environmental Affairs’ national database so that the
South African government can keep track of all rhino horns and their movements.
175 See id.
176 S. AFR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. AFFAIRS, STRATEGIC PLAN: 1 APRIL 2011
TO 31 MARCH 2016, at 22-43 (undated), http://www.info.gov.za/view/Download
FileAction?id=175474 (outlining the vision, mission, values, goals, strategic
objectives, and policy initiatives for South Africa’s Department of Environmental
Affairs regarding the country’s environment).
177 See Molewa Amendments Press Release, supra note 171 (“TOPS”
stands for “threatened or protected species”). This permit would enable the issuing
authority to trace rhino horns back to the hunt’s location. Id.
178 See id.
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for a TOPS permit, which would be restricted to one white rhino
trophy per year.179
Minister Molewa has also stated that South Africa should
refuse all rhino hunting permit applications from Vietnam. 180
Furthermore, Minister Molewa’s proposed amendments would
mandate that, before exporting the trophy, a hunter take his kill to a
local taxidermist and have a micro-chip installed in the rhino’s
horn.181 Finally, the amendments propose taking DNA samples from
rhinos before and after death to assist law enforcement in
prosecutions.182 While these amendments are being considered,
Minister Molewa has recommended a moratorium on rhinoceros
hunting.183 However, hunters fear a moratorium would only increase
rhino poaching, causing even more harm.184
To implement Minister Molewa’s proposed amendments,
South African lawmakers must amend South Africa’s Biodiversity Act
of 2004, specifically Chapter Seven, where the CITES permit system
is encoded.185 The purpose of the Biodiversity Act is to manage and
conserve biodiversity within South Africa by protecting threatened or
protected species186 and “[giving] effect to ratified international
agreements relating to biodiversity which are binding on [South
See Strict New Rules to Curb Rhino Poaching, Control Hunts, PRETORIA
NEWS (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/strict-new-rules-tocurb-rhino-poaching-control-hunts-1.1277833#.UWh0tqKG2So.
180 See Sue Blaine, No Rhino Hunt Permits for Vietnam, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.),
Apr. 5, 2012, http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2012/04/05/no-rhino-huntpermits-for-vietnam.
181 See Molewa Amendments Press Release, supra note 171.
182 See id.
183 See Molewa Rhino Poaching Statement, supra note 132 (if the
moratorium were to go into effect, no rhinoceros hunting would be permissible,
even if it had been permissible under the permit system. Minister Molewa has
considered recommending a moratorium as a last resort to end rhino poaching.
The minister can impose a moratorium if there is clear abuse or a complete collapse
in the permit system.); see also Merten, supra note 19 (stating that Minister Molewa
hopes to begin the moratorium soon, but that it will be a challenge and will
probably not begin any sooner than late 2012).
184 See Ban Worries Hunters, MERCURY (S. Afr.), Sept. 2, 2011, at 3.
185 Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 ch. 7 (S. Afr.), http://www.info.gov.za/
acts/2004/a10-04/.
186
Id. § 51.
179
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Africa].”187 The Minister of Environmental Management is
responsible for ensuring that the Act’s objectives are being achieved;
currently, Minister Molewa holds this position.188 The Act also
establishes the South African Nation Biodiversity Institute—the
scientific authority CITES suggests—to monitor and report on the
state of biodiversity in South Africa.189
Chapter Seven of the Act implements the permit system.190
This Chapter sets out the permit application standards, 191
requirements,192 and provides a permit cancellation process.193
Chapter Seven also creates an appeals procedure for those unhappy
with the decision of the issuing authority.194 Under this system, a
rhinoceros hunter hoping to keep the horn as a trophy needs four
separate permits: one to tranquilize the rhino, one to dehorn it, one
to transport the horn, and one to keep it.195
One of the Minister’s proposed amendments will allow the
issuing authority to postpone its decisions on a permit application if
the applicant is under investigation for a violation of the Biodiversity
Act relating specifically to rhinoceros hunting.196 Another would
create a new provision suspending an issued permit if the permit
holder is under investigation.197 These new amendments will
hopefully reduce the abuse and fraud within the permit system by

Id. § 2.
Id. §§ 1, 9, 35.
189 See id. §§ 10-12, 59-61.
190 Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 § 87.
191 Id. § 88 (stating that any person may apply, the issuing authority’s
powers, and the conditions which must be met in order to grant an applicant a
permit).
192 Id. § 90 (stating that a permit must specify its purpose, the time it will
be valid, any specified conditions, and any other matters prescribed).
193 See id. § 93 (stating the issuing authority may cancel a permit at any
time if the permit was issued under false pretenses or the permit holder failed to
comply with the permits conditions and/or any provisions of the Act, South
African law, or international law regarding the permitted activity).
194 See id. §§ 94-96.
195 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16.
196 See id.
197 See id.
187
188
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warning the issuing authorities of possible fraud and giving them the
authority to act.
Because white rhinos are considered “threatened or
protected” species, the South African Biodiversity Act requires
national protection for them.198 Therefore, the majority of the white
rhinos live in national parks. South Africa has nineteen national
parks, including the world-renowned Kruger National Park.199 Kruger
is known for its impressive size, its diversity of species, its advanced
environmental management and conservation, and its approximately
5,000 rhinoceros.200 Due to Kruger’s size—which makes going
undetected easier for poachers—and prevalence of rhinoceros, most
of the world’s white rhino poaching occurs in Kruger National
Park.201 In fact, wildlife officials have started removing signs
indicating where rhinos can be found around the park—which were
in place to aid sight-seers and safari groups hoping to spot a rhino—
to prevent poachers from using the signs to track down rhinos.202
Authorities have also proposed reinstalling an electrified fence along
the park’s border with neighboring Mozambique to physically deter
poachers from entering.203
In addition to the national parks, South Africa has state game
preserves that carry-out regional biodiversity conservation in their
specific province and provide for eco-tourism.204 These preserves are
198
199

6, 2013).

See Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 § 56.
S. AFR. NAT’L PARKS, http://sanparks.org.za/parks/ (last visited Apr.

Kruger
National
Park,
S.
AFR.
NAT’L
PARKS,
http://sanparks.org.za/parks/kruger/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
201 See Merten, supra note 19; Update on Rhino Poaching Statistics, supra note
29.
202 Kraig Becker, Signs Indicating Locations of Rhinos Being Removed from Kruger
National Park, GADLING TRAVEL BLOG (Dec. 15, 2011, 8:00 AM),
http://www.gadling.com/2011/12/15/signs-indicating-locations-of-rhinos-beingremoved-from-kruger-n/.
203 See Sheree Bega, Kruger Fence ‘Only Temporary Deterrent,’ CAPE ARGUS (S.
Afr.), Jan. 21, 2012, at 10.
204 See, e.g., EZEMVELO KZN WILDLIFE, http://www.kznwildlife.com/
index.php?/About-l-Biodiversity-Conservation-l-Ezemvelo-KZN-Wildlife.html
(last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife is a game-preserve that
manages the biodiversity conservation and eco-tourism of the provincial regions of
200
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also areas subject to poaching, although to a lesser extent.205
Additionally, poachers are increasingly targeting private game
reserves since security and anti-poaching measures have expanded in
the national parks.206 On a more positive note, South Africa’s wildlife
sanctuaries help care for injured and orphaned animals, such as the
rhino calves who are orphaned after their mothers have been
poached.207
The amendments proposed by Minister Molewa and the
actions of park and preserve officials are not the only
recommendations offered to stop white rhinoceros poaching. One
additional option to deter poaching may be preemptive government
dehorning of the rhinos.208 The South African government is
currently undertaking a rhinoceros dehorning impact study to
determine the feasibility of this option.209 Another alternative might
be to inject the horn with a parasiticide that is toxic to humans.210
This plan was proposed by the Rhino Rescue Project211 seeking a

Khahlamba-Drakensberg, Zululand, and the coastal region. The organization’s
officers work in the communities bordering protected areas to ensure that the
province’s conservation legislation is being implemented).
205 See Merten, supra note 19.
206 See id.
207 About Us, SANWILD.ORG, http://www.sanwild.org/about.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2013) (SanWild was funded by a wildlife conservation activist who
began taking in orphaned and injured animals herself while working for a game
preserve. Noticing the need for a rehabilitation center, as well as the unwillingness
of national parks, game preserves, and private game farms to help rehabilitated
animals back into the wild, the founder of SanWild purchased a large sector of
land, which has since grown, and began her own rehabilitation center and
sanctuary. SanWild rescues injured and orphaned wild animals and secures the
animals’ long-term welfare and safety).
208 See, e.g., Merten, supra note 19; Slater-Jones, supra note 16; Molewa
Rhino Poaching Statement, supra note 132.
209 See, e.g., Merten, supra note 19; Slater-Jones, supra note 16; Molewa
Rhino Poaching Statement, supra note 132.
210 See Charl Du Plessis, Poachers’ Toxic Shock, TIMES (S. Afr.), Sept . 8,
2011, http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/ 2011/09/08/rhino-poachers-toxic-shock.
211 Rhino
Rescue Project, Swaziland, ECOVOLUNTEER NETWORK,
http://greenvolunteers.com/rhino.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (the rhino rescue
project is a group of volunteers who aim to protect wildlife, particularly the white
and black rhinoceros, from poaching).
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more humane way to reduce poaching than dehorning.212 The
injected parasiticide would benefit the rhino by targeting ticks, but if
it is ingested by humans, the poison can induce nausea, vomiting, and
convulsions.213 The parasiticide is also infused with a dye that is
detectable by x-ray, enabling the injected horns to be easily identified
in airports when being illegally transported.214 This alternative, along
with micro-chipping, has been implemented on at least ten
rhinoceros so far this year; one rhinoceros died as a result of the
operation.215 Some skeptics believe these options will not deter
poaching because it is unlikely that a sufficient number of rhinos will
be caught to dehorn or inject with the dye.216
B. South African Law Enforcement
Law enforcement is the key to decreasing poaching and
conserving the white rhinoceros. Multiple law enforcement agencies
are involved, including: the police, park rangers, the justice system,
and specialized committees.

See Du Plessis, supra note 210.
See id.
214 See id.; see also Dube, supra note 67.
215 See, e.g., Geoffrey York, Anti-rhino-poaching Treatment Ends in Heartbreak
in
Africa,
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Can.),
Feb.
9,
2012,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/worldview/anti-rhino-poachingtreatment-ends-in-heartbreak-in-africa/article545097/ (reporting that Spencer, a 20
year old male rhino, died during a procedure to inject his horn with the pesticide, a
dye, a micro-chip, and a tracking device. Spencer’s heart stopped while he was still
under the anesthetic. The veterinarian performing the procedure believed the death
may have been because of Spencer’s old age and has stated that, while Spencer’s
death is tragic, he will not discontinue injecting horns with pesticide and dye);
Shaun Smillie, Horn-chipping Operation Kicks Off, STAR (S. Afr.), Feb. 9, 2012, at 3;
Sheree Bega, Poisoned Rhino Horn Plan Goes Awry, STAR (A. Afr.), Feb. 11, 2012, at 7
(reporting that Spencer’s death will not “be in vain” as veterinarians will continue
to try this practice to stop poaching. The procedure Spencer underwent went
“smoothly.” The main concern was Spencer’s age).
216 See Dube, supra note 67.
212
213
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1. South Africa’s Police Force
South Africa’s main police force is the South African Police
Service (SAPS).217 Minister Molewa considers SAPS to be at the
forefront of the fight against poaching, commenting that SAPS
continues to strengthen its biodiversity enforcement and monitoring
capacities.218 SAPS works closely with other, more specialized crime
units, such as Hawks,219 and INTERPOL’s Wildlife Crime Working
Group.220
Although SAPS officers are prohibited from commenting on
rhinoceros poaching,221 it is still apparent that SAPS is doing its job.
There are frequent press releases about police arrests of suspected
poachers and traffickers.222 Reports indicate 165 arrests of suspected
poachers in 2010, 232 arrests in 2011, 267 arrests in 2012, and 61
arrests as of March 2013; the large majority occurred in Kruger
National Park.223 Arrests at international airports also occur as
217 Vision and Mission, S. AFR. POLICE SERV., http://www.saps.gov.za/
org_profiles/vision_mission.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (SAPS responsibilities
include preventing, combating and investigating crimes, protecting inhabitants of
South Africa, upholding and enforcing the law, ensuring criminals are brought to
justice, and participating in efforts to address the causes of crime).
218 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19.
219 See id.; Slater-Jones, supra note 16 (the Hawks are a specialized
organized crime unit considered to be the leading police agency in the fight against
rhino poaching).
220 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19. The
Wildlife Crime Working Group is a part of INTERPOL focusing its expertise and
experience on the poaching, trafficking, or possession of legally protected flora and
fauna, like the white rhino. It is the international police authority for enforcing
CITES and created a practical guide explaining the operations of both INTERPOL
and CITES and making specific recommendations regarding the cooperation
between them. Environmental Crime Committee, INTERPOL http://www.interpol.int
/Crime-areas/Environmental-crime/Environmental-Crime-Committee/WildlifeCrime-Working-Group (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).
221 See Mandla Khoza & Masoka Dube, Comment on Rhino Poaching
Restricted, STAR (S. Afr.), Sept. 12, 2011, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/thestar/comment-on-rhino-poaching-restricted-1.1135346#.UUxhQIVpfC4
(SAPS
Commissioner banned all officers, provincial and regional, from commenting on
rhino poaching incidents).
222 See sources cited infra notes 224-25.
223 See Rhino Poaching Arrests Up in South Africa, UPI.COM (Mar. 22, 2012,
9:42 PM), http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2012/03/22/Rhino-poaching-
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customs officers in South Africa work closely with SAPS and the
Hawks to thwart international smuggling.224 A manager at OR Tambo
International Airport stated that airports “have a role to play in
maximizing security to prevent criminal activities in and out of the
country.”225 SAPS has even licensed private game farmers to carry
semi-automatic weapons in hopes that they will assist SAPS in
catching the rhino poachers.226 In addition, police often offer rewards
for information leading to the arrest of poachers.227 Finally, SAPS is
also working closely with the National Joints Operation (NatJoints),
which created a special committee and elevated rhino poaching to the
highest level of security management.228

arrests-up-in-South-Africa/UPI-87401332466959/; South Africa: Over 200 Alleged
Rhino Poachers Arrested, BUANEWS (Nov. 3, 2011), http://allafrica.com
/stories/201111040112.html; Update on Rhino Poaching Statistics, supra note 29;
Vietnamese Man Arrested for Illegally Possessing Rhino Horns, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
(China) (Apr. 23, 2012), http://english.cri.cn/6966/2012/04/24/3123s695120.htm
(in 2012 a Vietnamese man was found and arrested in OR International Airport
with millions of rand worth of rhino horn).
224 E.g., Press Release, Joint Statement by the SARS and Crime Line,
Another
Blow
for
Rhino
Syndicate
(Nov.
4,
2011),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201111080070.html; see also Frankfurt’s Wildlife Sniffer
Dogs Draw Interest from European Airports, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Ger.) (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.dw.de/frankfurts-wildlife-sniffer-dogs-draw-interest-from-europeanairports/a-15359372 (explaining how dogs are used to protect endangered species
from illegal international trade by sniffing out wildlife contraband in luggage at
customs. The practice started in Frankfurt, Germany, and has since expanded to
more European airports. This practice puts added pressure on smugglers engaged
in illegal international trade of endangered species. Since its inception in Germany,
the dogs have found over 250 illegally smuggled animals or animal products,
including rhinoceros horns, causing seizures by officers to increase across Europe).
225 Airports Add Weight to Fight Against Poachers, TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012, 12:23
AM), http://www.timeslive.co.za/business/2012/02/08/airports-add-weight-tofight-against-poachers.
226 See Wyndham Hartley, Semi-automatic Arms to Fight Rhino Poachers, BUS.
DAY (Sept. 23, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2011/
09/23/semi-automatic-arms-to-fight-rhino-poachers.
227 See Rhino Poaching: A R500,000 Reward Offered for Information,
BIZCOMMUNITY.COM (Feb. 13, 2012), http://m.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/
507/70706.html.
228 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19.
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2. South Africa’s National Park Rangers
The national park rangers and officers are also integral players
in law enforcement. To help combat poachers, South Africa has
increased its number of park rangers. For example, within the last
year approximately fifty-seven rangers have been added to Kruger
National Park alone.229 As recently as August 2012, South Africa
National Parks (SANParks) inaugurated 150 new rangers230 and
implemented new “hi-tech” techniques to fight poachers.231 Minister
Molewa commended the rangers’ work and innovative methods in
fighting poaching.232 In addition, a volunteer ranger organization
called “Honorary Rangers” donated millions of dollars of antipoaching equipment, including compasses, camouflage equipment,
and first-aid kits, to rangers in Kruger National Park.233 The park
rangers “risk their lives daily to protect wildlife from poachers and
traders.”234 In fact, while tracking poachers with a team of other
rangers, one ranger was mistakenly shot and killed after the group

See id.
See SANParks Step Up the Fight Against Poaching in Kruger National Park,
BIZCOMMUNITY.COM
(Aug
2,
2012),
http://www.bizcommunity.com
/Article/196/507/79467.html.
231 See Going to War For Rhinos, INDEP. ON SAT. (S. Afr.), July 28, 2012, at
7 (outlining several new “hi-tech” techniques rangers are now using to track and
catch poachers, including a rhino horn DNA database, unique dog tracking
systems, and helicopters).
232 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19.
233 See Tony Carnie, Kruger Rangers Kitted Out to Tackle Poachers, MERCURY
(S. Afr.), Nov. 15, 2011, at 5, http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/kruger-rangers-kittedout-to-tackle-poachers-1.1178315#.UUxkPIVpfC4.
234 WWF Calls for End to Rhino Poaching on World Rhino Day At Least 287
Rhinos Have Been Killed in South Africa as Crisis Escalates, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://worldwildlife.org/press-releases/wwf-calls-for-end-torhino-poaching-on-world-rhino-day (internal quotations omitted).
229
230
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split up.235 In some countries, rangers are trained to kill poachers
outright if caught.236
South African park rangers also receive special training from
the WWF on how to handle a rhinoceros if found hornless. 237 The
rangers are taught to avoid touching the animal and cordon off the
area.238 Additionally, they are taught to take a DNA sample from the
rhino to use as forensic evidence to help find the poacher.239
Recently, however, rangers have begun to strike over pay and terms
of employment, creating concern for the rhinos under their care.240

Ranger Mistaken for Poacher, CAPE ARGUS (S.Afr.), Sept. 13, 2011, at 4;
see also Gianluca Mezzofiore, Kruger Park Rhino Poaching Wars: Policeman and Ranger
Shot Dead After Radio Breakdown, INT’L BUS. TIMES NEWS, Apr. 30, 2012,
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/335022/20120430/south-africa-kruger-parkrhinos-poaching.htm (both police and rangers fighting against poaching have been
accidently shot).
236 See Sian Powell, Hunters Now the Hunted, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 30, 2011,
at
9,
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/hunters-now-thehunted/story-e6frg6z6-1226232815327 (explaining how park guards in the Indian
state of Assam “hunt” rhino poachers and shoot to kill, regardless of whether they
initiate the shooting or flee. The officers are given immunity from prosecution if
they kill a suspected poacher in protected forests, so the state’s forests have
become a “bloody battleground.” The officers believe they are simply performing
their duties and that killing poachers is entirely legal. Additionally, they feel that
they are keeping the community and tourists safe.); see also Local Rhino Poachers Shot
Dead, AGENCIA DE INFORMACAO DE MOCAMBIQUE (Mozam.), Jan. 12, 2012,
http://allafrica.com/stories/201201130328.html (recently rangers in Kruger
National Park killed two suspected poachers during a shoot-out, but this is not the
general practice in South Africa and the general manager of Kruger has stated that
he regrets the deaths).
237 See Maditla, supra note 125.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See Rhinos Threatened By SAF Ranger Strike, VOICE OF AM. (Feb. 6,
2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/ rhinos-threatened-by-saf-ranger-strike138848174/151697.html; Tony Carnie, Kruger Rangers Go On Strike, MERCURY (S.
Afr.), Feb. 2, 2012, at 3, http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/kruger-rangers-to-go-onstrike-1.1225684 (stating that while the rangers are on strike, honorary rangers,
police and the South African National Defense Force will be filling their place in
the parks).
235
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3. South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority
Another pivotal player is the National Prosecuting Authority
of South Africa (NPA), the single prosecuting authority in South
Africa.241 It is the NPA’s sole responsibility to prosecute poachers in
custody. Poachers can be charged with illegally hunting the white
rhinoceros in a national park, violating the Biodiversity Act,
possessing unlicensed fire-arms and ammunition, and illegal trade and
trafficking.242 Additionally, the NPA is receiving special training from
the WWF to inform the prosecutors on conservation matters.243 The
NPA’s understanding is important to ensure that poachers cannot
evade prosecution and to aid the justice system in determining
sentences.244 Since this training has commenced, guilty verdicts have
increased noticeably and prison sentences frequently reach up to
eight years and, in one instance, even twenty-five years.245 However,
despite the hard work of the NPA, many people feel that the
prosecution rates are too low and the cases are taking too long,
thereby failing to convey a “tough on poaching” message.246
4. South Africa’s National Anti-Poaching Committee
One final law enforcement player is the National Antipoaching Committee, which was created to improve communications
and coordination among poaching law enforcement.247 The
Committee agreed on four initial priorities to help combat rhino
poaching.248 First, the Committee wants to create a national hotline

241
242

S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 179.
See, e.g., South Africa: Over 200 Alleged Rhino Poachers Arrested, supra note

223.

See Maditla, supra note 125.
See id.
245 See id.; see also Erin Conway-Smith, South Africa: Rhino Poachers from
Mozambique Jailed for 25 Years, GLOBAL POST (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/south-africa/120201/
south-africa-rhino-poaching-mozambique-poachers-sentenced-25-years.
246 See Molewa Press Release on Poaching Scourge, supra note 19.
247 See National Anti-poaching Committee Established, MAIL & GUARDIAN (S.
Afr.), Aug. 23, 2010, http://mg.co.za/article/2010-08-23-national-antipoachingcommittee-established.
248 See id.
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for reporting rhino poaching.249 Second, the Committee plans on
coordinating intelligence from all groups involved in fighting rhino
poaching.250 Third, the Committee hopes to organize a national
fundraising campaign.251 Fourth, the Committee wants to raise
poaching awareness among the people of South Africa.252 The
Committee’s efforts are ongoing.
C. Current Vietnamese Law
While South Africa is taking great strides to comply with
CITES and to deter rhino poaching, Vietnam has a long way to go.
Recently, poaching forced Vietnam’s native rhinoceros, the Javan
rhino, into extinction.253 The WWF accuses the Vietnamese
government of failing to control poaching due to insufficient political
support for endangered species conservation.254 The WWF stated
that “significant improvements need to be made in law enforcement
and protected area management in Vietnam.”255 The WWF also
ranked Vietnam as the worst Asian or African country for wildlife
crimes, giving it a “red score” for rhinoceros and tigers.256

See id.
See id.
251 See id.
252 See National Anti-poaching Committee Established, supra note 247.
253 See Ives, supra note 70.
254 See id.
255 See id. (internal quotations omitted).
256 See Vietnam at Bottom of WWF Species-Protection Report, GUARDIAN, July
22, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/10348872; Vietnam Accused
Over Rhino Poaching, DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), July 23, 2012, at 28 (describing the
WWF’s African and Asian country ranking system reflecting progress in each
country’s protection of endangered species. The WWF ranked 23 countries, giving
them scores of green for good, yellow for moderate, and red for poor); Countries Get
Failing Grades on Illegal Wildlife Trade Enforcement, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, July 23,
2012,
http://worldwildlife.org/press-releases/countries-get-failing-grades-onillegal-wildlife-trade-enforcement-wwf-analysis (reporting that illegal wildlife trading
persists in all 23 countries, but the ranking system was designed to differentiate
between countries that are actively working to stop the trade and countries “where
current efforts are entirely inadequate”).
249
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As a comparison, China, another area of high rhino horn
trafficking,257 has made considerable efforts to decrease the
international trade in endangered species.258 Through confiscation of
weapons, tougher penalties, and awareness campaigns, China has
reduced the number of criminal cases involving trafficking of
endangered species.259 In January 2012, China’s State Forestry
Administration began a crack-down on Chinese auction houses to
ensure that they are following Chinese wildlife laws and regulations
and to emphasize that they are subject to the trade ban on
endangered species.260 Although Vietnam could benefit from
Chinese-like law enforcement efforts, Vietnam has taken steps to
raise public awareness through a campaign providing scientific
research showing the need to protect the rhino.261
In 2007, the CITES Scientific and Management Authorities
of Vietnam conducted a voluntary assessment of Vietnam’s wildlife
trade policies, both domestic and international, to identify strengths
and weaknesses.262 Vietnam recognized that it is an important

257 See Jessica Hatcher, Op-Ed., Deadly Trade: Rhino Horn Poaching Surges,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Dec. 10, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/wildlife
/8935724/Deadly-trade-rhino-horn-poaching-surges.html (commenting on China
as a main destination for poached rhino horns, which are used in traditional
Chinese medicines. The Kenya Wildlife Service has noted a correlation between the
influx in Chinese labor and poaching; there are about a million Chinese workers
now in Africa. The author went on safari with many wealthy and influential
Chinese figures—a safari meant to educate. The article is optimistic about China’s
efforts to stop the illegal trade of both rhinoceros horns and elephant tusks and the
author hopes the increase of Chinese laborers and tourists to Africa will help
spread the word about the evils of poaching).
258 See Wildlife Smuggling Becomes Rarer But Has Not Gone Extinct, CHINA
DAILY, Oct. 20, 2011.
259 See id.
260 See China Applies Trade Ban to Wildlife Auctions, INT’L FUND FOR
ANIMAL WELFARE (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.ifaw.org/africa/news/chinaapplies-trade-ban-wildlife-auctions.
261 See VN, South Africa Act on Wildlife Protection, VIET. NEWS AGENCY
(Sept. 29, 2011, 8:51 PM), http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/VN-South-Africa-acton-wildlife-protection/20119/21283.vnplus.
262 See generally CITES SCIENTIFIC AUTH. OF VIET. & CITES MGMT.
AUTH. OF VIET., REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF VIETNAM’S WILDLIFE TRADE
POLICY (2008) [hereinafter VIETNAM WILDLIFE TRADE POLICY REPORT],
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location for wildlife trade, both legal and illegal.263 Vietnam also
recognized the importance of biodiversity, which, due to degradation
and deforestation, has become a critical issue.264 Additionally,
Vietnam acknowledged its peoples’ traditional consumption of
wildlife, much of which is legal through the CITES permit program,
but which has also fueled the well documented and expanding illegal
trade market.265 As a result of this acknowledgement, after Vietnam
became a CITES member in 1994, it created a National Action Plan
aimed at promoting the sustainability of natural resources, improving
the economy, strictly controlling trade in endangered species, and
enhancing the efficiency of the agencies which control illegal wildlife
trade.266
After Vietnam joined CITES in 1994, the government passed
several decrees concerning illegal trade in endangered species; two of
which focus on international trade.267 The first, Decree No.
11/2002/ND-CP, was passed as the principal legal basis for
implementing CITES and providing training for enforcement.268
However, due to its hasty passage, the law overlapped with a
Vietnamese Customs law, creating confusion regarding the proper
procedure when species are listed under both laws and resulting in no
fines being issued for violations of illegal trading under CITES. 269
Therefore, Decree No. 82/2006/ND-CP was passed to remedy the
problems of Decree No. 11/2002/ND-CP, but it had problems of its
own.270 It failed to effectively manage punishments for violations or
craft proper disposal techniques for confiscated specimens.271

http://www.cites.org/common/prog/policy/Vietnam_wildlife_trade_policy_revie
w.pdf.
263 See id. at 1.
264 See id. at 8.
265 See id. at 10-13 (commenting that the quantity of wildlife provided for
the Vietnamese trading market is over 1 million individual animals per year).
266 See id. at 19.
267 See VIETNAM WILDLIFE TRADE POLICY REPORT, supra note 262, at
28.
268 See id. at 29.
269 See id.
270 See id. at 30-31.
271 See id.
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Overall, these actions have failed to meet Vietnam’s
conservation goals and there are still many problem areas concerning
Vietnam’s wildlife trade policy. One explanation might be Vietnam’s
attempt to address too many issues at once, making implementation
much more difficult.272 While there were training programs and
education about certain endangered species, they did not focus on the
white rhinoceros, or any rhinoceros for that matter,273 and local
citizens were provided with little guidance on endangered species.274
Furthermore, insufficient government funding has made
implementation difficult and has limited law enforcement agencies,
resulting in policies which have had very little impact on the illegal
trade of endangered species.275
Despite the ineffective implementation, Vietnam’s efforts
have had a few positive effects. For example, conservation policies
have created over 120 new special use forests, the decreased
deforestation, and decreased damage to marine ecosystems. 276
However, Vietnam can do much more to effectively manage the
illegal trade in wildlife. For example, confusion still exists because of
overlapping policies among different agencies, and loopholes in
endangered species legislation make it easy to bypass current laws. 277
So easy, in fact, that some restaurants continue selling prohibited
rhinoceros horns.278
Moreover, the rhino horn trade has historically provided jobs
and income for many of Vietnam’s poor.279 Even if the trade began
legally and has since become illegal, most traders continue to work
because it is so hard for them to find another means of income.280
Without the support and cooperation of traders, policies attempting
272

See VIETNAM WILDLIFE TRADE POLICY REPORT, supra note 262, at
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See id. at 26.
See id. at 32.
See id. at 26.
See id. at 34.
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32.
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to control the illegal trade of wildlife tend to be ineffective. The
Vietnamese wildlife trade law have not yet met the goals of CITES.281
D. Vietnamese Law Enforcement
Despite campaigns to raise awareness and the secretary of the
Vietnamese embassy in South Africa’s declaration that the rhino horn
trade is the “shame of [the] nation,”282 Vietnamese law enforcement
continues to be insufficient—a key area where it cannot afford to be
lax if it wishes to tackle the problem of rhino poaching. Vietnam’s
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment has taken notice of
the problem.283 Le Xuan Canh, the director of the Institute of
Ecology and Biological Resources, has informed the Vietnamese
government that its poaching problem is due to illegal trade in
endangered species, deforestation, and lack of wildlife protection.284
Yet, nothing seems to be happening to correct the problem.
Vietnam has reported that its law enforcement controls only five to
ten percent of the total illegal wildlife trade.285 Decree No.
139/2004/ND-CP contains provisions for punishing those involved
in the illegal trade of endangered species, making the crime a high
level offense.286 However, effective law enforcement has been
difficult because the Decree was developed primarily to combat
illegal trade in wild flora, which differs substantially from trade in
fauna because of the size and mobility of some animals.287
Additionally, law enforcement personnel have received insufficient

See id.
See Vietnam, South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horn,
supra note 60.
283 See Fewer Than 50 Tigers Still Left in the Wild, VIET. MINISTRY OF
NATURAL RES. & ENV’T (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.monre.gov.vn/v35/
default.aspx?tabid=675&CateID=58&ID=112249&Code=K5LF112249.
284 See id.
285 See VIETNAM WILDLIFE TRADE POLICY REPORT, supra note 262, at
14.
286 See id. at 58 (noting that wildlife crime is generally punishable by fine,
but that punishment varies because it is hard to calculate the fine according to
species. Some species weigh more or are more endangered than others. This creates
loopholes in the criminal law).
287 See id.
281
282
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information concerning the illegal trade and the CITES requirements,
harming implementation efforts.288
In 2010, Vietnam hosted South African representatives
involved with monitoring the rhinos and enforcing poaching laws to
discuss Vietnam’s efforts to control the illegal rhino trade.289 The goal
of the meeting was to improve collaboration between the two
nations.290 Not only is there a lack of enforcement in Vietnam, but
there is a lack of a system to enforce; there is no legal system in place
to register and track already owned horns, which allows legally
obtained horns to more easily enter the illegal trade market.291
Hopefully, the collaboration between South Africa and Vietnam will
lead to a substantial reduction of rhino poaching.
E. How Poachers Are Getting Around the Laws
Despite poaching laws and law enforcement efforts, poachers
continue to victimize rhinoceros, and the number of poachers is not
declining.292 Like other organized crime, rhino poaching and horn
trafficking has become syndicated.293 There are several known gangs
and syndicates; the more sophisticated ones use helicopters, highpowered firearms, and new technology to avoid detection while
hunting.294 The syndicates are largely foreign, but some are suspected
of working with South African citizens, even law enforcement
officers and government employees.295 Many of the syndicates shoot
See id. at 32.
See South African Delegates Visit Vietnam to Address Illegal Rhino
Horn Trade, TRAFFIC (Oct. 20, 2010) [hereinafter South African Delegates Visit
Vietnam], http://www.traffic.org/home/2010/10/20/south-african-delegates-visitviet-nam-to-address-illegal-rh.html.
290 See id.
291 See id.
292 See supra Part II.A.
293 See sources cited infra notes 295-98.
294 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16.
295 See Zanu-PF, Aliens Colluding in Poaching Syndicates, ZIM. STANDARD,
Oct. 23, 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201110240648.html; see also Tendai
Rupapa, Rhino Horn Case Takes New Twist, HERALD (Zim.), Jan. 11, 2012,
http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=311
87#.UUxujoVpfC4 (explaining how three rhino poachers suspected of murdering a
game ranger were caught with illegal rhino horns in the car of Zimbabwe’s Local
288
289
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the rhinos “legally” by abusing the permit system.296 For example, a
recent Thai syndicate was suspected of using strippers and prostitutes
posing as hunters to obtain permits to hunt white rhinos.297
Once a horn is obtained,298 the syndicates have a number of
methods they use to smuggle it to its final destination. There are
established smuggling routes, which are shared with smugglers of
other animals and changed often to avoid detection.299 The smugglers
hide the rhino horns in containers, such as large “statues” or luggage,
or ship them in bulk consignments by boat.300 More recently,
smugglers have been using the internet, selling the horns online and
mailing them disguised as art or antiques.301 In addition, smugglers
Government, Rural and Urban Development Deputy Minister. The Deputy
Minister denies involvement, saying that he sold the vehicle and has had nothing to
do with the car since).
296 See Omphitlhetse Mooki, Suspected Thai Rhino Poaching Kingpin Fights for
Bail, PRETORIA NEWS (S. Afr.), Oct. 27, 2011, at 4.
297 See id.
298 See Rhino Horn Thieves Gas Paris Museum Guards, TELEGRAPH (U.K.),
Dec. 7, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france
/8939250/Rhino-horn-thieves-gas-Paris-museum-guards.html (rhino horns are
most frequently obtained by hunting the rhino, as described throughout this
comment. However, recently, a pair of thieves stole a white rhino horn from a
hunting and nature museum in Paris, France. Zoos and museums across Europe
have been alert to possible thefts of rhino horns for some time, as this most recent
robbery is not the only one. Rhino horns were stolen from at least three other
French museums in 2011, as well as from a taxidermist in Vienna); 50 Overseas
Museums Holding Rhino Heads Have Been Burgled, CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), Jan. 31, 2012,
at 3; Rhinos Given Fake Horns, N. Z. HERALD, Dec.22,2011,
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10774696
(in response to the rhino horn thefts from museums, curators in a Swiss museum
have replaced the horns of its rhinos on display with fake horns); Michael
McCarthy, British Zoos Put on Alert Over Rising Threat of Rhino Rustlers, INDEP. (U.K.),
Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/british-zoosput-on-alert-over-rising-threat-of-rhino-rustlers-6296572.html (noting that zoos
have also been warned to prepare for potential targeting by rhino poachers and
other criminals looking to steal and sell their rhino horns on the black market).
299 See Candice Bailey & Shaun Smillie, Record Rhino Horn Haul: 33 of Them
Seized in ‘Scrap Plastic’ Shipment in Hong Kong, STAR (S. Afr.), Nov. 16, 2011, at 1,
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/record-rhino-horn-haul-1.1179722#.
UUxvzIVpfC4.
300 See id.; Wildlife in Their CITES, METRO (U.K.), Oct. 5, 2011, at 20.
301 See Smuggling of Rhino Parts Goes Online, CHANNEL NEWSASIA (China),
Sept. 5, 2011, http://wildsingaporenews.blogspot.com/2011/09/smuggling-of-
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have started making fake horns in order to mark-up the prices on real
horns.302 However, due to the increasing efforts of law enforcement
personnel, many syndicate rings have been busted sending several
high-profile smugglers to trial.303 For example, the Groenewald Gang,
started by a couple that operates a safari touring company, recently
appeared in court facing hundreds of charges under several laws.304
For the most part, law enforcement personnel are fighting on
behalf of the white rhinoceros to end poaching. Unfortunately, some
officers and park rangers are also involved in poaching, largely
because of the great monetary benefits.305 South African police,
politicians, and government officials have taken bribes from the
poaching syndicates or aided them in some other way.306 One
Vietnamese diplomat was even caught on tape making an illegal rhino
horn purchase.307 Permit issuing authorities have also been suspected
of aiding poaching by issuing questionable permits.308 Additionally,
the South African government has kept stockpiles of rhino horns,
which have been audited and are reported to be secretly held in safe
keeping.309 However, the Minister Molewa’s Department’s booklet
entitled “National Strategy for the Safety and Security of Rhinoceros
rhino-parts-goes-online.html; Tony Carnie, Rhino Horn ‘For Sale’ Online as Prices Soar:
Website Advertises Illegally Amid Spike in Poaching, PRETORIA NEWS (S. Afr.), Feb. 21,
2012, at 3.
302 See Tony Carnie, Fake Rhino Horn Pushes Up Price of the Real Thing, CAPE
TIMES (S. Afr.), July 27, 2012, at 10.
303 See Sheree Bega, Trial Delay is a Danger to Wildlife Say Activists, STAR (S.
Afr.), Oct. 1, 2011, at 4 (commenting on the trial of suspected rhino horn poaching
syndicate Dawie Groenewald and the rest of his gang, called the “Mafia of
Musina”); Mooki, supra note 296 (commenting on the denial of bail by a South
African judge for a Thai kingpin, who used strippers and prostitutes posing as
hunters to gain hunting permits so he could shoot rhinoceros legally. He was
denied bail because he was deemed a flight risk).
304 See Crucial Rhino Poaching Case Delayed Again, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
(Apr.
25,
2012),
http://www.wwf.org.uk/what_we_do/press_centre/
?unewsid=5924.
305 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16.
306 See id.
307 See South African Delegates Visit Vietnam, supra note 289.
308 See Yolandi Groenewald, Wildlife Officials’ Link to Hunting, MAIL &
GUARDIAN (S. Afr.), Oct. 21, 2011, http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-21-wildlifeofficials-link-to-hunting.
309 See Merten, supra note 19.
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Populations in South Africa” says these stockpiles may be depleting
as well, implying that some officials are stealing and selling the
horns.310
So many park rangers and game preserve employees have
been involved in poaching that South Africans have coined the
involvement “khaki-colored crime.”311 All levels of rangers have been
implicated, many have been arrested,312 and some have been
criminally charged.313 Additionally, veterinarians have been implicated
in aiding the poaching syndicates by providing them with
immobilizing drugs only available to vets.314 In one notable instance,
a South African court convicted a veterinarian of aiding rhino
poaching.315 However, instead of a court sentence, the South African
Veterinary Council sentenced the vet to six months suspension and a
fine.316 This “puny” sentence caused an outcry in the environmental
conservation community.317 Those responsible for protecting the
See id.
See Melanie Gosling, Rhino Poaching’s Inside Job, MERCURY (S. Afr.),
Dec. 14, 2011, at 5.
312 See, e.g., South African Game Park Officials Arrested for Rhino Poaching,
BNO NEWS (S. Afr.), Feb. 29, 2012 (reporting that four parks officials, including
one ranger and two traffic cops, were arrested under suspicion of involvement in
poaching activities); Colleen Dardagan, Ranger Awaits Trial Behind Bars, MERCURY
(S. Afr.), July 24, 2012, at 3, http://www.iol.co.za/mercury/ranger-awaits-trialbehind-bars-1.1348162 (reporting that three rangers suspected of being involved in
rhino poaching activities were caught in a trap laid by other park rangers).
313 See Comins, supra note 35 (reporting on park staff, rangers, and senior
officials’ involvement in rhino poaching and the current investigations concerning
that involvement, as well as recent criminal charges brought against two rangers);
Sydney Masinga, Top Park Official Accused of Poaching, MAIL & GUARDIAN (S. Afr.),
Sept. 10, 2010, http://mg.co.za/article/2010-09-10-top-parks-official-accused-ofpoaching (reporting on the accusation of two senior national park officials’
involvement in rhino poaching).
314 See Gosling, supra note 311; Fiona Macleod, Vets Charged for Illegal Use
of Tranquilizers, MAIL & GUARDIAN (S. Afr.), Mar. 2, 2012,
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-03-02-vets-charged-for-illegal-use-of-tranquillisers
(reporting that three veterinarians appeared in court relating to charges of illegal use
of M99, a drug commonly used by poachers).
315 Shaun Smillie, Outrage Over Vet’s ‘Puny’ Sentence, STAR (S. Afr.), Feb. 9,
2012, at 6, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/gauteng/outrage-over-vet-spuny-sentence-1.1230448.
316 See id.
317 See id.
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white rhino often help the poachers instead, making the fight against
poaching even more difficult.
F. The Response
Clearly rhinoceros poaching is a problem. Unfortunately, the
problem only seems to be growing. While South Africa is taking great
strides to fight the poachers and curb the supply, the demand in
countries is soaring; and Vietnam, for one, is doing little to control
it.318 If the demand is great and prices for rhinoceros horns are high,
the poaching problem will only persist. Additionally, a major
roadblock in the fight to stop poaching is the involvement of people
“on the inside.”319 Fortunately, South Africa and Vietnam have begun
to take steps to work together to address the problem, as has the
larger international community.
To put an end to poaching, South Africa must first tackle its
“khaki-colored crime” problem and suppress insider assistance to
poaching syndicates. The specialized South African police force,
known as the Hawks, has commented that they will continue to hunt
those insiders despite the challenges of being repeatedly “stymied” by
them.320 Additionally, retired park rangers, who are viewed as
independent from their former parks and therefore less corruptible,
are helping law enforcement officials generate new and effective ways
to defeat poachers.321 Park officials have also encouraged bordering
communities to help arrest poachers.322 Minister Molewa has also
discussed cross-border law enforcement between SAPS and their
counter-part in Mozambique.323

See supra Part IV.B & D.
See supra Part IV.E.
320 See Slater-Jones, supra note 16.
321 See Lyse Comins, Conservation Veterans Enter the Fray: Former Rangers to
Tackle Poaching, Advise Officials, INDEP. ON SAT. (S. Afr.), Nov. 19, 2011 at 5.
322 See Locals Help Kruger Park Catch Poachers, STAR (S. Afr.), Apr. 25, 2012,
at
13,
http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/locals-help-kruger-park-catch-poachers1.1283200#.UUx3YIVpfC4 (explaining how members of Matsulu, a community
that borders the south-west area of Kruger Park, helped officials arrest a suspected
rhinoceros poacher).
323 See John Yeld, Global Boost in Rhino-Poaching Battle SMS the Argus: China,
Vietnam Set to Sign Agreements, CAPE ARGUS (S. Afr.), Jan. 17, 2012, at 6.
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In response to the alarming number of rhinoceros poached in
2012, Minister Molewa called all of South Africa to action.324 The
Minister stated: “It is clear that this is an organized crime of the
highest degree . . . [and] we need inputs and actions from all South
Africans.”325 The minister called on rhino anti-poaching organizations
for input, plans to add 150 more park rangers to the existing 500 in
Kruger National Park, aims to deploy conservation specialists at key
places of entry for poachers, especially sea ports and airports, and
intends to continue working closely with Vietnam.326
South Africa is also taking steps to curb the demand for
rhinoceros horn in Vietnam. In September 2011, South Africa hosted
Vietnamese delegates to address the growing demand for rhino
horns, and the parties drafted a memorandum of understanding
(MoU) to work together to prevent rhino poaching and preserve this
endangered species.327 The MoU seeks to disrupt the rhino horn trade
through cooperation between Asian and African governments and
cooperation among law enforcement during investigations, among
prosecutors during trials, and among supervisors during legal
hunting.328 The delegates are CITES members, including Vietnam’s
Deputy Director of the General Department of Forestry, Ha Cong
Tuan, and South Africa’s Deputy Director of biodiversity and natural
conservation, Fundisile Mketeni.329 The delegates praised Vietnam’s
participation, acknowledging the importance of Vietnam’s
cooperation and effective implementation of CITES in order to win
this fight.330
This 2010 meeting, arranged by IUCN331 and

See Shaun Smillie, ‘YOU Are Needed to Join Fight Against Rhino Poachers’:
Minister Calls on All South Africans to Help in Stopping the Slaughter of Endangered Species,
STAR (S. Afr.), Jan. 16, 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/you-are-needed-tojoin-fight-against-rhino-poachers-1.1213120.
325 See id.
326 See id.
327 See WWF Calls for End to Rhino Poaching, supra note 58; see also Vietnam,
South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horn, supra note 60; Yeld, supra
note 323.
328 See WWF Calls for End to Rhino Poaching, supra note 58; see also Vietnam,
South Africa Sign MOU on Anti-Smuggling of Rhino Horn, supra note 60; Yeld, supra
note 323.
329 See VN, South Africa Act on Wildlife Protection, supra note 261.
330 See id.
324
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TRAFFIC,332 inspired South Africa and Vietnam to meet once again
in 2012.333
On August 17, 2012, Deputy International Relations and
Cooperation Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim and Vietnam’s Deputy
Foreign Affairs Minister Le Luong Minh held a second meeting in
South Africa concerning the MoU.334 The delegates expressed great
331 IUCN, http://www.iucn.org/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) (IUCN is a
global network which provides frameworks for planning, implementing,
monitoring, and evaluating conservation work done by its members. Every four
years, IUCN drafts new programs that provide members with an analysis report on
the current state of biodiversity. IUCN’s key priorities are conserving biodiversity,
climate change, sustainable energy, human well-being, and a green economy).
332 Wildlife Trade News, TRAFFIC.ORG, http://www.traffic.org/ (last visited
Apr. 6, 2013) (TRAFFIC’s mission is to “ensure that trade in wild plants and
animals is not a threat to the conservation of nature.” The organization partners
with the WWF and the IUCN, was established in 1976, and works in over 100
countries worldwide. TRAFFIC also works closely with the Secretariat of CITES.
TRAFFIC has a five part program for ensuring conservation of species: (1) The
Setting—the program looks at wildlife trade and how it fits in with wider
environmental concerns, people, and the economy; (2) The Strategy—the program
is built around changing attitudes and behaviors by working with governments and
providing incentives to implement and enforce more effective policies and
legislation; (3) The Results—TRAFFIC tracks results in five key areas: early
warnings, flagship species in trade (like the white rhino), resource security and
wildlife trade, wildlife trade routes, and rapid response and innovation; (4) The
Core Competencies—TRAFFIC uses its expertise, in research, analysis, proposing
solutions, advocacy and awareness, and supporting remedial action to carry out its
mission; and (5) The Partnerships—drawing upon the expertise of its partnerships
with WWF and IUCN, helps TRAFFIC to deliver more effective conservation
action plans.); see also Sheree Bega, Rhino Report Gives Some Hope, STAR S. Afr.), Aug.
25, 2012, at 8 (reporting on TRAFFIC’s rhino and elephant program leader Tom
Milliken’s new report “The South Africa-Vietnam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A
Deadly Combination of Institutional Lapses, Corrupt Wildlife Industry
Professionals and Asian Crime Syndicates.” Milliken worked on compiling the
report over a three year period. The report documents corrupt South African
wildlife and government officials. Milliken’s own eye-witness reports on
Vietnamese usage of rhino horns, Vietnam’s denial over their role in the trade,
growing arrest rates, increased awareness, and trafficking).
333 See WWF Calls for End to Rhino Poaching, supra note 58.
334 See SA, Vietnam Discussing Poaching, S. AFR. PRESS ASS’N, Aug. 17,
2012; Sue Blaine, SA Set to Sign Deal with Vietnam on Rhino, BUS. DAY (S. Afr.), Aug.
20, 2012, http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/science/2012/08/20/sa-set-to-signdeal-with-vietnam-on-rhino.
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concern over the poaching problem and sought to strengthen their
cooperation in the field of bio-diversity conservation and protection
through further bilateral agreements.335 They also discussed finalizing
the MoU, the scope of which will include provisions on bio-diversity
management, law enforcement, CITES compliance.336 The MoU
would also require Vietnamese efforts to increase public awareness of
the problem by providing education about legal rhino hunting in
Vietnam.337
On December 10, 2012, the MoU was officially signed by
Minister Molewa and H.E. Cao Duc Phat, Vietnam’s Minister of
Agriculture and Rural Development.338 At the signing ceremony,
Minister Molewa stated that “South Africa is looking forward to
receiving the close cooperation from Vietnamese partners to stop the
illegal trade of rhino horns.”339 Agreeing, Minister Cao Duc Phat
stated that the fight “against crime on wildlife regulations especially
on the rare, precious and endangered species including rhinos . . . are
always of concern to the Vietnam government . . . . The Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development . . . are [sic] submitting the Prime
Minister to issue a Decision on banning the import of all rhino
specimens to Vietnam.”340 Although the MoU is written in general
terms, it indicates that rhino horn trafficking will be at the top of the
policy agenda for the two nations.341
The epidemic of rhino poaching is a global concern not only
limited to South Africa and Vietnam. An international effort will be
required to address the problem; and many countries will have to
become involved. Kenyan citizens have created an on-line petition to
See SA, Vietnam Discussing Poaching, supra note 334; SA-Vietnam
Relations Bolstered at Forum, S. AFR. GOV’T NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://oldsanews.gcis.gov.za/rss/12/12081715051001.
336 See SA-Vietnam Relations Bolstered at Forum, supra note 335; Blaine, supra
note 334.
337 See SA-Vietnam Relations Bolstered at Forum, supra note 335; Blaine, supra
note 334.
338 See Signing of MoU Between SA and Vietnam to Help Tackle Conservation
Efforts, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.wwf.org.za/
?7360/MoU-between-SA-and-Vietnam.
339 Id.
340 Id.
341 See id.
335
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compel the Chinese government to act against the poaching and
trafficking of rhino horns.342 Five other African Countries—
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia, Angola, and Namibia—have legalized
the sale of rhinoceros horn powder in pharmacies, hoping to reduce
the profitability of the illegal trade.343 The Australian government has
suggested using microdots, originally used to track stolen vehicles, to
track rhino horns and poachers.344 Activists in India have tried to
enlist the help of reformed poachers to inform on their former
gangs.345
The United Kingdom, a leading member of CITES, has been
working to unite the international community and debunk the myth
of rhino horns’ medicinal effects, to create public awareness of the
poaching crisis, and to encourage the sharing of intelligence and
policing tactics.346 In January 2012, the U.K.’s Department for
Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs invested over one million
pounds in a wide range of projects to protect endangered species,
including the white rhinoceros.347 The U.K. government is committed
to being a pioneer in, and an example of, international
conservation.348

See Kenya: New Campaign to Stop Rhino Poaching in Country, NAIROBI
STAR (Kenya), Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-44702/newcampaign-stop-rhino-poaching-kenya.
343 See Bill Corcoran, Decision of Five African States to Sell Rhino Horn
Criticized, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 31, 2012, at 11, http://irishtimes.
newspaperdirect.com/screenprint/viewer.aspx.
344 See Microdots Could Help Combat Poaching, INDO-ASIAN NEWS SERV.
(India), Oct. 14, 2011, http://newshopper.sulekha.com/microdots-could-helpcombat-poaching_news_1357565.htm.
345 See Powell, supra note 236.
346 See UK Secures International Agreement to Combat Illegal Rhino Trade, supra
note 20.
347 See PS1.3 Million Government Pledge to Protect Our Most Endangered Species,
EUR. UNION NEWS, Jan. 11, 2012.
348 See id. The U.K. has the support of Prince Charles, president of the
WWF in the U.K. and an avid activist for wildlife conservation, as well as his son
William, Duke of Cambridge. See James Edgar, Charles Spots Endangered Rhino, PRESS
ASS’N (S. Afr.), Nov. 4, 2011; Ross Lydall, William: We Must End Killing or Our
Children Will Not See These Animals, EVENING STANDARD (U.K.), June 19, 2012, at
13. The Prince recently spotted a rhino in his travels to South Africa and saw
342
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Finally, the United States, in conjunction with several other
countries, has started a partnership called the Trans-Pacific
Partnership to address environmental challenges, such as illegal trade
in wildlife like the white rhino.349 In May 2012, the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the poaching
problem in Africa, hearing from wildlife experts and organizations
including the WWF and TRAFFIC.350 Senator John Kerry, Chairman
of the Committee, stated that “[p]oaching is not just a security
threat . . . [i]t’s also a menace . . . thriv[ing] where government is
weakest. Poachers . . . are a danger to . . . rangers and civilians as well
as the animals they target.”351 U.S. Federal Agents have also actively
reduced the rhino horn trade in the U.S.352 in cooperation with South
African wildlife authorities.353 In an unprecedented event on illegal
wildlife trafficking held on November 8, 2012, U.S. Secretary of State
exactly how rhinoceros are being protected from poachers by the South African
government. See Edgar, supra.
349 See US Trade Representative Green Paper on Conservation and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership, US FED NEWS, Dec. 5, 2011 (the U.S. is currently in negotiations with
Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam,
who are all members of CITES. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) aims to
advance the countries’ common interests in enhancing trade and economic growth
by coordinating responses to illegal trade in wild flora and fauna. The U.S.
specifically chose countries to participate in TPP that are integral to such illegal
trade and whose economies depend on such trade. The TPP’s aims are
conservation and protection of biodiversity. The U.S., through TPP, has made
several proposals, such as prompt reporting and information sharing, mechanisms
for cooperation among law enforcement, more partnerships with other similarly
oriented organizations, greater restrictions of trade in wildlife, and stricter following
of implementations under CITES).
350 See WWF Statement on Senate Hearing on African Poaching Crisis, STATE
NEWS SERV., May 24, 2012, http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/
5/prweb9543974.htm (“[W]ildlife crimes need[] to be treated with the same
seriousness and level of attention that we give other transnational organized
crimes”).
351 See id.
352 See Lee Rondganger, Operation Crash Crushes Rhino Horn Ring: US Agents
Arrest Seven, Including an Antiques Expert, STAR (S. Afr.), Feb. 24, 2012, at 11,
http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/rhino-horn-breakthrough-1.1242087#.UU
yCWIVpe0c (reporting that Operation Crash, an 18 month investigation, lead to
the arrest of at least seven people involved in the illegal trade of rhinoceros horns);
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Env’t & Natural Res. Div., Federal Officials Announce Nationwide
Crackdown on Black Market Rhino Trade, US FED NEWS, Feb. 23, 2012.
353 See Rondganger, supra note 352.
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Hillary Clinton also recognized the problem, stating that “wildlife
trafficking has serious implications for the security and prosperity of
people around the world.”354
The United Nations has also taken an interest, calling for its
member nations to “step-up” and combat the illegal rhino trade.355
Working together on an international level will be the best way, and
maybe the only way, to end the illegal trade of white rhinoceros
horns.
CONCLUSION
There is still more to be done to combat rhinoceros poaching
and the illegal trade in rhino horns. People around the world are
campaigning,356 protesting,357 and petitioning358 their governments to
pay more attention to poaching and to work to stop it. Conservation
354 See Secretary of State Clinton Calls for End to Illegal Wildlife Trafficking,
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND (Nov. 8, 2012), http://worldwildlife.org/stories/
secretary-of-state-clinton-calls-for-end-to-illegal-wildlife-trafficking.
355 See Head of UN-Backed Convention Urges Greater Effort to Combat Illegal
Rhino Trade, supra note 127.
356 See Kenya: New Campaign to Stop Rhino Poaching in Country, supra note
342.
357 See Maregele, supra note 28 (describing the scene outside South
Africa’s Parliament on National Rhino Day: protestors drew a chalk outline of a
rhino horn and splattered the pavement with red paint. In protest of the South
African government’s lax on anti-poaching enforcement. Signs were seen saying
“will your children get to see a rhino?” and protestors were chanting “no bail,
straight to jail.” The protestors hope the government will take harsher actions
against poachers and greater strides to protect the endangered species).
358 See Edward West, Zuma to Get Ultimatum to End Rhino Poaching, BUS.
DAY (S. Afr.), Dec. 29, 2011, http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2011/12/29/zumato-get-ultimatum-to-end-rhino-poaching;jsessionid=A13531D3681882AB56345432
A5D5FF96.present2.bdfm (animal conservationists have put together a “Rhino
Ultimatum” to present to South African President Zuma and several other South
African government officials to urge greater government action against poachers.
The ultimatum will call for new laws on sales of state-owned rhinoceros, a census
of the rhinoceros population, a moratorium on rhino-hunting trophy permits, a lift
of the media “gag” so officers can comment on the situation to the media, to
engage more actively with demand countries like Vietnam, and to exhibit greater
compliance with CITES. The petition already has over 7,000 signatures and hopes
to get upwards of 250,000).
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groups have created plans to stop poaching.359 However, poaching
will continue despite South African efforts to curb supply as long as
the demand in Asian countries like Vietnam remains. Therefore, it is
of the utmost importance to educate people that rhinoceros horns do
not cure cancer and other ailments. Unfortunately, convincing the
Vietnamese citizens may be easier said than done. If they abandon
this myth, the demand for rhino horns will fall off drastically, thereby
eliminating the poachers’ financial incentives.
Additionally, a continued international effort against poaching
will be important. Cooperation and shared intelligence will make
breaking trade routes and law enforcement efforts easier, placing
more pressure on poachers and traffickers themselves. Eventually,
poaching risks will begin to outweigh the benefits. This will be
especially true if nations increase statutory penalties for illegal
poaching and trading of rhinoceros horn.
Finally, it is important for each country, individually, to
continue efforts to stop rhino poaching and trading. While South
Africa has taken great strides, there is still more that it can do,
including cracking down on so called “khaki-colored” crimes. More
importantly, Vietnam, which has slowly begun to take action, must
implement and enforce a stricter regulatory system. With these
recommendations, as well as continued education and support from
activists around the world, the white rhinos can grow and flourish for
future generations instead of ending up like the Javan and Black
rhino—extinct. One can only hope.

359 See, e.g., Tony Carnie, Legal Rhino Horn Sales Plan Mooted, STAR (S. Afr.),
July 13, 2012, at 5, http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/legal-rhino-horn-sales-planmooted-1.1340555#.UUyFR4VpfC4 (one conservation group proposed a plan to
sell horns legally directly to Asian pharmaceutical companies and to use the money
to fund rhinoceros protection); Rhino Summit in Nairobi Develops Action Plan,
ETURBO NEWS (Uganda), Apr. 7, 2012, http://www.eturbonews.com/
28680/rhino-summit-nairobi-develops-action-plan (conservation group African
Wildlife Foundation met with wildlife authorities, private rhino reserve owners, and
other conservation groups to outline an action plan. The plan consisted mainly of
expanding support for surveillance to officials and lobbying for amendments to
change financial penalties and prison terms).
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